

# THE REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW

NO. 4.—OCTOBER, 1884.

## I.

### FIRST PRINCIPLES: OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THINGS.

REV. THEODORE APPEL, D. D., LANCASTER, PA.

#### PREFACE.

1. Wir betrachten den Menschen als Schlusspunkt einer unendlichen Vergangenheit der Natur (*Entwickelungs-Geschichte der Erde, geologische Anthropologie*);
2. Als Mittelpunkt einer unendlichen Gegenwart (*Organische Epoche der Erde, physiologische Anthropologie*);
3. Als Anfangspunkt einer unendlichen Zukunft (*Geistige Offenbarung in einem Jeden, psychologische Anthropologie*).

—STEFFENS.

Es soll behauptet werden dass mit dem Leibe zugleich die Seele geschaffen worden dass Bildung des Leibes, Entstehung der Seele und Einhauch des Geistes als hauptsächlich gleichzeitige Momente Eines Schöpfungsaktes sind. —J. P. LANGE.

Alle geschöpfliche Wesen sind wesentlich gewordene Gottesgedanken, aus dem idealen Sein in wirkliches Dasein gesetzt und darin erhalten, durch das göttliche Machtwort, *önu*, welches die Fassung des auf die Welt bezüglichen göttlichen Willen, und das Mittel der schaffenden und erhaltenden Thätigkeit Gottes durch seinen Logos ist. —DELITZSCH.

#### GENESIS.

*Evolution.*—A year ago we prepared an article for this periodical on the First Principles of Things, whilst the burning sun of July was upon us. Our object was to make some contribution to the solution of a problem which has exercised the thoughts of men in one form or another from the earliest ages, and especially so in this nineteenth century of ours, when more than ever before it has been suffering violence, and the violent are seeking to take it by force. The problem was this: Given this universe of ours, in which we bear no small amount of responsibility, it is required to find the radix of the sum total of

things of which we form a part; or, in the language of mathematics, to extract the root of the cosmos as a given quantity, large enough, certainly to appal us by its magnitude. This is Evolution, in the proper sense of the term, although not exactly thus understood by many who are daily using it. The conclusions we arrived at, not without much study and reflection, were just the converse of those advocated by many scientific men at the present day. Modern evolutionists believe that they have found the root of things in one or more simple substances, which they are pleased to call protoplasm, out of which all things, including man himself, have grown, by a natural course of development. We examined the region in which protoplasm is found as carefully as we could, and went even beyond it into the region of atoms, but nowhere we could find the energy that possessed sufficient potential power to unfold itself into a world; or, to speak again in mathematical language, the *exponent* of such a root as was at all adequate to bring about the desired result. It was a vicious solution that had to bring in at each step adventitious aid and make-shifts, or unknown factors, so as to keep up the appearance of legitimate reasoning and to silence the demand for the missing links. In our dissertation we were, therefore, compelled to look deeper *down* into the universe than the evolutionist allows himself to do, or perhaps more correctly, *into* the universe for its animating principle. Such an energizing principle we found in the idea of humanity, not as an abstraction or a subjective thought of the mind, but as an objective reality, an entity or thing, a real substance or power, a living generality in which a real unity generates multiplicity with a true nature or being, and having in itself the force of law; or, in a word, as the most comprehensive thought which God posited first and foremost in creation, as the prolific source of all other germs.

The subject of our last summer's essay on First Principles we named the "Science of Things," because it was a case in which it was necessary to resort to analysis, and to employ what is called the inductive method of reasoning. We looked at the subject for the most part as a question of evolution, an un-

wrapping or unfolding, with the view of getting at the central thought or idea of the matter in hand; but space did not allow us to proceed any further, and so the article was left incomplete.

*Involution.*—Justice requires that the problem which has thus far been under consideration should be reversed, and that some effort should be made to solve it by involution. A school-boy knows that if he succeeds in extracting the cube or any higher root of a quantity, it will go far to assure him that he has found the true answer to the question, if he reverses the problem and by involution shows that the cube or some higher power of the root gives him the number or quantity with which he started out. And so it is here. We may be reasonably sure that our process of evolution or unfolding is correct; that man is the radix of creation, but it will give us material aid in confirmation of our work and in strengthening our faith, if it can be made to appear that we can arrive at the same conclusion by the deductive method of reasoning—or, in the language of school-boys, that the work can be proved. This is the task which we have taken upon us in this paper under another summer's sun, whilst nature all around us is alive in its rich profusion—encouraged thereunto by our learned friends, the editors of this quarterly. As we look at it, our investigations may lead us into some dark and hidden recesses of nature, into ghostly caves or delightful grottoes, ravines or umbrageous retreats; but these we can explore with perhaps just as much ardor and success during the summer's heat as at any other time, if urged on by the desire to make some contribution to the general stock of human wisdom. We may hope that we will get up into some mountain heights also in our excursions.

*Man's Primacy.*—We propose here to present a few considerations that will help to show, by the inverse order referred to, that the universe grew out of man by a rational process, and that man in no rational sense is the product of nature. Our thesis requires us here to use for the most part deductive reasoning, and to consider First Principles in the light of a genesis or

synthesis. We name the article the "Philosophy of Things" as the counterpart of our previous effort. For this we ask the charitable indulgence of our readers, if it should sound somewhat startling, merely reminding them that the term philosophy according to its etymology is the most modest term that could be used.

*Man a Unity.*—But before we advance any further in the work of synthesis we find ourselves suddenly arrested by another question in analysis, quite as formidable as those which we have left behind us. Having once convinced ourselves that we have found the germ of creation in humanity, we discover that we are on the border-land of another creation of wider extent than that which we have just traversed. Man is a universe in himself of infinite complexity, and extending much farther out than the worlds beneath him. Here with infinite variety there ought also to be unity, organic and genetic, and much more so, if possible, than anywhere else. Accordingly, we are confronted with another question in evolution before we can advance any further. If man is a unity, it is necessary that we should ascertain the principle of this unity, so that we may form a better idea of that diversity which grows out of it. Thus mountains rise up before us, and they must be scaled. It is only as we reach their summit, that we can gain a comprehensive view of man himself, or of that outlying region of nature which is involved in him as its parental source. To this we must now address ourselves, and the report which we will have to give must necessarily be much briefer than its importance deserves.

*Dichotomy.*—Man is two-fold in his nature, as all authorities must admit, in general terms. He consists of body and soul, and the question arises whether they have anything in common, or are to be regarded as distinct, or different substances, held together for a while much in the same manner as the Arab clings to his tent or the Eskimo lives in his seal-skins. The latter view has been largely predominant among heathen philosophers in past ages. But it has gained ground largely among Chris-

tian writers. It predominates also in much of our thinking and feeling. With us it is probably due in a large degree to the idea that it is a part of our religion and is the teaching of the Bible.

One of the most respectable illustrations of this is found in the case of Dr. Franz Delitzsch, a judicious and truly able theologian, the bearer of numerous honorable titles, whose writings cannot be read without profit and edification. In his *Biblische Psychologie*, a work of decided ability, he is quite sure that man had a body before he had a soul, in opposition to V. Rudloff and others, who maintain just the converse. He takes his stand on Gen. 2: 7, and with all the courage and persistence of Luther himself asserts that it teaches successive acts of creation, beginning with the human body. In his zeal for God's Word, he administers Dr. Lange, the great commentator, a characteristic Lutheran reproof, by replying with a downright "It is written!" The position that the body is in any sense the soul's own formation he pronounces without hesitation "contrary to Scripture." He tries to be here biblical as consistency requires him to be in writing a Biblical Psychology, but he is biblical only in a one-sided sense. The description of the formation of man in this passage (Gen. 2: 7) is very beautiful indeed. It describes first the body, because it *appeared* first; and then as it began to heave with life, and lastly as it became radiant with light and intelligence. This is indeed a picture, and one that becomes complete when God is represented as breathing into the nostrils of man the breath or spirit of life. The order is the historical one, where the events that first unfold themselves are first described; and then those that succeed, just as the successive parts of creation in the first chapter of Genesis are described in the order in which they made their appearance to the eye. Here the natural comes out first and then the spiritual. But the rational or logical order of things, where effects follow their causes, is just the converse of this, and with all respect to Dr. Delitzsch, we say this is biblical also, and something that is much needed to make his view of the matter fully and roundly biblical. It

comes out not so much in the historical parts of the Bible as in the latter portions, where the religious consciousness differentiates itself more fully into the rational and intellectual. Thus the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews says that "the things that are seen were not made of things that do appear," which manifestly implies that they were all made of things that do not appear. With this writer, whoever he was, if he had been called on to write out all the momenta, the order would have been: first, the Spirit or breath of God, and then in regular succession, the spirit, the soul, and, lastly, the body of man, down to his home in nature.

*Dr. Delitzsch.*—But now let us see how Dr. Delitzsch gets his first human body, since he denies that the *ψυχή* or soul had anything to do with its formation, and affirms that it was finished and furnished ready beforehand for the soul to enter and inhabit. He is careful, it is true, to avoid the grosser conception, "that God formed a clod of earth with His hands into a human form, and standing near it, breathed into it from without, the breath of life;" but now let us see what he substitutes in its place: "The being of man begins with the earthly basis of his existence, in order that he may not forget that he is the man of the earth (Ps. 10: 18)." "The body of man," he says, "is formed from the earth, and indeed, from the most composite of the elementary forms, in accordance with the delicacy of its organization; and therefore, out of the finest portions of the earthly material; and, what is not less worthy of note, out of moist red earth: the earth was red, for red on white is the normal color of man, the fundamental color of beauty (Cant. 5: 10), according to the unexceptionable testimony of the ancients. The earth was watered, because man was to be a microcosm, an image and copy of the cosmos, baptized and drawn from the waters; as also actually the elementary conditions of the human body are united with such a mass of water, that the quantity of water in the human body amounts to more than three-quarters of its entire weight." This is the kind of romancing which we get

when theologians, even of the most respectable class, attempt to become scientific men and to explain scientific facts. We doubt whether Dr. Delitzsch is an evolutionist, but we must remark that if his view of the rise of the human body is correct, the evolutionists will here have one of the very strongest arguments in favor of their theory. We cannot agree for a moment with Dr. Delitzsch that man is either "copy or image of the cosmos." We maintain just the converse. Nature rather as a whole is a reflection of man, dark and obscure in places, but everywhere exhibiting in bolder or fainter lines the lineaments of his image. This is also true even of its separate parts. Each in its own way, when attentively studied, bears the impress of the general plan of creation, and illustrates, if not the whole, at least some part of it, as this becomes real and concrete in man. As a genial writer has well observed, nature resembles a broken mirror in which all the fragments scattered about continue to reflect in dissevered parts the august form of man, for whose special use it had been made by skill divine. The law of continuity in nature has been established on an impregnable basis, and science has shown that all parts of nature, including man, are vitally connected. Evolutionists themselves, in fact, have helped to bring this about, and it is a valuable service which they have rendered to science. And theologians generally, as many now do, must allow this law to stand in their expositions of creation. It will simply no longer do for them to treat of man as made up of different parts, put together much as the parts of a machine are put into their places. He is of all other creatures a unity, the outgrowth of one single central power.

NOTE.—It is not a little remarkable that the hypothesis of evolution which has sprung up quite recently, and is now so popular in this country and England, has in fact its origin in Germany. There its germs lay concealed for a long time in much of the reigning thought, and more particularly in the Schellingian philosophy, until they found a congenial soil in the minds of practical Englishmen and Americans, where

they have found a wonderfully rapid development. "I suppose," says Professor Francis Bowen of Harvard College, "that even the Darwinian hypothesis of the origin of Species and Pangenesis may be traced directly to Schelling's Philosophy of the Absolute. See his "Modern Philosophy," an able work, under the article "Schelling." The Germans do not like one-sidedness and profess their strong preference for being many-sided. But they are probably just as one-sided, as the rest of us imperfect creatures. Kant was certainly one-sided, and so by his rationalism his system called forth in the way of protest the mystical school of Jacobi and the idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, all of whom we can now see were one-sided, the last mentioned just as much so as the rest in the philosophic succession in the fatherland. But Schopenhauer certainly exceeds them all in this respect.

*Materialism.*—The supposition that the body is in any sense the centre or source of man's activities is untenable. It is materialism of the worst kind, and asks of us a larger amount of credulity than even false systems of religion. Mr. David Hartley, an English physician of the last century, a professed follower of Mr. Locke, attempted to explain all our intellectual and moral phenonema as the result of the vibrations of our nerves and the action of the brain, and his followers went beyond him, and flatly denied that we have any thinking principle or soul distinct from our bodies. But Mr. Hartley never succeeded in explaining the phenomena of thought or consciousness by physiological principles, and his followers of the present day who are still working at the same problem, rolling the stone up the hill and then compelled to see it rolled down again, have made little or no progress beyond that of their teacher, more than a century ago. The simplest illustration of the folly of this kind of evolution ought to show its futility once and forever. Take the instance of sound. We know all about its physiology. The sound-current enters the outer ear, strikes the tympanum, which is thrown into corresponding vibrations, that are conveyed by certain small bones to the inner ear

through another membrane. Once in the bony interior, where a fluid increases their intensity, they come in contact with certain nerves, and are thus conveyed to the brain. Then we get the sensation of sound; but how the vibrations produce the sense of hearing, neither physiology nor any of the physical sciences can explain. The only rational account that we can give of it is that the soul sitting serenely on its throne, in a way perhaps never to be understood, takes knowledge of the commotion in the brain, reads its hieroglyphics, and informs itself of what is going on in the world on the outside, with more facility than an operator at the end of a telegraphic wire receives a dispatch. When we come to reflect we are all conscious, as it seems to us, that we are superior to our brains; that we can read their dispatches; and that we can command them to obey our behests.

*Trichotomy.*—When, however, we come to consider the soul in its antithesis to the body, and as embracing our entire internal constitution, we encounter again a universe of great complexity, and we seem to be just as far as we were before from the centre of unity for which we have been searching all the while. How different are our sensations from our reasoning processes or the voice of conscience! There is need, then, of another step in analysis, in evolution, before we reach the radix of man's being. There is truth in the dichotomy of man, but not the whole truth of the matter.

*The Spirit more than Soul.*—To most persons the soul includes everything in the human nature that lies beyond the body, and so the term is often used in popular language. But when we come to look into matters more critically, we discover that a material distinction is to be made between soul and spirit, that the terms are by no means commensurate; that, instead of covering exactly the same ground, they at times represent something different; and that it would often be a misuse of language to say that the one does or suffers what the other does or suffers. Thus the soul is more frequently regarded as passive, whilst the spirit is predominantly active. The soul is

sad or sorrowful, whilst the spirit within us is aroused, or if troubled at all, it is the trouble of the storm or tempest. In the ancient languages the distinction between these two forms of our being is made no less than in those of modern times. In Latin *anima* stands for the soul and *animus* for the spirit; in Greek *ψυχή* for the soul and *πνεῦμα* for the spirit; and in the Hebrew the same distinction is made by the use of two different words; and so marked is the distinction made in the Bible that any attempt to use the words soul and spirit interchangeably or as synonymous would in many passages create in the reader a sense of incongruity. Dr. Delitzsch in his *Biblical Psychology* has brought out the difference between these elements of our nature very forcibly; he curiously refers them to distinct principles of human nature, the soul to the female and the spirit to the male principle. In man the spiritual element predominates and in woman the psychic or soulish; but not exclusively so in either case, as men have souls as well as women, and women on the other hand share with men in the gift of spirituality. There is much truth no doubt in this speculation.\*

There is then a trichotomy as well as a dichotomy of parts in man; and these conceptions are not opposed to each other, but are readily harmonized, if we bear in mind the different significations that are popularly attached to words. Man is made up of body, soul, and spirit, no less than of body and soul, as when the latter term is employed to cover more ground than what properly belongs to it. How they are related to each other, or where the line runs that separates the one from the other, is a different question, and one that cannot in all instances be so readily answered. They are of course not different substances brought together outwardly as in a chemical compound, as the old theology seems to teach, nor are they merely different aspects

\* The Jacobi-Schellingian philosopa, Dr. Gotthilf H. von Schubert has also brought out the Trichotomy of man, as body, soul, and spirit in close connection with nature in his *Geschichte der Seele* (1833) in a highly interesting way. His work cannot be read without edification by all classes of readers.

of one single activity. They involve real differences, whether we can clearly draw the line of demarcation that separates the one from the other or not. They constitute an ascending or descending series, according to the point of view from which they are viewed and their connection is organic, so that they are one and indivisible. The body and soul have for the present, at least, most to do with this present mundane world of ours, whilst the spirit rises above it and finds its congenial home more properly in a higher supersensuous sphere.

If now the question is asked, which is primary in man, the soul or the spirit, there can be only one answer, in the light of what has just been said. Inanimate nature has no potency in itself to produce an animal; the animal world has no potency to produce man; in man, the body cannot produce the soul; and so we maintain that in the soul, the less, there is no potency to generate the spirit, the greater. Contrariwise, our position is that the spirit of man has in itself the potency of producing body and soul, and, in a remoter sense, the universe of nature. The more general produces the less general. This requires of us to fix our attention for a moment on the idea of spirit or of spirits, so that we may see what it involves.

*Spirits.*—We are aware that we are here getting on a border land, where shadows flit before us and we are sometimes left in doubt whether they are real or the mere creations of the imagination. Science often shuns this region or treats it with contempt as unworthy of being explored, as a dark cavernous recess of nature, the abode of hideous creatures that does not deserve to be examined with the torch of science. But what a humiliating confession is this for men to make, who for the sake of knowledge wind their way into the bowels of the earth, pant under a torrid sun, freeze themselves among the icebergs of the North, or soar away into distant space to measure and weigh the stars!

We know that in this night-side of nature, which we are taught by old traditions to regard as a dark, sepulchral region, there are ghosts, direful chimeras, gorgons, hydras, and a vast

host of abnormal creatures; but we are coming to know that they are placed there by our fears and are moreover mere harmless abstractions. As, however, we are now freed from many superstitions, it is a question whether it is not wise for us to consider, whether there is not also a concealed world of reality beneath these dark shadows. The probability is that if we can here discern the world of true spirits, the sepulchral scene will vanish at once and give way to another scene more radiant than the starry heavens above or any flower-decked paradise beneath.

It is the universal voice of humanity, of all nations and tribes of people, that there are spirits; that they are rational activities; that they are not dependent necessarily on the covering of a human body; and that they may exist and live on the outside of nature. This is one of our first conceptions of spirits, and an elementary determination of their nature. But if we look inwardly and consider the capacities of our own spirits; that they are endowed with power to transcend nature; to contemplate holiness, justice, truth, moral order and an eternal beauty; to hold converse with God, the Author of all things; to apprehend His character and government; to admire and love Him as a personal being and as a parent; and to submit to His authority; then all shadows vanish, and we feel that here we likewise see realities and not gaunt ghosts walking about in aimless solitude.

*Spirits Embodied or Disembodied.*—It may, however, be averred that men are only embodied spirits, which lifts them out of the category of pure spirits, for these latter have neither flesh nor bones. Let this distinction be granted. It is simply a distinction that involves no essential difference. Spirits have a historical development like everything else around us that has life. So far as our knowledge and experience go, there is no living thing that does not start in a germ and pass through various stages of growth, the last often presenting a very striking contrast with the first and earlier stages. And if this be so, then spirits must obey the same law, and there is no con-

tradition between their embodied state and that which follows after the body is laid aside. The former is simply a stage of development and the latter the result of that which preceded it.

NOTE.—*Angels.* It is a current opinion that the angels are a different order of beings from man, that they were created outside of nature in a spiritual state, and that man after a long siege of suffering and sorrow in this life will have an opportunity to join their society as a higher order of beings in another life. This indeed is generally supposed to be the doctrine of the Scripture. But only a cursory reading of the Bible will show that it nowhere sustains necessarily such an interpretation. In the 8th Psalm, it is said, it is true, that God made man a little lower than angels. But that is an error in our version, taken from the old Greek and Latin translations, which our new version is expected to correct. In the original it reads that man was made a little lower than God, and that happily falls in fully with the connection. We therefore claim for man an original equality with the angels, as indeed the Bible asserts, and think that Schleiermacher—a man of wonderful insight—is correct in his opinion that the angels are merely beings like ourselves, who once passed through a nature from mere germs in another planetary world, previous to their glorification, just as we are required to do. The opinion has much in its favor. We know that there are innumerable worlds above us, many of which must be inhabited with beings like ourselves. Why may we not then regard them as the original homes of all the angels? And why should some of us be bound to a material world for a period of time, pass through helpless infancy up to manhood and then to final glorification, whilst other spirits have been exempt from what might be justly considered as an unfair and humiliating condition.

*The Primacy of Spirit.*—We have thus, after a considerable amount of climbing, arrived at what must be regarded as the most fundamental idea of humanity, and at the same time the fountal source of the universe. Man is essentially a spirit. It is this that makes him what he is, a man, and distinguishes him from

the brute world beneath him. The animal has a soul, but it has no spirit, and so its soul is of little value.—Man has a spirit that permeates his soul, and this it is that makes it rational and gives it an infinite value.—This of course will be regarded as a mere hypothesis by so called evolutionists, but consistency requires of them to allow us to use it as a “working hypothesis” at least. Its value or truth must be judged by its utility or capacity in explaining facts and phenomena, not of a particular class, but as they stand combined in the universe as a whole.

*Man in Nature, and Why.*—Theory has thus landed us on a sublime mountain height, from which we are in a condition to survey the world of nature beneath. The first question now that rises up in the mind of an intelligent observer is, Why was this vast universe made, what is it good for, what is its design, its end? To this the only rational answer is, that it was made for man, for his support, for his training, growth and development. As already said he appears first as a mere germ or thought of God. He is placed here in nature as a mere potency, in order that he may be developed and unfolded. Nature is the soil in which he is to take root for the time being, not that he may get his true life from it. This must come from a higher source. Just as the tree is assisted in its growth by a congenial soil, but grows and gains most of its volume from the atmosphere, from its carbon, so man rooted in nature rises above it, spreads out his branches and receives his strength and vitality from a higher sphere, on that side of his being which connects him with the Author and Source of his existence. Still nature is essential to his proper growth and development, without which he must have forever remained as a mere potency or undeveloped possibility. It is what we call the condition of his growth. It is so everywhere. Cause and condition go together wherever there is life, as in the animal and vegetable world. It is a universal law, and man is not exempted from it. God might have established a different order, but all our experience proves that He did not.

*Subordination.*—The universe is made up of multitudinous

beings\* of higher and lower rank, each of which is in some sense autonomic or independent and has the cause of its activity in itself. But these differ widely in their range and significance; and so in the constitution of the cosmos there must be subordination. The lower must serve the higher, and become, not a cause, but a condition to promote the development of some other activity. All are thus linked together in "being's endless chain," and every part serves as a condition directly or indirectly, as it was intended, to promote the spiritual growth of and glorification of man. Man is here the main thing, the sovereign, who has a right to the obedience of all other creatures—one to whom they all render a cheerful allegiance, provided he asserts his claims and exercises his rationality.

*Cause and Condition.*—The distinction here made between condition and cause is a matter of importance in all investigations in science or philosophy. It is especially important, as we look at it, to Evangelical theologians. They must maintain it rigidly, or else they will be in danger of falling back on some old exploded doctrines of heathenism, such as the magic of good works.

*The Main Question.*—But now comes up the main question of these discussions. How did all this order, this subordination centering in man, come to be established in this vast system of creation, where there is so much autonomy in the parts? The tendency from the remotest ages has been to place some controlling power between the Creator and His creatures, in order to explain results and to account for uniformity wherever it has been seen to exist. With Mohammedans fate to this day explains the whole economy of nature and history. Leibnitz proposed a pre-established harmony in its place in order to make his monads work together harmoniously with each other, and with the primary monad which was God. In our days we hear, especially from the theistic side, much about a divine plan, or purpose, or decree as controlling and giving shape to all things. As frequently used, however, it sounds to us very much as if it were something outside of God and outside

of creation, something like Plato's ideas, by which God carries forward the affairs of the world. But most manifestly the divine plan is in His creatures, and is their very life, the very essence of their existence. Why then we may ask, and we do it with deference, should there be another plan outside of nature and history, as if God were a mechanic, who must first draw up a plan of the universe and then like an architect stand by and see that it is carried out in detail? God does not work in that way. He does not need two plans. His thoughts are His plans. His words are their realization and full of life. We are therefore constrained to rule out all such external plans and purposes, including the fate of the Stoics, the ideas of Plato with his soul of the world, Leibnitz's harmony, the potency of nature, a plastic nature, a general life, and other imaginary natures or powers, as mere abstractions of our own minds. These are simply our own thoughts of what God is doing, or ought to be doing, not God's thoughts.

We are thus brought back to the sphere of reality in the spiritual nature of man as the starting point of the universe. In Him we have the purpose, the plan, the thought or idea, the life, the inner circle of the whole process. Sometimes man and nature are set over against each other as antithetical and parallel, the one representing the object and the other the subject, both springing out of their sources in God, but moving out of Him as the Absolute in different directions. This is Schelling's *Anschauung*. There is a dualism here, but no inward, living unity. Man and nature do, it is true, run in parallel lines, but they are not straight lines, neither do they possess equal intensity. They ought rather to be considered as concentric and parallel. Man is the first wave that proceeds from the great centre in God, and all the other undulations, without number, out to the periphery, embracing the animal, the vegetable and the mineral worlds, proceed from the source of all life and power in God through man the primary undulation. Thus we may regard the universe as a vast ocean, or if we choose, a vast sphere, with God as the centre sending out His

power and strength in waves for ever breaking on the shores of eternity.\*

*The True Genesis.*—But if the universe grew out of man as an immanent cause, and was not made mechanically, as if by the square and compass of an architect standing over it all the while, we may be asked whether such an inner process or genesis can be explained. We answer, probably not—certainly not, *ab ovo usque ad mala*. Involution has its rights here as well as evolution, but he would be rash indeed who should insist that the involution here considered should be logically established at every point. It is a much more difficult question than any of the intricate questions in mathematical involution. At best we can perhaps trace out only a few indications of such an order, showing that the universe as a whole is an organic process.

*Not Physical.*—The genesis of things proceeding from man is of course not physical, such as we know is the case in the reproduction of plants and animals. It might indeed, as we think, be shown with as much plausibility that the monkey is an immediate descendant of man, as that man came from the monkey. Some tribes in Africa think that monkeys are only degenerate men, who were reduced to this condition on account of their wickedness. Some American Indians have a tradition that all animals at first could speak, but that they lost their voice at the time of the flood, because they murmured at their

\* We object to Schelling's *Anschauung* of nature as inconsistent with itself. He climbs up from inorganic nature to man, much as the evolutionist does, and as he ascends from one department of nature to the other, from the mineral to the vegetable, or from the vegetable to the animal, he does no better than the evolutionist. He brings in at each step a new principle to explain the new process going on, a new *potenz* as he calls it, whenever he needs one. But he does not tell us where he got it. Hegel, in his *Logic* seeks to begin from above when he attempts to explain the universe, and is certainly more logical here than Schelling; but he starts out with mere notions, such as nonentity, being, essence, becoming, and builds up his system in a series of momenta that are mere abstractions. It is Hegel's *Logic*, not the *Logic of the Universe*.

preserver in the great boat when the flood was over. An argument in favor of this origin of the animal world might also be derived from comparative anatomy and physiology. It could, however, only amount to a probability,—as strong, we think, as that the lower animals passed out of their natural condition into one that was higher and altogether different.

*But Rational.*—The generation of the world out of man was not physical, but rational, the same in the sphere of reality as when in the mind one comprehensive thought generates a smaller world of subordinate thoughts, fancies and ideas. The process was strictly logical, only in this case the logic had for its contents real things, and not the abstractions of our own brain, as in ordinary subjective thinking. The cases may, we think, be regarded as strictly parallel. Man is a general thought of God, implying and including in himself the idea of a universe in all its diversity as a necessity of his existence, and hence the creation of the one necessitated the creation of the other. The one was the major proposition, the other the minor, and the universe was the conclusion. The world-wide difference lies in the fact that God's thought here involved at the same time an act of His will, and so became a reality, whereas when man thinks it is not often that his thought can be actualized. He can create ideal worlds and fill them with the creations of his imagination; he is ever creating such air-castles; but they exist only in his own thoughts and never go beyond the region of a mere subjective fancy. It is otherwise with God's thoughts. He never romances, and never can. He is the greatest of all logicians; each thought that comes from the depths of the eternal mind carries with it vitality to embody itself in a reality, and vitality enough to embody all other thoughts which it involves or implies. It was therefore not necessary that He should think or speak outwardly the different orders of creatures into being, and then afterwards by some plan or command, order them into harmonious relations to each other and to the final result. He created man; that was His plan; and that involved a universe of beings as the necessary out-come, with all its successive creations.

*Man.*—But this involves, not a one-ism of man with nature, as some mystics dream and some pantheistic poets like Pope, Wordsworth and Byron sing, but an intimate relationship and some features of family likeness, that is traceable, though the relationship may be very distant and difficult to make out. And such is the truth in the case, recently brought out by the evolutionists themselves more fully, although inversely, than by poets and mystics who have always had some vague and undefined yearning for nature, as if it were in some sense a part of themselves, if not their mother.

*Animals.*—"Simia quam similis turpissima bestia nobis," said the honest old Roman poet; but we can hardly be said to love monkies, because forsooth they are such horrid caricatures of ourselves; still they are always interesting, to men as well as boys, as they make such a near approach to human beings. But all other animals resemble man to a larger or smaller extent. Quadrupeds have all the physical organs that man has, and the anatomy and physiology of the horse or the cow is the same as that of the human subject. As we descend through the lower order of animals the *quam similis* of the monkey becomes less and less marked. One organ after another is dropped out; entire bodily systems disappear with their nerves, veins and arteries, until there is scarcely anything remaining except a fragment of our vegetable nature. In the polypus and lower orders of animal life, nothing is left but a stomach, and yet it is a well-developed stomach.

*Vegetables.*—In the case of the plant or vegetable the relationship may no longer seem to exist, or be too remote for recognition; and yet in the trees, which we delight to associate with in our homes, we have a dim, distant adumbration of ourselves. Their leaves are their lungs, and the circulation which produces their growth resembles in many respects the current which gives increase and vitality to all parts of our bodies. A tree, moreover, is like man a denizen of two hemispheres. It is fixed to the soil, but it lives and thrives in the atmosphere; just as man is fastened to a material soil, but is continually rising above it,

and lives and thrives best in the more ethereal region of the moral, the intellectual and the spiritual.

*Minerals.*—From a false and erroneous view of what is sometimes called dead matter, the mineral world has from time immemorial been disfranchised, and not only deprived of all claims of relationship to man, but regarded as hostile to him, and in one form or another the source of all evil. Fortunately the time of this ignorance is passing away, and it is beginning to be seen that the inorganic world is more spiritual in its elements than was formerly supposed; that it is in fact an intellectual system throughout; and that whilst it is a cosmos on a gigantic but rudimentary scale, man is its counterpart, a refined microcosm, in whom is concentrated the sense and energy of all its vastness and diversity.

*The Earth.*—To the generality of men the earth, our own single planet, is to all intents and purposes the outward universe, bounded by the blue sky not far above our heads. Considered as the last outermost result of that spiritual movement which took its start in man, it ought therefore to present some points of resemblance, some degree of parallelisms, or some fancy likeness to the original thought or idea. And such may be shown to be the case, without admitting the validity of all the mystical interpretations of Schubert, Franz von Baader and other writers of a glowing fancy.

Our earth is a unity of activities; it maintains itself; it is in fact an organism, not indeed precisely in the same degree as a tree or an animal. One part supports the other, so that there is an equilibrium of forces; one preventing the other from running riot and bringing about the destruction of the whole. The average amount of our annual heat does not increase in any perceptible degree, and we are in no danger of being burnt up in that way, neither does it diminish perceptibly, and there is no prospect of our being frozen to death, at least for a long time. The evaporation of the waters of the ocean have their limit, and as a general thing we do not get too much rain so as to produce another deluge, nor do we get too little so as to

destroy entirely all vegetation. Of course there are here and there some exceptions to the rule, and portions of the earth may have local disorders, its fevers and its chills, but these only serve to show that its organism bears some remote likeness to the organism of man's body, which is seldom sound in all its parts. In the rocky portions of the earth, often running out into vertebral columns for an entire continent of land, some have detected the counterpart of the osseous system in man's body, whilst, in the superincumbent rich soil or loam, they have seen our well rounded muscles and other living textures covering our hard skeletons of bone. The circulation of our blood through arteries from the heart through the system back again in veins to the heart is distinctly adumbrated by the ever recurring circulation of the waters of the ocean through clouds and vapors over all parts of the dry land, and then by their return to their source in multitudinous streams, rivers, brooks and brooklets. The action of the human brain and of our nervous system is portrayed faintly, but no doubt truthfully, by the magnetic and electric currents that encompass the earth, and have perhaps as much to do with its vitality as the brain has with that of our bodies. The two currents of power, the one terrestrial, the other human, have one thing in common. They are both mysterious in their actions, baffling the ken of the scientist, but both most essential vital forces, that seem to vanish when we attempt to grasp them in our knowledge.

*The Solar System, the last Undulation.*—Man, however, belongs to a much more extensive system than this terrestrial mundane sphere in which he lives and breathes. He is a part of an immense system which has the sun for its centre and support, and his connection with this is of the most vital character. His connection with the fixed stars and more distant systems is much less perceptible. His breath, his life, his physical growth, and, in his present circumstances, through his body, his mental, moral and spiritual progress are all dependent on the vivific rays of the sun. We must, therefore, take a wider view of his dominions, and inquire whether we

can find any part of his image,—anything that borders on the human,—impressed on the solar system. It is an organism of immense proportions that grew out of the sun, which in the beginning gathered up rudimentary matter; threw off planets and satellites, one after another; and then concentrating its energies into its own body, formed a system, over which it now rules with more than regal splendor and magnificence. But this monarch in the material world is a most apt type or prophecy of what man was intended to be in a higher spiritual plane in creation. Taken as a whole, both in its inward and outward aspects, man was to be the true sun of the entire system. As the physical sun began to shine on the darkness of creation on the fourth day, so man at the end of the sixth period, when as yet there was no consciousness anywhere, made his appearance, completed the meaning of the whole process, and like a still greater sun, arose in auroral splendor to shed light over the new born world.

And further, as the entire solar system grew out of the sun and was formed out of its underlying idea, so we maintain it was with nature in its upward progress. It grew out of the idea of man as a living, active power, was controlled at every step by its presence, and still shows the evidence of its descent. Whether man has asserted and maintained his authority over these vast realms is another question, which will be considered in another place.

*Inner Relationship.*—We have thus far considered only some of the more external marks of man's kinship to the natural world of beings around him. An examination into the internal constitution of things will tend to show that this relationship is a real one, and something that goes farther than the mere surface.

*Through the Body.*—The normal development of man as a moral and spiritual being in this, his mundane sphere, requires that he should call into requisition all the elements of his present constitution. As he is partly mineral, partly vegetable, and partly animal in his outward envelope or covering, so he

must have some source from which he can draw the supplies that are kindred to his nature and necessary to his physical existence. These he finds by his own keen instinct in the three grand divisions of nature, all at hand and ready for his use, in the greatest abundance. At intervals he utilizes vegetable, and then animal food; but he is every instant dependent on the mineral, continually taking oxygen into his lungs; and water or other minerals are just as necessary for his subsistence as bread or meat.

*Through the Mind.*—But he does not live by bread alone. The development of his mind or intellect must go hand in hand with the growth of his body, and this can be awakened into full consciousness and exercise only by that which is allied to it. Mineral, vegetable, and animal food can only respond to those wants in man's body that are of a kindred nature with themselves; but where shall he find reason and intelligence to stimulate his own reason and intelligence? That he finds everywhere from its lowest to its highest forms in nature around him, in its forces and laws, all of which are of an intellectual character and are all well calculated, because they are of a kindred nature to his intellect, to arouse him from his stupor into a wakeful and thinking state. In this process he owes much to his parents and other instructors, of course, but they themselves all depend on nature for their stimulus, without which in their circumstances they would probably never think themselves, nor get outside of their subjective fancies in dream-land.

Thus by constant contact, friction and communion with the intellectual side of nature man's intellect or understanding is awakened, and his psychic life, the life of the soul, is elevated far above the psychic life of the animal, for the reason that the higher life of the spirit constantly emits its light and influence upon man's lower nature, and gives it an entirely new character.

*Through the Spirit.*—But the process does not end here. Nature has in its constitution, just as we might expect, some-

thing more than mathematical, chemical or physic laws, that address themselves to the cold intellect. Taken as a whole and in all its parts, it is a symbol of something higher and more spiritual than itself, towards which it is ever pointing and towards which it seems to be vainly struggling. It is so constructed in its entire framework, that it is throughout adapted to illustrate within us truth, beauty, goodness, divine and heavenly things. It has everywhere its parables, its allegories, or its æsthetic side. It is in fact the grandest and the truest of all works of art, where there is the union of the material and the immaterial, the natural and the spiritual, the seen and the unseen, and where with never-ceasing joy and admiration we may see the hand and trace the fingers of the Supreme Artist. It is from this side especially that nature addresses man as such and assists in developing his spiritual nature, not indeed as a cause, but as a condition, for the source of all spiritual progress comes from above and must be lodged in man's inner constitution.

*Man's Glory.*—Thus all nature in its humble way ministers to man, tends to elevate him into his proper position as lord, and to qualify him for his mission and destiny. If he has not appreciated her services, or if instead of mounting upward in a purely spiritual career, he plunges backward and downward into a sensual, animal life, that is his own fault, with which the school in which he has been placed has had nothing to do. Volumes might be written in illustration of the spiritualizing tendency of nature. Rationalistic philosophers, who regard man mainly as an intellectual being, fail to perceive the spiritual character of nature or make a slight account of it, and therefore we turn away and turn rather to the school of Christian mystics, such as Schubert and others, for instruction in matters of this character. The first is sometimes called the poetical philosopher, but no one can read his works without feeling that they contain truth as well as poetry.

When we maintain that the entire sphere of nature around us, including the solar system, thus belongs to man by so many

ties, such a degree of subserviency might be regarded as an exaggeration; and such it doubtless would be, if we did not bear in mind that the spirit even of a little child is of more intrinsic value than all the planets put together.

*Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem.*

*Trichotomy Again.*—It will thus appear that nature is a connected chain, which from its farthest limit gradually approaches man in external and internal resemblances; but still there is a wide chasm between it and the spirit of man. How shall it be filled up and a real connection be established? Nature has done all it could and well; now it is the turn for man to come and meet it and supply the missing links. The spiritual must limit itself and become less spiritual, so that there may be the necessary continuity, as nature admits of no saltus or leaps. This could be accomplished only by the intervention of a body, that takes up material particles, through which the spirit may hold communication with the outward world. It is partly material, and yet so refined that it is capable of receiving impressions from all parts from the outside and to convey them to the inner man. How wonderful it is in all its arrangements, especially in its sensibility and its special senses, which are so many windows, through which man looks out and takes in a knowledge of the universe! How was it constructed? By a principle of its own? Certainly not. It bears everywhere the impress of the spirit within, more so by far than does the coral indicate its minute architect. There is room here to think of a plastic power that formed the body. Of course there was, but it was one that came from within. Else we would have a centaur or a hermaphrodite. But between the body and the spirit there is also a missing link. How was this connection to be formed? Only, we say, by a living soul, which was so limited and constituted that it could be united with the spiritual side of the body on the one side, and, on the other hand, with the spirit above it by its own semi-spiritual nature. Body and soul are simply limitations of man's spirit, pervaded by it, or, as we

may say, spirit in its rudimental forms, distinct and yet forming with them an indivisible unity, never to be separated. Thus with the development of the human soul and the formation of the human body, the connection of man and nature out to its periphery is established. In the endless chain of creation there are therefore no missing links.

*An Excursus.*—But possibly by this time our evolutionist friend may have become impatient and may be prompted to interrupt us as we go on working with our hypothesis, as he calls it. Well, let him do so for a moment. He has his hypothesis, and wishes to show that it explains these matters better than we do. We are quite willing that he should have some of our time to show that it does, while we take a walk with him at this point in our discussion. He denies that man ever had such a high origin as that which we assign to him; that he commenced his distinctive existence as a human being on a very humble plane, not much higher than the more advanced animals from which he sprung; and that ever since he has with possibly a few exceptions been rising upwards in an ascending scale. As he never stood on any very elevated ground, he could never have fallen very far down; and that he has never been descending but always on the whole actually ascending. This of course rules out the history of Adam and Eve, and consigns it to the region of myths. Of course he here brings forward an army of facts from geological science and from other sciences that are almost astounding, all so arranged as apparently to support his position. But now, if we ask him whether he has actually demonstrated his favorite hypothesis, he hesitates and acknowledges—in deference to the rigid demands of science—that he has not. That we regard as enough for the present in this direction. His doctrine is new, and the *onus probandi* lies on his shoulders—to show that the ancient doctrine is no more than a beautiful myth. But before he withdraws we may be permitted to remind him that historical facts are all against his hypothesis. History goes to show that the human race commenced somewhere in Central Asia; that from that point the

earth was settled by successive emigrations, which declined in intelligence and culture the farther off they wandered from their original home; and that the races which remained nearest to man's primitive abode were the bearers of the highest civilization, until they themselves in the course of time declined also (Schelling), and left their countries a moral and spiritual waste. At an early age in the history of the race, before the deluge and before emigration commenced, the uses of copper and iron were discovered, showing that the antediluvians were remarkable for their sagacity and intelligence, and were not so near the state of the dumb brute as the theory of the so-called evolution requires. Emigration to distant regions, it has been observed, has in all ages been attended with more or less deterioration in races, always more or less in the direction of barbarism. In the original dispersion of mankind, some of the wandering tribes lost the knowledge of the use of iron, but still retained the use of bronze, like the primitive Greeks, whilst others in the course of time came to know nothing of either, and had recourse to stone or flint for their rude implements. It is therefore more rational to suppose that the so-called stone and bronze ages commenced somewhat in this way than that they had the precedence of all others, according to the modern theory. Some tribes of heathen, it is said, have sunk so low that they have lost the use of fire in their descent towards bestiality.

But here just at this point the Darwinian as a final retort points us to the progress of the Indo-Germanic races in Europe as an illustration of the growth of man upwards from below. Here for once he gets out of his narrow rut into the broad field of history. But we simply reply to this that from all that we can learn from Cæsar, Tacitus and other very reliable historians, our German ancestors had degenerated considerably from the culture and refinement of their forefathers in Asia. And then it must be further remarked that the wonderful advance here made in enlightenment and civilization was not brought about under the theory of the evolutionist, but mainly

through the doctrines which we are here substantially advocating. And we also assert that heathen nations,—left to the help of a so-called evolution,—have for ages stood still, or sunk lower in the social scale; and that they awake to new life and activity only as they receive an inspiration from a higher region, which makes it possible for them to rise from their animal degradation. But we have rested long enough during this excursus, and we must not here anticipate what belongs properly to another part of our solitary summer symposium.

## EXODUS.

But, if what has just been said of the headship and supremacy of man in creation, commends itself to our readers, then it will be interesting to know whether the *First Principles* here advocated may be useful in throwing any subsidiary light on other problems that have engaged the earnest attention of the great and good in all ages. Philosophy we know is not everything. There are questions that gather around human destiny that are more practical and profound than those which are usually discussed in the schools. In order, therefore, to give completeness to the views maintained in both of our dissertations, we now proceed to show briefly the harmony that may be traced between the evolution and involution of things here advocated, and some of the great questions referred to, involving time and eternity, divine revelation and Christianity, man's destiny here and his destination hereafter. Of course all that we can ask of dissenters is to allow what has been thus far written to stand as a hypothesis. It will then be seen how it works.

*Man's Degeneracy.*—In reply to what has here been said the question—a very pertinent one in this connection certainly—may be asked, whether the idea lying at the bottom of humanity has been realized in history. We say, certainly not, it must be acknowledged. Experience goes to show that the spiritual nature of man has been unfolded only to a limited extent during past ages. Men taken as a whole have lived

only a psychic life, and experience shows that this soulish life has in many cases not been elevated far beyond that of the animal. The cases in which gifted individuals, sages, prophets or philosophers, have exhibited spiritual tendencies and proved their spiritual origin, are few and solitary exceptions. But if this is admitted as an indisputable fact, how is it to be reconciled with the high destination marked out by the divine purpose in man? The plan of the creation was pronounced to be good, and when man was ushered into his possession, it was said to be very good. But facts, alas, prove that for the time being, at least, it was a failure. Can theory be reconciled with stubborn facts? Let us see.

The difficulty or discrepancy here brought to view could not be in the plan or purpose of the Creator, for this, as we have seen, was perfect and good. The work of His hand must, therefore, have been marred in some other way, in such a way that it was prevented from coming to its proper normal development. We have many illustrations of such failures, although by no means on such a general and extensive scale, in the animal and vegetable world. They are witnessed wherever life of any kind is interfered with by some unfriendly power or activity. This, however, holds good only of individuals; nowhere of an entire genus, as in the case of man.

*The Temptation.*—The old belief or tradition, apart from its claims to authority based on divine revelation, that the original life of man was paralysed in some way by a fallen spirit, falls in, as we think, fully with theory, and is sustained by the profoundest investigations into the internal constitution of man's being. No other explanation, whether devised in the schools of philosophy or in the sacred records of the heathen, is entitled to a tithe of the respectful consideration, to which the one given in the old Hebrew records is entitled.

The story is characterized by native simplicity and truthfulness on its very face. Satan is represented as attacking man in the very citadel of his strength, by an appeal to the pride and ambition of our first parents. He told them that they would

be as gods, if they would disobey the divine command. This was a purely spiritual transaction in which the spirit of man was addressed, tried and seduced from its spiritual relations. Of course, the eye, the taste, the bodily and soulish senses, were appealed to in the fruit that was good for food and pleasant to the eye; but these were merely the outward approaches to the inner stronghold. The last and decisive struggle took place in the spiritual part of man, and there, when there was no necessity, the base surrendry was made.

*The Fall and Captivity.*—The temptation of man being thus in his deepest internal nature, in his spirit, in what makes him a man, in himself, we must see at once that this could be possible only through the agency of a spiritual being, one who had a spiritual nature in common with man. But many persons express surprise, and some are free to ridicule the idea, that a single transgression in the Garden of Eden should have been followed by such fearful and far-reaching consequences. Abstractly considered such a sin could not have had manifestly such an effect; but it cannot be considered as an abstraction; it did not stand by itself; it could not have been anything else but the beginning of Satan's continuous reign over humanity. He took formal possession of man, and holds him still with no relaxation in his grasp. As the stronger of the two this he could do. And facts go to show, that he does it, not as one strong man holds another against his will, but with man's consent and full acquiescence all the while. He does not groan under this as oppression and slavery; he fancies music in his chains. This is the worst feature of his case, and many facts might be cited to prove that such a demoniacal possession has been at work among men during all ages of history. It may be seen everywhere in the heathen world; it manifests itself in higher and more refined forms also in Christian countries.

When the Evil Spirit gained a foothold here in this virgin territory of ours, he came to remain, and so he usurped the authority over the world, which had been conferred on man as his birthright. This is the simple narrative handed down to us

from the beginning, through the purest channels of history. In the light of a divine philosophy there is nothing improbable or mythical about it. Of all the origins of evil in this world, it is the only one that is entitled to our rational belief. It does not explain the origin of evil as such. It shows that it did not take its start in this world of ours, but sprung up in some other extra mundane sphere, in some chasm whose dark depths it is beyond our capacities for the present to fathom. God made the world to be the best; His plan was good and perfect; but he could not contradict Himself by making man a free agent, the greatest gift He could bestow, and then deprive him of it by a coerced obedience. That is about all that we know of this matter; in this our pupilage state we are compelled to see many things through a glass darkly.

*Powers of Darkness.*—Here it is true we arrive at the border land of demons and demonology, and of an Egyptian darkness, from which some suppose that our modern science and enlightenment have happily freed the world, once and for ever. Its superstitions have been exploded, very much to our relief no doubt; but there are also realities there still, as well as in the regions of the blessed, and they are of such a character as to command our attention, not to be ignored or ruled out by any form of superficial science. There is an abyss somewhere, the source of our present miseries, of man's lamentable failure, and it is the interest of science and philosophy as well as of religion to fence it off, lest we all, with our culture and knowledge, go down into its dark depths. It is a reality, too, and belongs to the philosophy of things.

*Deliverance, Redemption.*—Is there any deliverance for man? Is there any hope for the world in its ruins? These are questions which the drift of our discussion does not require us to answer directly. They are answered for us elsewhere. Ours here is the humble task to show what kind of a redemption we need from the standpoint of our knowledge of man, and then, if it can be shown that there is such a redemption at hand, it will be so much the better for all alike.

As we have seen, the fall of man took place in the inner constitution of man, in the spiritual realm of his being, and that the spirit which brought it about still holds possession as the stronger, dominating power. Dispossession, accordingly, as the dictates of common sense would require, is the first thing to be thought of. But the same common sense would here also require that the agency of another spirit greater and more powerful than the one that now holds possession would be requisite, and must undertake the task, as alone qualified for it. If, therefore, it can be made to appear that the Spirit of God himself has come into our world to accomplish precisely this work, then certainly we would have a sufficient guaranty that it would be successfully accomplished and all doubt in regard to the final issue must vanish.

*Christ.*—The work, however, under this view must necessarily be a stupendous one; if it is to be accomplished at all, it must be in harmony with the laws of the universe to which God has so to speak committed Himself. There must be, as might be supposed, difficulties in the way, as there is here an immense empire of darkness to overthrow, and these must all be overcome, before the Spirit from God can reach and take possession of man. There is the active power of the Evil One, with his hosts, as we must now believe; there is justice to be maintained and guilt to be removed, and an active campaign to be carried on during all centuries and over all lands, before the emancipation is complete. This would require a more than human power, insight, and wisdom. If, therefore, there is one who can and is willing to exercise such supernatural powers; if there is a Messiah, or Christ, or the Son of God Himself, who has undertaken such a conquest, then certainly we may hope, and can see for ourselves, that the work can be accomplished. And then further, if this Christ should find it necessary to unite Himself with our fallen humanity and become flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, a new guaranty is furnished to us that the victory may be gained. There is, however, nothing absurd in the idea of such a union of the human and divine, of man with God, for so

it must have been in the beginning. God could not unite Himself with a brute animal, for there is nothing spiritual or god-like there; but it is otherwise with man, who is a spiritual being, constitutionally allied to God. God can thus make His abode with us in our common humanity. Here, however, we are approaching the region of the highest philosophy, that lies beyond the region of things. But even of this Lord Bacon has well said, and it was the wisest thing he ever said: *Philosophia obiter libata abducit a Deo, sed penitus hausta reducit ad eundem.*

*The Spirit of Regeneration.*—But if the inner house of man's abode is once swept and garnished, what would theory require to be done next, in order that he released, ransomed, and redeemed from a foreign oppressor, may now go forward to accomplish his true destination? Evidently account must be taken of his forlorn condition, his decaying state, his paralyzed faculties. He needs to be quickened, revived and refurnished with that primitive energy, which he has lost in the service of the oppressor. This is even more essential, perhaps, than mere emancipation, which would be of little account unless it is followed up by reconstruction and a new life. But this manifestly cannot be accomplished unless man can in some way be again united with God, and the original connection through which he derived his being, with all the energies which it involved, be again restored. If, therefore, it can be further shown that the Christ, the Son of God spoken of, came into the world for this express purpose; that He through the medium of the divine Spirit unites Himself with man and individual men; and that there is evidence in the history of the world that such a connection has been established by palpable and visible results, then philosophers and scientists, no less than other men should rejoice. It is the solution of the grand problem of human destiny, and it is in harmony with the highest and purest reason. No system of heathen religion ever proposed anything of the kind. It could probably have never entered into the imagination of any human being to conceive of it. But if it is to be found anywhere, that can be only in Christianity;

and if this be so, it involves no small degree of responsibility to ignore it in a philosophy of man. The difficulty here probably lies in the inadequate views which are taken of human nature. If man has only a soul, understood as merely the bond which connects him with nature, then there is no hope for him and he must perish with the brute; but if he have a spirit, something that connects him with God and spiritual realities, above the ordinary understanding or reason, then he must needs have the gift of immortality, and the way is open to him to realize the end of his existence in the society of his Maker.—In this materialistic age of ours the great question, one on which every thing hangs, is on the subjective side, whether man has a spirit as well as a soul. Much, very much, of our reigning philosophy seems to be bent, as if by some dark fatality, to prove that he has only a soul. It is an abnormal bird that befouls its own nest.

*Miracles.*—The view which is here taken of man is broader than that which enters into his consciousness. We know full well that he is an energy that goes far beyond his own thoughts of himself. Thus in his body there are multitudinous activities of which he is never conscious until they are arrested by some disorder or disease. In his healthy state he knows nothing of the process of respiration, circulation or assimilation except what he learns from books or his own examination. His will here is just as inactive. He may by an act of his volition determine to partake of food, but there is the end of his willing and knowing, and yet it is man himself that carries on the work of digestion, and not chemical or physical laws as something outside of himself, placed there to do the work for him by some blind instinct. These laws are in fact his servants. There is, therefore, good reason for believing that there is a large world of sub-consciousness in man's constitution, extending also far into nature, which never, or rarely if ever, comes to consciousness. Admitting this, and it flows necessarily from the idea of humanity as the reality here advocated, and we may see at once the possibility of miracles. They are the results of man's potency,

when at times he is elevated above his abnormal state and overshadowed with the presence of the divine and spiritual. In this light miracles cannot be regarded as the violation of any law. They come to pass in accordance with the laws of the universe, and what seems to be an infraction or suspension of a law is merely an overruling of it by the presence of another and higher law. This is a matter of common occurrence in lower spheres of nature.

There are periods in the history of man, where miracles—which are divine interpositions of course no less than human acts—are absolutely necessary, as experience teaches, in order to promote ends of history and to subserve man's true interests. Then they are performed by men eminently possessed of spiritual energy as acts of self-defence against the tide of widespread demoralization. They are the necessities of the hour. If men did not perform such acts, then the cattle on the hills or the stones of the field would perform them and yield to the necessity of self-preservation; but the virtue would still proceed from the idea of humanity.

*Prophecy.*—For most purposes the psychic nature in man, or the mere understanding, is a sufficient guide. But there are emergencies and conjunctures in history where the interest of the world requires a broader and wider range of vision, and there we may conceive that the ordinary consciousness of some individual men should be expanded so as to take in a larger area of the world of sub-consciousness already referred to, embracing future events and distant places which cannot be seen with the ordinary eye. Thus the way is opened for the mission of the prophet, when young men see visions and old men dream dreams. Then we have a true inspiration

The difficulty with Hume and his followers in their objections to miracles was that he believed only in a soul in man, with its ordinary experience, and not in spirit—in psychology, but not in pneumatology. It is not strange: he lived in a humdrum materialistic age, in which scarcely anything but the knowledge of material things was valued. In ordinary things an ordinary

experience will suffice; but when spiritual things are to be concerned a more etherial discernment is absolutely necessary.

*Prayer.*—In all past ages, among the heathen, no less than more enlightened nations, prayer has been regarded as efficacious. A false tendency that claims that it is based on science, attempts in our day to set this all aside, either as superstition or a misapprehension. Prayer is commended as merely a healthy subjective exercise. It serves to put men into salutary relations with the mind and will of the Creator, it is said, and therefore as long as they live should Christians pray; but if their prayers are answered, they ought not to think that any gifts were secured through prayer; it was a mere coincidence, or an anticipation, which may be expected sometimes to occur. Prayer cannot be supposed to change the ordinary course of events. This is fixed by the laws of nature. But, we ask, is not this something as bad as the fatalism of the Stoics, or something even worse?

What has just been said of miracles and prophecy applies to prayer with equal propriety and need not be here repeated. The only difference is that the former are extraordinary and less frequent instances of spiritual power, whilst the latter is of daily occurrence, and when properly exercised may be expected to be continually working wonders. Why should it not be efficacious in changing the course of events or bringing about even physical changes, if according to the faith of the Christian, it moves the hand that moves the universe. Let us hear what Dr. Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert, whose knowledge of the sciences was as extensive as his knowledge of philosophy, has to say on the subject of prayer:

*Wie das Kind zu seinem Vater, so spricht der durch den Geist betende Mensch zu seinem Gott. Dieser aber, der Vater, welcher des Kindes Flehen vernimmt, ist zugleich der Herr über alles Wesen und Seyn der sichtbaren, wie der unsichtbaren Welt. Darum, wie das Kind durch Liebe den starken Arm des Vaters, so bewegt der im Menschen betende Geist die Macht des Schöpfers und durch diesen die Schöpfung der Dinge.*

*Death.*—The planting of man as a spiritual being in a natural world and surrounding him with natural conditions that are only at best remotely allied to his spiritual destiny, far removed from what might be regarded as his more congenial home amidst the society of the angels, might be regarded as a misalliance. But it was not so. It was the best for the time being, from which other spiritual beings were themselves probaly not exempt. It was to be only a temporary arrangement for a good purpose, by which man might be awakened to a consciousness of his higher destiny, and be helped onward towards it, so far as this rudimentary training here in nature could be made contributory towards this general end.

*This bondage to the elements* must, however, in the nature of things come to an end, when the time has arrived for him to go up higher. The change involved in such a transition in man's normal development, in his normal state, could have been nothing else but of the most pleasant character, a happy release, accompanied with a grateful sense of elevation to a higher and more congenial atmosphere and social surroundings. But now the change is painful, and we call it death. A higher knowledge says it is a falling asleep. Still it has all the elements of death or dissolution about it, and it bears very little of that entire transformation of the natural in man into the spiritual which the original idea of humanity called for. It is all explained by what has already been said in regard to his great misfortune through the fraud and malice of his great enemy. Weakness and disease have been entailed upon him by a law which cannot be set aside at once. St. Paul, whose side-glances of human nature excel the theories of philosophers, calls it the "law of sin and death." The body has been weakened by diseases, and the soul has suffered with it; but the source of all his weaknesses lies in the spirit. Had this latter been enabled to attain to that development of energy and strength, which was its original endowment, then after its allotted time here on earth, it would have been able to bear up body and soul, and on expanded wings taken its flight to a better land without passing

through any dying agonies. But at best, in present circumstances, it escapes only with great difficulty out of the prison-house on earth, loaded down as it is with the burden of weakness which it has carried with it all its life-time. Now the transition can be made only through a dark river, where all must sink except those who are buoyed up by a living faith.

*Falsehood and Blindness.*—But here the empiricist comes in, who ignores all things, and attempts to set this aside with his experience. He says we know nothing of another world, and it is altogether doubtful whether man lives at all after he once dies. It is true, very true, that our present experience does not carry us beyond our present life, for the sufficient reason that it cannot in the nature of things do so. Insects, that live in the earth or the water in their first estate, cannot rise up into the air and have an experience there until the period of their transition arrives. The dragon-fly commences its existence in the water, and as long as water is its element, it can have no experience in the air; and therefore when it mounts up with its unfolded wings into the air, it cannot get back again into the water and there live over again its water-experience. So whilst men are confined to their earth-experience, they cannot get into the spiritual realms as a matter of experience, nor when they once get there, can they return to their old habitation in the flesh, when they are disembodied. It is, therefore, absurd to expect that some one should either go into the other world and then report to us that there is such a world, or that some one on the other side should come over the boundaries that separate us from the invisible world, and tell us that there is a house for us there not made with hands.

Empiricism has its rights, but reason has also, and the latter in the higher regions that lie beyond the plane of a man's sensible experience, when left to itself, is our best and most faithful guide. It says to men in all ages and of the most diverse temperaments in regard to a hereafter, "it must be so." Plato here reasons well, Cato reasons well, and so also does our own Addison. All deprecate the idea of "falling into naught,"

and a faithful contemplation of the spiritual elements of man's nature falls in fully with the catholic faith of the ages.

All that seems to be necessary to place our reason in right relation to a future life is, as it seems to us, to lay proper stress on the supremacy of man in creation, and then it will be seen that the two sides are in harmony. If, therefore, what has been said of him in the preceding paragraphs, be true, then immortality is a necessity, of the reason no less than of the conscience or moral sense. For only think of it. If the destination of man is what it is said to be; if instead of realizing that destiny, he has all his life-time, fallen short of it and been compelled to struggle with naught but adverse elements around him; and if, moreover, all the while he has been a sufferer, sending up wails of anguish and vain cries for help, then, if there is no hereafter, we must either say that there is no God, or curse Him and die. But reason, the light that is within us, teaches us better things.

NOTE.—We use reason here not as the theoretical or the practical reason, but in their unity. They are organically united and can neither be taken asunder or act in a separate capacity. Their divorce is the result of the extreme analytical tendency of a modern science, which has been justly censured by the Oriental philosopher, Chunder Sen, of India. In ancient times knowledge was knowledge, always combining in it the rational and moral element, as we find it in the Scriptures, where every other kind of knowledge or wisdom is considered as vain and empty. Kant, therefore, we think, made a fatal error in separating them, and affirming that the speculative reason is indifferent to the ideas of God, or of a future life, and of all others which flow from them, because they lie beyond the region of experience. Of course he upholds the interests of religion, because, as he maintains, these have their support in the practical reason. But what is that but saying that one part of the light, which is within us, asserts one thing, whilst another ignores it, or in fact even denies it! It simply leaves the most important questions that can engage the attention of men to the domain of feeling or conscience. We know, full well that they are safe in the

presence of such a tribunal, but what are we to think of our reason on which we justly pride ourselves! It would be little worth. Admit such a limitation to our rational nature as a concession, and it is easy to see that a door is left standing wide open for the entrance of scepticism, which Kant in his great Critique was anxious to arrest. Schelling, as if afraid of the logical reason, proceeds to invent a new faculty which he calls "Intellectual Intuition," but there is no good ground for such an invention. Reason is reason, in the understanding or soul, it is logical, as it must be, but higher up, it is also logical, intensely so, but intuitional at the same time.

*The Resurrection.*—The resurrection of man follows as a necessity from his immortality and a proper theory of his unity in body, soul and spirit. He is in all the elements of his being an indivisible monad. His external frame that is laid in the grave at his death is no longer his body. It is merely his corpse, a mass of outside material elements, which he used for his purposes for a time and then laid aside when they were no longer needed. The true body at death becomes once more germinal; not exactly an etherial wrapper or enswathement as some imagine, but a real potentiality, one that under proper conditions will develop itself into a spiritual body of immortal youth and beauty. It cannot be any longer psychic as our present bodies are, which correspond to our surroundings in nature. It must needs be pneumatic, pervaded with the spirit, as our bodies now are pervaded with the soul, so that it may be adapted to the new spiritual sphere in which it is to live. But a body in the unseen world will need a soul no less than it needed one here. Accordingly man will be saved, redeemed and renewed in the totality of his being in body, soul and spirit. Thus theory teaches, and if some sure word of prophecy comes in, and teaches us that this is an infallible truth, then again it is so much the better for us all.

*Eternal Death.*—We have seen that there is a pit somewhere in the universe of being, outside of our world, from which all evil springs. Will it ever be closed up and cease to be?

Neither theory, history, tradition, nor the divine oracles have answered the question in the affirmative. It is an awful mystery, with which we have nothing to do except to avoid it and try to keep our fellow men from being engulfed by it. It is bottomless in fact and theory, from which there is no deliverance except as men attain to a new life.

*Eternal Life.*—Eternal life like eternal death is also a great mystery, but it is distinctly visible to faith, as an overwhelming reality, although as yet seen through a glass darkly. It addresses itself to our spiritual natures, and we can easily see that it has already its foundation here in our experience in this life. There is such an experience as well as a lower psychic experience; there is a Canaan as well as an Egypt; there is a theory that embraces the cosmos as a necessity as well as one that can find no room for it in its category; and there is a philosophy that looks up as well as one that looks down. Of this the poet was the prophet when in an unphilosophic age he sang:

How charming is divine philosophy!  
Not harsh and crabbed,—  
But musical—as is Apollo's lute,—  
And a perpetual feast.

NOTES.

*Humanity.*—We are well aware that the idea of man or humanity, which we have all along treated as a reality, is regarded by many as a mere abstraction, as much so as the common name for trees or stones. A learned friend, who read our first essay, asks us what is the difference between man as a universal and a molecule. We reply that a molecule is an aggregation of particles that come together from different forces acting upon each other from without. The term that describes such a combination is of course an abstraction. An individual man on the other hand is an organism always having a definite form, in which the parts or organs are the result of an inner force, which is of the character of an objective thought or idea. Man

or men taken collectively, may be regarded as an aggregation of individuals like a forest or a pile of brick, and then the term mankind is an abstraction; and there is no real humanity anywhere. But individual men do not by any means stand in such an independent relation to each other as the trees in a forest, or the particles of a molecule. There are vital ties which hold them together as a race of beings, which shows itself in tribes, nations and distinct races, and point to a common end, to a common origin and a common life. With infinite variety in non-essentials, they form a genus or species which is here not an abstraction, a mere classifying term, but a general law or force, that holds the whole human race together as a totality, and gives it a generic as well as an individual character. This latter could not in fact exist or have reality without the former. The Latin poet had no doubt some dim intuition of this when he uttered the noble saying:

"Humani nihil a me alienum puto."

Pure nominalists who remand all universal into the region of abstractions here demur, as consistency require them to do. But all partizans are more or less one-sided, because they can embrace only a *part* of the truth, and that is always at the sacrifice of the other part. There is truth, we conceive, in realism just as surely as there are errors in it, as when it absurdly claims objective realities for all its universals. There are general thoughts in nature, in the animal and the vegetable worlds, constituting its truth, that are realities too palpable to be ignored; and humanity, which forms the most general and fundamental objective idea of creation, is also a reality, that is still more palpable than all other subordinate thoughts.

Theologians as well as philosophers differ in regard to this point, and, as we are well aware, stand in hostile camps. It is unfortunate that it is so, because many of their unhappy differences take their rise just here in a philosophical question. The Bible, which treats exclusively of God and man, ought on such a point to have great weight even apart from its claims to inspira-

tion. As the collected wisdom of ages, whilst it does not teach us natural science, it might be expected to teach us something about the nature of man. That it certainly does, indirectly at least. Glances into the internal constitution of man's internal constitution appear frequently, especially in the writings of St. Paul. On its first page indeed man is spoken of in his generality first; but throughout man and God are regarded as antithetical, which would certainly be an incongruous representation, if man were an abstraction. As we have already said, there is not only ground for such a generic idea of humanity, that embraces all individual men in an real objective syllogism, but also for one that goes further and takes in the order of nature in its full comprehension. The true primacy of man requires that also; and it matters not whether he is conscious of such an extension of his being or not; as we have already seen, he is conscious of only a small part of the activities of his body, and physiologists assert that it is well for the equanimity of his mind that he is not conscious of the whole energy given forth from his central self, which differentiates itself into fibres, veins, arteries and nerves, so minute and delicate, that to see them with the eye might seriously disturb his powers of locomotion. Much more, presumably, would he be appalled, if he were conscious of all the vital ties which connect him with the universe at large. Happily virtues can go forth from him as a central energy, of which he need not be directly conscious in his present frail estate. The Puseyite Wilberforce, eccentric as he was, is very instructive in what he has to say of the sacredness of humanity in his work on the Incarnation and elsewhere. He presents us with interesting illustrations of German thoughts that have passed through an English alembic.

Theologians of the left wing, pure nominalists, will regard all that has been here urged on the subject of humanity, as mere theory, or perhaps as something like transcendentalism. Well, they start out on a theory also, and it only remains to see which theory explains all the facts in the case, including the Bible, in the most satisfactory manner. History and the progress of aggres-

sive thought will have to decide that. Old methods of thought are breaking up everywhere; men are pushing their investigations into all parts of the universe; and they should not be specially alarmed if, out on such a voyage of discovery, they should on some bright day find themselves landing on transcendental ground. For ages they have been deceived by pantheistic notions and other abstractions, which as dense fogs obstruct and endanger the vessel of true progress. Some form of pan-anthropism is in our day very much needed to counteract the old and inveterate disease of pantheism. God, man, and nature are the only objective truths or realities with which we have to do. What is put in between them are all abstractions, empty shadows in the valley of death, without any substance or reality about them.

*The Family.*—The most palpable evidence that the term humanity has a reality for its object, shows itself in the subordinate realities that grow out of it and derive their vitality from it. The first of these is the family institution as it is called. Who can doubt that there is a family life? How wonderful it is in the organization of all its parts, in which the stronger protects the weaker, and all form one flesh, pervaded by the spirit of love, obedience and good order! From the beginning to the end it breathes the spirit of humanity. Beginning outwardly in the natural, it comes to its bloom in the spiritual; and when this law is set aside the institution falls into decay and is carried away with the whirlwind. Sceptical science can see nothing in it but a convenience, a mutual arrangement for a time. Of course it cannot see anything else.

*The State.*—The same learned friend from New England, to whom we have just referred, asks a similar question in regard to the state, and seems to regard it also as an aggregation. We admit that when we speak of different states, then the term used is as much of an abstraction, as trees or stones; but when we speak of the State we mean something, a concrete reality, something which the term actually describes. Here as in the case of the family our generic humanity differentiates itself on

a larger scale, and a new centrality makes its appearance, subordinate to that out of which it grows. So it is everywhere, in nature as well as in subjective thinking. In the human body as an organic whole, there are subordinate unities or systems, as in the separate apparatus for respiration, circulation or digestion, which seem to act independently of each other and from their own centres; and yet they are so connected together, that any disorder in the one affects all the rest and with them the whole man. Thus it is with the State. It is a part of humanity, not the whole of it; it takes in many of its vital interests, but not all of them, nor the most vital; it maintains order, protects the weak, and asserts the majesty of law; binds the citizens together by the bonds of mutual love, and opens up the way to all a free course in the pursuit of true happiness. Its true end, however, is the moral advancement of men, and it finds its basis in the spiritual nature of man, for which in its own way, if true to itself, it must constantly strive. It is an inspiration of God in man, a law of his being from which he can no more extricate himself with impunity, then he can from any other law that governs his bodily or mental activities. There is no nation or tribe so low or degraded in which it does not assert its presence. All savage tribes must have some kind of government, and are urged by an invisible power which they do not understand to maintain some kind of order, even when it is contrary to their prejudices and passions. And in civilized countries where for a time all order and authority are broken down, as once in California, Lynch law asserts itself and arming itself with a terrible power drives back chaos and anarchy.

The State may assume different forms in accordance with the light and intelligence of the people, but any violence done to its underlying thought is sure to bring about its own retribution. Much of the suffering and sorrow of the world's past history, its carnage and bloody fields, have their source just here in the violation of a divine thought or law, as when one nation seeks to oppress another, or turning in upon itself it abrogates its own law and plunges itself into the horrors of civil war. The

State is a sacred thing, not to be constructed by philosophers nor to be shaped by the whims and ways of men. Its duties also are all sacred, especially the casting of a vote. Formerly in some parts of Switzerland the people went first to their churches to pray, and then they cast their votes. It may be so still in some rural districts, where rationalism has not rooted out this good, pious custom, and taught the people that there is no use or profit in prayer.

*The Church.*—The State as a power of generic humanity seeks to organize man into a unity for the purpose of protection and his education and development. It is therefore always organic and brings about various organisms that represent the life of humanity in its general forms with more less truthfulness and majesty according to the age or culture of the people. But all such manifestations (*Verwirklichungen*) are only partial and of an external and imperfect character. They are at best only physical exhibitions of man, influenced no doubt by man's spiritual nature, but not truly spiritual. There is, therefore, a necessity for an organization that shall correspond to the spiritual-psychic element in man and be pervaded by it as its own life. This is found in the Church, which as an organizing power takes hold of man in the depths of his being and seeks to express his deepest life, as this is renewed by his union with God through Christ the Mediator. It shows itself palpably in man's psychic state, for there is scarcely a tribe or people which has not a religion or a church. To be realized, however, if it is to be realized at all, it must grow out of the renewed spirit of man, which has been so reconstructed and purified that it may become the abode of the Spirit of God. Thus regarded, the Church is a pneumatic body, just as the State is a psychic; and the supposition that the Church is to be finally absorbed in the State, as Richard Rothe advocates, is simply an impossibility. As well might we suppose that the spirit of man is to be taken up into his soul, the lesser absorbing the greater. What Schubert says of the two distinct activities of man applies with equal truth to the question here considered: *Der Geist ist die Kraft,*

*welche das Leibliche gestaltet; er ist die Ursache alles lebendigen Erregens und Bewegens. Menn die Seele des menschen zuweilen, wie diese so viele, weiter oben Erwähnte. Thatfachen bezeugen, an dem Leibe eine wundervolle heilende, umgestaltende Kraft bewies, so hat ihr hierzu der Geist aus seiner Lebensfülle das Vermögen geliehen.*

*The Kingdom of Heaven.*—The Church as it comes to view in history presents to us its human side, with human weaknesses, at times quite as prominent as in mere human institutions, so glaring too often in the past times, that under particular forms it has been denounced as an evil too grievous to be borne. The infirmities that have clung to it, however, are often magnified or been rendered so much the more conspicuous by the effulgence of the light which it itself diffuses around. But it has a divine as well as a human side. It has a divine head, a divine law and a divine spirit, and this constitutes it the kingdom of heaven on earth. The two conceptions are distinct, but they are nevertheless one, and refer to the same thing. The Church as a Spiritual Kingdom is in a measure germinal, potential, and something that is ever coming; hence its outward manifestation in history remains imperfect. It is, however, not an abstraction, nor a subjective idea outside of it, a plan or a scheme that is to serve as a model. The kingdom of heaven, we are told, is within you. It is the ultimate form which humanity is to assume, and which it is now assuming in the way of progressive development, the realization of the divine thought, the fulfilment of the word which God spake when He said, Let us make man, in our own likeness and in our own image.

## II.

### ON THE TESTIMONY OF LANGUAGE TO THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

BY PROF. JOHN B. KIEFFER, PH. D.

The writer acknowledges his obligations to the following articles and books.

Dr. Elam's article: "*The Gospel of Evolution*" in the Contemporary Review for May, 1880.

Dr. Calderwood's article: "*Herbert Spencer on the Data of Ethics*" in the Contemporary Review for January 1880.

Professor Goldwin Smith's article: "*Has science yet found a new basis for morality*" ? in the Contemporary Review for February, 1882.

Professor A. H. Sayce's "*Introduction to the Science of Language*, vols. I. & II.

Professor T. H. Key's "*Language, its Origin and Development*."

WHEN St. Paul declared to the Epicureans and Stoics assembled on Mars' Hill: "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation," and concluded with the words: "Because He hath appointed a day, in the which He will judge the world in righteousness by *that man* whom He hath ordained; whereof He hath given assurance unto all men, in that He hath raised Him from the dead," he was reaffirming the doctrine of the book of Genesis that the origin of the human race was specifically and numerically one,—and reaffirming it in the light of a new revelation—the revelation of the only begotten Son of God. For the second part of his declaration is the more emphatic, and the thought underlying it is the same as runs through the whole of the New Testament, that, namely, "As by one

460

man sin entered into the world and death by sin," "even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." And although Epicureans and Stoics jeered at a doctrine which ran counter to earthly wisdom and to all man's selfish propensities, it came eventually to be the accepted belief, as well at Athens as in all other parts of the world, and so, entering into the intellectual life of the world, was ultimately found to be in direct agreement with all that man had received by tradition respecting his own origin, as well as with the final conclusions to which their reasoning had brought the most gifted men of the world. For, on the one hand, (to use Prof. Max Müller's words), the idea that all mankind are derived from a single pair "is so natural and so consistent with all human laws of reasoning, that there has been no nation on earth, which, if it possessed any traditions on the origin of mankind, did not derive the human race from one pair, if not from one person;" and, on the other, it was not an unfamiliar thought, even to heathen philosophers, that human reason is insufficient to solve the problems of man's future being, and that "God *must* come down to man." It has been reserved for the Epicureans and Stoics of the nineteenth century to call this doctrine in question, and to do more than any other class of men of any age to involve in doubt everything that pertains to man's ethical and spiritual nature, and that once was held to be most well-established and most true. Their reasoning has brought them to such definite conclusions, indeed, that they affirm as an unquestionable fact that all supposed marks of difference between man and the brute,—physiological, intellectual, and moral,—have successively disappeared under the microscope of science, and that only the faculty of speech is left,—nay, that even the faculty of speech is only an apparent, and not any longer a real, distinction between man and the brute.

It becomes an interesting question, in view of this statement that if there be any distinction between man and the brute it is to be found in the faculty of articulate speech, whether the

science of language can throw any light on the origin of man, —whether it can bear positive testimony to his derivation from a single pair, or the contrary. And the question has by no means escaped the notice of linguists ; nor have they evaded it, or failed to answer it according to their several powers and prejudices. That a definite categorical answer cannot be given, either now or at some future time, on the basis of mere science is certain beyond any doubt. For science cannot prove the absolute beginning, or the absolute ending, of anything. It deals with the relative, it itself is relative, and so all the results to which it can hope to attain are necessarily relative also. If it strives for anything beyond this, “the edge of the human understanding is turned,” and from a theological basis the thinker plunges into gross anthropomorphisms, while from that of a purely human science he involves himself in endless assumptions and contradictions. The evolutionist, if he does not wholly disregard this truth, at least does so in part. He imagines that if he cannot explain to his reason the absolute beginning of things, he can at least bring within the scope of his scientific vision all *organic* existence, leaving only a small residuum of mechanical force and inorganic matter unexplained. He imagines that he can put absolute beginning so far from him that it need count for but little in his reasoning, and be of little or no essential weight in the determination of his conduct. But the evolutionist pays the penalty of his boldness, and finds that his conclusions are no sooner stated than they are found to involve contradiction and to be in violation of the first principles of sound reasoning. To use the language of a recent writer : “Evolution means either gradual creation by a creator on a definite plan, or the growth of non-existence into existence,—which is contrary to every principle of materialistic thought from beginning to end. It is true ‘evolution’ of the form ‘evolved’ was long before ‘involved’ in the creative will. But it is not evolution at all,—it is mere magic, if, at every step in the upward growth, physical forces are transforming themselves into something perfectly new which they did not before even

suggest, and becoming first chemical, then vital, then sentient, and lastly moral, by a spontaneous alchemy of their own."

We are led into this apparent digression on the subject of evolution, and will be obliged to dwell upon it to some extent, because that theory has entered the domain of linguistic science and has professed to build up the whole history of human speech along with the growth of man himself, from the point of absolute non-existence. For, while Mr. Darwin "with his usual candor confesses that the endowment of articulate speech is peculiar to man," Mr. Huxley, though he accepts the statement, modifies it in such a way as to make it be almost an admission that animals *might* have articulate speech, when he says that their not having it is due to some inconspicuous structural difference, and Dr. Büchner boldly declares that animals *have* articulate speech. Professor Sayce holds essentially the same view and says that "the difference between the beginnings of language which we detect in animals and the first attempts at speech of early man is but a difference of degree; but differences of degree become in time differences of kind." "Just as the rudiments of conscience and will exist in animals, so also do the rudiments of speech. Physiologically there is a greater chasm between the monkey and the chimpanzee than there is between the chimpanzee and man, and the moral and intellectual interval that divides the 'supreme Caucasian mind' from the Tasmanian or the smileless Veddah, seems at least as great as that which divides the latter from the anthropoid apes. Only the fact remains that no anthropoid ape has ever raised himself to the level of articulate speaking man. Between the ape and man *therefore* the evolutionist has *inserted* his *homo alalus*—his speechless man,—"whose relics may be discovered in Africa, or in the submerged continent of the Indian Ocean." We cannot stop now to characterize fully the methods on which this argument is conducted, but will only say in passing that it involves some strange positions. It is, for instance, an apparent contradiction to state that the faculty of speech, and "the power of forming concepts, of summing up generalizations

under single heads, which form the starting points for new generalizations" "constitute the one mark of distinction between man and the brute," and then to claim that articulate speaking man is derived from the speechless offspring of anthropoid apes, whose descendants through long ages were gregarious and not communal in their habits, lived in a condition of mutism and were destitute alike of thought and of morals, until after the lapse of unnumbered ages, having developed the hard and fast lines of the Xanthochroid, Melanochroid, white Albino, and copper skinned races, they formed the "first community and evolved the infantile language of mankind." The development of articulate speaking man from a speechless ancestor seems to be a contradiction,—seems to be a growth of non-existence into existence. Certainly if the premises of the evolutionist are granted, from the organless organisms of Prof. Haeckel's *History of Creation* to Herbert Spencer's *Data of Ethics*, it does seem to be clear sailing and the system to have a strange attractiveness and harmony. But if the results reached by Herbert Spencer are found to have been reached only by a virtual abandonment of the fundamental principles of evolution, and if it is found that Prof. Haeckel starts with an unproved assumption and at almost every successive step calls in his imagination to eke out the insufficient strength of his reason, the whole hypothesis is of questionable validity, to say the least. And certainly Dr. Calderwood discloses a vital weakness in the *Data of Ethics* when, commenting on Mr. Spencer's introduction to what he calls perfectly evolved conduct,—that is, a conduct which has ceased to be selfish and has become altruistic,—he points out that this altruism is not reached by following the line of evolution, but by the admission of what is called *antithesis*,—an element "not to be found in the evolution of structure, and function and action." And Dr. Elam performs the same kind office for Prof. Haeckel when he calls attention to the fact that he starts from the unproved assumption that there is nothing in the universe but mechanical force and matter, and that in his history of creation

each successive link is a creature of the Professor's imagination, the only proof of whose existence is given in the words that we are bound to accept it as a fact "auf den wichtigsten allgemeinen gründen"—for the weightiest general reasons—, or in the still more astounding assertion that if some such a creature as his *chordonia* did not exist the Ascidian would have had no ancestor, or at least no back bone!—Prof. Goldwin Smith reaches the same results as Dr. Calderwood with reference to the basis on which the Data of Ethics rests, and also with reference to the altruistic social state which Herbert Spencer would substitute for the hope of a future life which he discards. Mr. Mivart, himself a scientist, claims that man "differs fundamentally from every other creature which presents itself to our senses; that he differs absolutely, and therefore differs in origin also;" and Mr. Wallace, a close observer of natural facts and a faithful student of natural science, argues in favor of a special origin of man. Nay even Mr. Huxley admits that there "is an altogether immeasurable and practically infinite divergence of the human from the simian stirps." Not only do the opponents of Evolution, then, feel secure in discarding that hypothesis as an unproved theory and wholly inadequate to solve the problem of man's origin and the existence of his mental and moral nature,—but scientists themselves are not agreed as to the limits of its applicability, and hence are not perfectly certain that it is a secure basis for even scientific investigation to rest on.

Whatever we may say or believe, therefore, with respect to man's animal or physical nature, this much is certain, that the origin of the faculty of articulate speech, the power of conscious abstract reasoning, the possession of a moral sense and of religious sentiments, have not been, and cannot be, satisfactorily accounted for by any application of the theory of evolution, or, indeed, of any theory which has a purely physical basis. It is at every point found that there has been superadded to man's physical nature a something which cannot be derived from his physical nature;—that there are evidences in him of an infinitely higher beginning and an infinitely higher destiny than

that of any other creature, and that so far as scientific investigation into his faculty of speech, his moral sense, and his religious sentiments is concerned, we are obliged to confine ourselves exclusively to the data that are derivable from his own life and history, and should not resort to any purely physical theory for their explanation, especially to one which is still open to question, if not wholly unsound.

And the traditional view that has been held by the Church, and everywhere enforced by her, since the days of St. Paul, establishes precisely the same limitations for our inquiry as are left us when the theories of students of physical science are found to be inadequate to solve the problems it was hoped they might explain. For, if we are to believe that God made man in His own image, innocent and pure; and that man, by the exercise of moral freedom, fell from his high estate, and so sin entered into the world and death by sin, we are confronted with a mystery which is far beyond the power of man scientifically to analyze,—a spiritual cataclysm which defies the farthest reach of his most daring imagination and his profoundest thought. We cannot define the disorganizing power of sin; we cannot say how much of human development and of human history is normal and how much the result of sin; we cannot select certain phases of human life and declare that they alone are primitive, and all else derivative; we cannot affirm that the curse, not only became at once operative, but, without any intervening process of decay and gradual degradation, plunged all individual men into a condition of mental eclipse and speechlessness,—of moral debasement like that of the Papuan, or of religious benightment like that of the Fetichist; and, beginning from such a point as this, proceed to build up the structure of human life in all its symmetry, grandeur, majesty and power. We are left to accept the data of his life as we find them, and by a careful weighing of probabilities to approximate some general view.

Our query, therefore: Does language, or the study of language, furnish any testimony to the original unity of the human

race? must be answered, so far as it can be answered, from the data of language alone. A categorical answer, as we have said, cannot be given. We are obliged to confine ourselves to a weighing of probabilities and to rest satisfied with the results thus obtained. But, bearing this in mind, we believe that the testimony of human speech will be as much, to say the least, in favor of the derivation of mankind from a single pair of ancestors, as it will be in favor of their derivation from several or many different pairs. And the proofs of this will probably be found to fall under two general heads—those which are derived from the past history of language, and those which are derived from a consideration of its probable tendencies.

Before we proceed to this, however, we must notice two elements which will necessarily enter into the discussion, and which might be supposed to carry with them some determining weight, viz: man's capability for continuous progress, and the great antiquity to which the history of human speech, as well as the teachings of geology, carry back the age of civilized man. With reference to man's capability for continuous progress and his "power of utilizing the registered experience of past generations," we have to bear in mind, not only our inability to say what was the primitive condition from which such progression started, but also the fact that this power is everywhere and always accompanied by a canceling power of retrogression. It is admitted, for instance, that the languages of the Polynesians and of the Arctic Highlanders have lapsed from a superior level of civilization, and if the Lydian, Etruscan and Basque languages, by refusing to acknowledge any genetic relationship to existing families of speech, prove themselves to be the waifs of long since extinct and forgotten families of language, we can see how this retrogression may lead to utter extinction and leave the line of development broken and full of gaps. However valuable, therefore, the study of the languages of savages may be, it is not hence to be concluded that they necessarily represent the primitive speech of mankind. They only bring to view the fact that language may and does grow from simpler to more

complex forms, but do not by any means prove that the original language was the language, it may be, of mere signs and interjections. They help to illustrate and establish the doctrine that language is of human origin, so far as its form is concerned, and has its character determined by the mental and spiritual condition of those who use it; but they do not definitely settle for us what was the original condition of the race, whether civilized or barbarous.

And if there be any value at all in the argument from the remote antiquity to which the records of human speech carry back the age of civilized man, it tends to prove man's origin from a single pair of ancestors, rather than from many and different pairs. For it certainly would require a longer continuance of development in order that languages should reach the widely discriminated forms and the vast multiplicity of dialectical variations which they present in the historical period, if they all were the offshoots of one parent speech than if they were derived from several. If the old Egyptian of 4000 or 5000 years B. C., the Accadian of 4000 B. C., and the original stock of the Aryan languages of 4000 B. C., were the languages of peoples who were already civilized, either that must have been the original condition of man, or there must have been a preceding development covering as much time, probably, as has elapsed since that date. And in the latter case there is no telling whether this development was not also, like the historical development, from civilized forms,—for all the traces of those old languages are irrecoverably lost. Nor is there any evidence to show that they were not the languages of an originally unique race, which, during long ages, was being differentiated in countless ways and by countless changes of condition and circumstance on the part of the language-speakers.

If the question be asked, now: What is the most important testimony that language gives to the original unity of the human family? the answer would probably be: The evidence which it presents that all men of all ages, and of all climates and conditions, possess the same inherent nature. Even Pro-

fessor Sayce, from his evolutionary standpoint, declares that "after all, languages, however unallied, have all originated under similar circumstances from men of similar mould." But he does this at the same time that he declares the hard and fast lines of race distinction to have been long in existence before the first infantile effort at human speech was made, and otherwise argues in favor of the theory of Prof. Haeckel. Now it is undoubtedly true that a present apparent unity of nature is not necessarily incompatible with the origin of the race from a number of different centres. For it is conceivable that the antecedents of such centres might be so nearly of the same character, that the nature of all their descendants would be sufficiently similar to account for all the evidences of oneness of nature that language furnishes. Especially would this be the case if the admission were made, as it was by Agassiz, that, even if man started from different centres, he was in each case the result of a creative act on the part of a personal creator, who had for all the offspring of such creations one and the same destiny in view. But in that case the burden of proof would rest on those who hold to an origin from different centres. And that they have failed to give satisfactory proof of their position is evident, not only from the general unsoundness of the hypothesis of evolution, but also from the fact that, if valid, that hypothesis might possibly lead in the direction of unity. Asa Grey, in his work on Natural Selection, as not inconsistent with Natural Theology, says: "Here the lines converge as they recede into the geological ages and point to conclusions which, upon Darwin's theory, are inevitable, but hardly welcome. The very first step backward makes the negro and the Hottentot our blood relations; not that reason or Scripture objects to that, though pride may." If, then, man's origin from a number of different centres has not already been established on other than linguistic grounds, we are justified in regarding whatever evidence of a unity of nature among men the study of language brings to view as pointing immediately in the direction of a unity of origin.

And such evidence is furnished us not only by multitudes of particulars that are brought to light in the course of the study, but as well also by the general conclusions of different schools and scholars of language. It is now very generally known that when Franciscus Bopp visited England in 1816, and devoted himself to the study of the language of the Rig Veda, he was entering upon a work for the languages of Europe, and of the whole world, which had been done for the sacred speech of India 2300 years before,—the work of demonstrating to the western world, as Pāncini had done to the eastern, that there is a Science of Language as well as of Mathematics. And in the course of this study he was led to recognize the fact that the ultimate result of word-analysis is the *root*, and that all vocabularies have been built up out of a comparatively small number of these roots. Assuming the root, therefore, to be the original unit of human speech, he divided the languages of the world into three general classes: 1st, those “which are without a grammar,” 2nd, those “which start with monosyllabic roots, and by the help of composition end with a grammar,” and 3rd, those “which express the relations of grammar by internal change” of the root or word. In other words, he recognized the three generally accepted divisions of language known as the *Radical*, the *Agglutinative* and the *Inflectional* groups of speech, to which have since been added the *Incorporative* and the *Poly-synthetic*. In his theory *roots* constituted the material of primitive speech, by composition of roots languages passed into the agglutinative stage, which is but a lower form of the highest type of all language, viz: the Inflectional. Accepting this to be true, Professor Whitney and his school boldly assert that “Indo-European language, with all its fullness and inflective suppleness, is descended from an original monosyllabic tongue; our ancestors talked with one another in single syllables, indicative of the ideas of prime importance, but wanting all designation of their relations.” In other words, Inflectional languages have passed through the process of agglutination; agglutinative languages have advanced beyond the radical stage,

and the radical, or isolating root languages, represent the primitive condition of all speech. According to this classification the language of China stands at the foot of the scale; the languages of the early Accadians, the Turks, the Finns and the Mongols represent a higher development; and the Aryan and Semitic languages, the most perfect forms of articulate utterance.

But this theory has been found by another school of linguists to be highly unsatisfactory. For if the original roots of language expressed only "the ideas of prime importance without any designation of their *relations*," how could they be adapted to the needs of beings whose whole life and every thought was *relative*? How could primitive man have had abstract notions as his first endowment of mind? Attention was called to the fact, too, that the roots that underlie such languages as the Hebrew and Arabic are absolutely unpronounceable skeletons—utterly useless until they have been clothed with flesh and blood and converted into words. The root, k-t-l, for instance, that underlies the Hebrew *kátal*, *kotél*, *k'tol*, *kátál*, *katl*, *kítl*, *kull* is a mere phonetic type having the general sense of killing, but being utterly unpronounceable until it has become a word by the insertion of variable vowel sounds. Besides, it is urged that we do not know what a root is in any such an absolute sense as this theory presupposes. There is nothing to prove that what we now designate roots were not at one time themselves words. On the contrary, there are many reasons for believing that the so called primitive roots had a history and are no more nor less than the worn remains of irrecoverable words. "An elementary work on French etymology groups words like *rouler*, *roulement*, *roulage*, *roulier*, *roulette*, *routis* round a root *roul*," and if we had no means of tracing it further we should be obliged to accept *roul* as a root. But our knowledge of Latin, and of the close connection of French with Latin, enables us to see at once that we have in this 'root' the abraded remains of the Latin *rotula*. And so again in the Greek word for life *Bíos*, we have what answers all the requirements of a primitive root, and it is

not until we find it to be the same as the Latin *vivere*, "to live," that we begin to suspect what its true origin was. In *vixi*, the perfect tense of *vivere*, we find that an original guttural has been dropped out of the word,—that in fact it is the same as the English *quick* and the Sanskrit *jivitam* life, and originally was a word containing the reduplicated root *gwi-gwi*. And the opponents of an original language of roots claim also that the existence of classes of roots having the same sound but different meanings points to the same fact. We have a root *kar* "making," another root *kar*, "mingling," and another root *kar*, "cutting;" and in the old Egyptian language *ab* means to dance, a heart, a calf, a wall, to proceed, to demand, the left hand, and a figure; and in old Chinese *tik* meant to throw and a joint. Now, as in Aryan tongues such homophonous roots as *kar* were differently inflected; in old Egyptian such as *ab* were discriminated by a change in the accompanying hieroglyphic; and in Chinese such as *tik* were distinguished by a difference of tone, it has seemed more than probable that in such homophonous words we have indications of a preceding stage of development in which these roots had not coalesced, but were just as distinct as any other sets of words.

This school of linguists have consequently abandoned the theory of an original root language, and, believing that all the so called roots of the historical period are only the remains of a prehistoric stage of growth in which they were words, have been ready to adopt a theory propounded by the anthropologist Waitz, who says that "as we do not think in words but in sentences, and as language is the expression and embodiment of thought, it is clear that the unit of language must be the sentence and not the word," or root. And the adoption of this view has led to a different classification of the languages of the world. Holding fast to the nomenclature of the other school, its advocates begin with the polysynthetic tongues of the American Indians which, they say, like the mountains of the Western Hemisphere, are the oldest in the world; above them in the order of development stand the agglutinative forms like those of

the Turk, the Mongol and the ancient Accadian; above these, again, the inflective forms like the Aryan and Semitic; and above these the root or isolating languages, like the Chinese. The order has been completely reversed, and Chinese, instead of being the most primitive language has passed through the longest period of change and abrasion, while English, Latin, Greek and Hebrew, instead of marking the highest point of development, stand below the Chinese, but at the same time give unmistakable evidence—especially the English—that they, too, are on the high road to the isolating or radical stage.

Neither of these theories, now, weakens the testimony in favor of the original unity of the human race derivable from the unity of human nature as indicated by language. For it is possible to show that the universal adoption either of the root or of the sentence as the unit of speech is as much in favor of man's origin from a single pair of ancestors, as it is in favor of his origin from several or many pairs. For, if we turn our attention to the root as the unit of speech, the first and chief difficulty that confronts us is that the roots of different families of speech are not alike, cannot be derived from one another, nor from any known common source, and give very definite evidence of having grown up under different circumstances and among men who looked at the world from entirely different points of view. The roots of Hebrew, Arabic, and all other Semitic tongues, are trilateral and trisyllabic, or dissyllabic, and all attempts at reducing the polysyllabism of the Semitic languages to a monosyllabic base, so as to be in agreement with the Aryan tongues, have utterly failed. It looks, consequently, as if we have here two families of speech that are not derivable from men who possessed the same mental and spiritual nature,—an argument, therefore, in favor of a diversity of origin for speakers of Aryan and speakers of Semitic languages. But the fact that we are not now, and perhaps never will be, able to prove beyond a peradventure the derivation of Semitic and Aryan roots from a common source, determines nothing either one way or the other. We can only consider the probabilities in the

case, and here a remark of Lazarus and Steintahl, as quoted by Carl Abel in his *Linguistic Essays* from a psychological basis, is of pertinent force. In the preamble to their "*Zeitschrift für Völker psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*" they say: "Those explorers of language who would tread in Humboldt's footsteps should seriously endeavor to discover in each language the peculiar imprint of the national mind. It seems to us that linguistic science, psychologically viewed, contains a wealth of the most interesting and important tasks scarcely dreamed of until now. Language not only presents a nation's view of the world, but also the reflex of its perceptive faculty." If we apply such a test as this to the origin of roots, it can readily be seen how such a diversity as exists between Semitic and Aryan speech could originate. For, to say nothing of the fact that the monosyllabic period in the history of Aryan languages is supposed to have been preceded by another which was wholly polysyllabic, and that monosyllabic roots are not entirely unknown to the Semitic tongues, the case is by no means so hopeless as at first sight it would appear to be. "The Semite has never developed a true verb; such verbs as he has presuppose a noun just as much as the Aryan noun, on the contrary, presupposes the verb." So that "the Aryan sentence is well-fitted to be the instrument of reasoned rhetoric just as the Semitic is of the broken utterances of lyrical emotion." The points of view of the Aryan and the Semite, therefore, according to this statement of Prof. Sayce, are polar opposites. The one is in the totality of his being objective and the other subjective. But we are not *therefore* forced to conclude that they represent two different lines of language development which sprang from absolutely different sources and began to converge only, in proportion as social contact operated to break down their differences. We are bound to bear in mind that it *was* possible for the Xanthochroid, Melanochroid, White Albino and Copper-skinned races to be developed out of a common stock by the influence of a multitude of complicated causes. And it was just as possible for the moral and spiritual attitude of communities of men

who had sprung from a common source, to be differentiated at the same time and by the same causes as led to the establishment of the hard and fast lines of race distinction. And this possibility is much strengthened in proportion as linguistic research is carried farther back into the remote past. The old Egyptian, which can be traced on contemporaneous monuments to an antiquity of about 6,000 years, has undoubtedly a close connection with the Semitic languages. But it is not wholly Semitic. On the contrary "the *primitive roots* and the essential elements of the Egyptian grammar," according to Brugsch, "point to an intimate connection with the Aryan as well as with the Semitic language." And so close was this connection that the language, as well as much else that belonged to *old Egypt*, has been the puzzle of modern scholars, and has forced them to the reluctant admission that one language may possibly borrow from the grammar of another. If we bear in mind now how small would be the influence of social contact in a period so remote we are justified in supposing that the affinity of old Egyptian to Aryan speech implies an inherent and not an accidental relation; that it implies a twofold tendency in the development of Egyptian life, and thought,—the one line bearing in the direction followed by the Aryan forms of speech, and the other, in that followed by the Semitic; and that it therefore points to the possibility that the Semite and the Aryan were descended from a common stock, had the same mental and spiritual endowment, started with the same view of the world; and that their several differences, however great and irreconcilable now, were the gradual result of a difference of environment. And this view seems to receive added strength from a consideration of the spiritual and ethical condition of the Egyptians in the historical period—in which they appear to be both subjective and objective, and in a state of perpetual hesitancy, as Hegel says.

And the same testimony to an original unity of nature among language speakers who now are most widely separated from one another is furnished by the consideration of another

problem. Prof. Sayce and other linguists speak of the agglutinative, inflectional and isolating, or radical, languages in terms which imply that an agglutinative language always was agglutinative; an inflectional, always inflectional; and an isolating always isolating. They say, for instance, that "Aryan languages started with flection and made their agglutinative compounds conform to the prevailing analogy;" and that, while such languages as the English are both agglutinative and isolating in many respects, and even incorporating, too; and the isolating Chinese shows much that is agglutinative, as well as much that is inflectional, the lines that separate these different forms of speech are definite and fixed and have always been so. But, as showing that the assertion although applicable to historical times may not always have been so, they are forced to make such concessions as that the "Etruscan, in spite of its agglutinative character, wears so frequently an inflectional appearance that scholars of repute have tried to compare it now with Semitic and now with Aryan." In other words, it is by no means a settled question that agglutinative languages always were agglutinative or inflectional languages, always inflectional. Such scholars as Weske and Professor Key have contended for the inclusion of the Finnic and Lapp languages, which are agglutinative, within the Aryan family, or, at least, for the possibility that there was such a thing as a process from agglutination to inflection, or from inflection to isolation. And their contention rests on very substantial grounds, indeed. For instance, when we compare the Lapp and Finn personal pronouns *mon* and *minä*, "me;" *mo* and *minum*, "mine;" *don* and *tämä*, "thou;" *du* and *tämän*, "thine;" *su* and *hänen*, "his," with the Aryan pronouns the resemblance is very close, indeed; or when we compare the Lapp *mocum*, "with me," and *tocum*, "with thee," with the Latin *mecum* and *tecum*; or the Lapp and Finn use of the particle *ek* or *ke* to emphasize a pronoun precisely as it is used in the Latin *hicce*, *haecce*, *hocce*; or the use of the particle *quin* with the Latin *qui*, *quad*, *quod*, as a relative pronoun; or the indefinite *eu-ca* with the Latin

*quisque* ; or the Lapp *akt*, one, with the Sanskrit *eka* ; or *lokke*, ten, with the Lithuanian *lika*, "which is generally accepted as a variety of the Greek *δέξα*, the *l* superseding a *d* as in our *eleven* and *twelve*" ; or the adjective *jorbes*, round, *jorbesub*, rounder, *jorbesumus* roundest, with the Latin *prope*, *propior*, *proximus* ; or the Ostiak verb *madddom*, *maddn*, *madd* ; *madau*, *maddr*, *madáda*, with the Sanskrit *bhavámi*, *bhavasi*, *bhavati* ; *abhavam*, *abhavas*, *abhavat*, we cannot avoid the conviction that the Finnic and Lapp languages sustain a very close relation, indeed, to the Inflectional forms of speech.

The same is true with reference to the Chinese. This is the typical representative among philologists of the radical or isolating type of languages, and it is generally held to be of a peculiarly monosyllabic character and utterly destitute of grammar. But it is doubtful whether even yet the language of China has been satisfactorily investigated. At any rate its study has been carried on under very great difficulties,—the remoteness of the country, the long continued opposition of its government to any intercourse with western nations, and the jealousy with which foreigners are regarded even to the present day. It is with some justice, therefore, that Professor Key doubts whether a careful study of the language, as used by the common people, and as constituting the dialects of the celestial empire, would satisfactorily sustain the view prevalent among scholars. But, independently of a doubt which can be cleared away only by further study, there are evidences in what we already know of Chinese sufficient to make a contrary view very reasonable, if not to establish its truth beyond question. Even Professor Sayce holds that, if we could get back far enough, we should be likely to find that the roots of Chinese originally were polysyllabic, as many of the Thibetan roots have been shown to be, and that their present monosyllabic form is due to phonetic decay. If this be true, Chinese has completed the process going on at the present time in our own language,—for instance, the rejection of the genitive in *s* and the substitution of the preposition *of*—the process of in-

dividualizing thought. But, in addition to this, we find that Chinese is by no means destitute of what may be called a grammar—and justly so. It has its *empty words*—that is, words which have been stripped of their nominal or verbal meaning, and are used as auxiliaries to express relations of thought. Thus *ki*, place, *li*, interior, *y*, to use, have been appropriated as a relative pronoun, and the signs of the locative and instrumental cases respectively; *t'sie*, thief means *I, tsian*, bad, and *ling*, noble, mine and thine. But, beside this, “as sounds disappeared and words formerly distinct came to assume the same form, a new device was needed for marking the difference between them. This was found in the multiplication of the *tones*, which now number eight, though only four are in common use.” And what is this but the effort of the language-speakers to replace by *tone* the means of expressing grammatical relations which the tendency to economy in utterance had destroyed? “The mere inspection of a Chinese grammar” (!), it is said, “tells us that a certain syllable affixed to a Chinese substantive serves to express the relation which Europeans denote by the term ‘genitive case’; that another syllable added may imply plurality, and so on with the other secondary relations of grammar.”

And other languages besides the Chinese furnish the same evidence that agglutination, inflection, and isolation are only relative terms and do not imply fixed boundary lines that hem in the different orders of human speech in such a sense that the one cannot, and never did, give place to the other. Prof. Max Müller holds that there is no such thing as a mixed language—that is, a language in which the grammatical structure belongs partly to one and partly to another family of speech. But, to say nothing of the argument which might be derived from the ease with which, for instance, the Semites adopted the civilization, literature and written characters of the agglutinative Accadians, the classified catalogue of the languages of the earth furnish not a few instances that negative such a position. The Dravidian languages of West-

ern Asia, we are told, show unmistakable signs of inflection, although they are agglutinative, as also do the Bantu of Southern, and the Mpongwe of Western Africa; nay, the Hottentot languages are classified as semi-inflectional, whatever that term may imply. In Asamese, again, which appears to be an Aryan, or inflectional language, the plural affix *bilak* is inserted between the noun and case-ending, so that from *manu-bilak*, men, we get a genitive *manubilakor*, a dative *manubilakoloi*, and so on, where the postpositions are said to be of other than inflectional origin; and the same peculiarity is found in the language of Harar in North Africa, which is Semitic. And, although in such cases as the Singhalese the uncertainty of their agglutinative, or inflectional, character may be due to an insufficient study of them, the same can hardly be said of the Aryan *Phelevi* or *Huevdresh*, which is given as an undoubted instance of mixed grammar. It will not do to say that all these are chance resemblances produced by analogy in one case, and by phonetic decay in another, for we do not know to what extent analogy has been operative in any given language in excess of phonetic decay, or contrariwise. These causes are everywhere at work in human speech, and if their combined results make it appear that the languages of the world are interpenetrable to one another, we must needs accept the fact. It makes no difference whether such a mixture be brought about by one cause or another; if it is true that a language may be partly isolating and partly inflectional, or partly inflectional and partly agglutinative, we must admit that a change from one form into another is possible.

If now we add that communities have abandoned their languages absolutely in favor of others, as did the Kelts of Cornwall, the Wends of Prussia, the Negroes of Hayti, and the Aborigines of America; if we bear in mind the account given by Sir C. Lyell, in which he states that "a German colony in Pennsylvania was cut off from frequent communication with Europe for about a quarter of a century, during the wars of

the French revolution, between 1792 and 1815, and so marked had been the effect of this brief and imperfect isolation that when Prince Bernhardt of Saxe Weimar travelled among them a few years after the peace he found the peasants speaking as they had done in Germany in the preceding century, and retaining a dialect which at home had already become obsolete;” if we recall what Humboldt tells us, “that in South America, together with a great analogy of physical constitution, a surprising variety of languages is observed among nations of the same origin, and which European travellers scarcely distinguish by their features”; if we remember that the manifold languages of the Malayan and Polynesian Archipelago can be traced back to a common source, and that before “the utter extinction of the Tasmanians, with a population of only fifty persons there were four dialects, each with a different word for ‘ear,’ ‘eye,’ ‘head,’ and other equally common objects”; that Greece with its small “extent of country and still smaller amount of population was said a few years back to possess no fewer than seventy dialects”, and that among the 600,000 people who speak the Basque tongue persons living only forty miles apart are mutually unintelligible; when we remember all this, we can see not only how universally operative the law of change is in language, whether civilized or not, and how rapidly it works out most astonishing results, but also how great the possibility is that the languages of men who have had a common origin, and therefore the same mental and spiritual endowment, may diverge, whether into isolation as over against inflection, or into agglutination as over against isolation,—that, indeed, there is no limitation to the manner in which languages may develop. Especially is this true, if we are forced to admit by reason of such examples as the Etruscan and Lykian, that inflectional, as well as agglutinative languages have disappeared from the earth, leaving not even a trace behind them. For in that case we would have at least the privilege of surmising that those languages, could they be recovered, might furnish additional proofs of the unlimited character of human speech in the matter of its changeability.

Moreover, although it is undoubtedly true that language cannot determine ethnological relationships, the very fact that its divisions are not dependent upon racial differences adds weight to the argument from a community of nature to a unity of origin. The Jews of Austria and Turkey believe that the Spanish of the 15th century is their sacred language, and "the Spaniards themselves have forgotten that any other language, whether Iberian, Keltic, or Teutonic, ever existed in Castile beside Latin." Two-thirds of the vocabulary of the Basque language is French or Spanish, and "races physiologically as distinct as Mongols and Turks may be found speaking allied tongues," while others physiologically related like the Jews of Europe and the Bedouins of Arabia may be found speaking unallied tongues. Nay, even such an authority as the great German linguist Grimm has advised his countrymen to abandon their native tongue in favor of the English as being better suited to the wants of the age. All these, and many more examples of the same kind that might be adduced, go to show that language is the expression of a common human thought; that the laws of human thought are everywhere the same; and that, however much the forms adopted for the expression of human thought may in time and by reason of a multitude of causes come to vary, these variations interpose no impassable barrier between men who use one form of speech and those who use another. The dweller along the banks of the Nile and the dweller along the banks of the Rhine may be mutually unintelligible; the vocal organs of different classes of language-speakers may have come to be so variously formed that the Polynesian will have to say *Raviri* for David, *Hemara* for Samuel, *Ranana* for London, *Waratariki* for Frederick, or the Iclander *tila* for steel; men may have come to think of their surroundings in different ways, so that a Roman could say *high down*, as well as *high up*, or a Greek *near from* where we say *near to*, and all these differences of tendency and growth may have so ingrained themselves in the character of different peoples, as to have led to the establish-

ment of forms of speech which apparently were of different origin,—and yet the fact remain that they were all of one origin; the thought they embodied, in all cases a thought common to all men; the mental and spiritual nature which they represented, a nature common to all men,—and all this traceable and capable of explanation in the way which we have endeavored to point out.

And the case remains essentially the same if we regard the sentence as the original unit of language. There is absolutely no proof that the simple sentence was the first or primitive form for the expression of thought. Just as the roots to which we can trace back words are only the types that seem to underlie words, but may themselves in all cases possibly have been words in an irrecoverably lost condition of language, so the simple sentence does not necessarily mark the primitive condition of speech. There is no conclusive evidence that it, too, may not be the result of a foregoing degradation from a complex form. And so long as this is the case, Prof. Max Müller is undoubtedly right in his position that “no theory, whether it be a theory of imitative cries, or a theory of interjectional utterances, has succeeded in its task of explaining the origin of language.” We are in precisely the same position, therefore, with respect to the sentence as we were with respect to the root; and all that has been said on the basis of the root theory about language proving an original community of nature among all men, and thus pointing to a unity of origin, is equally applicable to the sentence theory also.

The second general proof that the testimony of language favors the theory that all men are derived from a single pair, is to be found in the destination to which, in all probability, human speech is tending. “The guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories of the ancients respecting language put together,” are the words of Prof. Jowett, and he is undoubtedly right. And so when Plato represents Socrates as often dreaming that there must be an absolute or ideal language, just as there is an absolute or ideal good, and an absolute or ideal

beauty, he is treading that mysterious borderland that separates ancient from modern life and thought, even as he is when he speaks of education, or tries to prove the immortality of the soul and a future state of reward and punishment, or reaches out after the idea of God as one and not many, as personal and not abstract, and shows that the twilight of the ages is come and that men are waiting with expectant hope for the full light of the dawning day. And this dream of the man in whom were summed up all the best tendencies of ancient philosophy was partially realized when the strong arm of the Roman state, together with a uniform law and uniform government, imposed upon its dependencies an almost uniform speech. Nay, even when the Roman power was shattered, and an ecclesiastical hierarchy took its place, the dream still lingered in many a school of learning and many a monastic retreat. In the chaos of the German Reformation, when nation stood against nation envious and mistrustful, the dream was forgotten, but forgotten only to be recalled in a way that made it seem to be a prophecy and no longer a dream. In the middle of the seventeenth century Bishop Wilkins composed his essay towards a "Real character and a Philosophical Language," and in 1744, Leibnitz "had acquired a perfectly clear insight into his ideal of a universal language." What these two able men deemed to be desirable and possible as a medium of intercourse between scholars has in the present century come to be regarded as no longer the "empty dream of an idle day," but one of the results towards which human life is looking, and which is kept in waiting only by the still remaining imperfections of our social and religious development. A universal language is, in brief, the end and practical object towards which the linguistic science of the age is looking, and the prophecy has been ventured that when that universal language comes it will necessarily be some modified form of English.

And this prediction of linguistic science, at least in its general features, rests on substantial ground. It is a commonly known historical fact that there is a broad mark of distinction

between the ancient and the modern world, and that the point at which the divergence begins is the birth of Christ, the establishment of the Christian Church, the formation and spread of the Christian Creed. No other so-called "world religion" has had the intrusive and controlling, reforming power of this; nor has any other, with its law *Be this*, instead of *Do this*, sought in like manner to lay hold of man's inner nature, to transform it and to settle it upon an entirely new centre. It, and it alone, has succeeded in giving to human life and human institutions a universal coherency and uniformity. Those vast empires that preceded the Christian era, and those wondrous civilizations that in some respects surpassed even our boasted culture, all moved in the line of their own selfhood, and hence were confined to but a single narrow sphere or the elaboration of but a single factor in human life. The Assyrian Empire was an empire of brute despotic power; the national life of the Jew was lost in rapturous contemplation of the supernatural and divine. Egypt represents to us the human spirit in a state of irresolute doubt; Greece moved in the line of human intelligence and earthly beauty, and Rome developed the principle of military power and constitutional law. But none of them realized in the slightest degree the sense of a common brotherhood among men. Even to the cultured Greek all men who were not of the same blood with him and spoke not the same language were barbarians. Hence came a cruelty the record of which is often revolting to our senses. Hence came the barbarities of a predatory warfare and the justification of human slavery. Before the Christian era human life was a life of isolation, and only dimly foreshadowed, in the gradual massing together of tribes of the same ethnic origin and the same language into distinct nationalities, the possibility of a universal community.

The Star of Bethlehem heralded the dawn of an age of meekness and righteousness, of mercifulness, purity, and peace, and these beatitudes grounded themselves in precisely that principle which was unknown to the ancient world,—the universal brotherhood of man. And in proportion as this sense of a commun-

ity of nature came to be generally recognized throughout Christendom, in that proportion did the conditions and activities of the world begin to take on new forms and human life to flow in new channels. Men and nations ceased to move in antagonistic and isolating lines, to exalt the self-hood of the individual, to justify might over against right. Men came to feel that they *were* "members one of another," that the strong must protect the weak, that there is a future for humanity, and hence a higher responsibility, as well for the nation as for the individual, than attaches to material prosperity or present pleasure as the motives of conduct,—nay, a responsibility which involves the necessity of giving the farthest possible contemporaneous extension and perfection, not to one only, but to all, of the elements that enter into our common human life, so that in all civilized communities every tendency to the undue exaltation of any one element is checked and counterbalanced by the rising into prominence of another.

In the degree, now, in which this sense of a community of nature and destiny is disseminated among men and perfected, it is reasonably supposed, will be developed a sense of the need of a common language,—not necessarily a language in which there will be no room for the peculiarities of individuals and the natural influences of differences of locality, but a language which will be universally intelligible,—a language which will reflect the brotherhood of man. And, as we have already said, there are not wanting signs of its coming. When a given language is heard from the lips of a larger number of persons than any other, and has already made itself the language of commerce and of trade; when science also is claiming it as hers, and Swedish and Danish writers are beginning to recognize it as such and to use it in place of their native tongues; when a government resolves to adopt it, as did the Japanese; and when it can be prophesied that some modified form of that language will eventually be the common language of mankind, we are justified in believing that all this is predictive of the future,

and that sooner or later, in some form or other, the prediction will be realized.

Now a tendency to a universal speech, as growing out of a community of nature, does not, necessarily and of itself, prove a community of origin on the part of language-speakers. But when it is taken in connection with the facts that a diversity of origin has not been established on other than linguistic grounds, that we have received a uniform tradition of unity of origin, and that the past history of human speech lends its testimony as readily in favor of a unity, as of a diversity, of origin, surely it helps to establish a presumption in favor of an original unity, and gives an additional warranty to the statement that whatever testimony with reference to man's origin can be gathered from the study of language may be said to be in favor of the traditional view. At least for these reasons we are justified in refusing to accept the opposite conclusions of some scientists until they have shown on grounds more incontrovertible than any yet offered what was the primitive condition of man and what the manner of his development, and in believing that the words of St. Paul, on which we based the first and second part of our argument, have not yet been set aside: "God hath made of one blood all the nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed and the bounds of their habitation. . . . Because He hath appointed a day in the which He will judge the world in righteousness by that man whom He hath ordained whereof He hath given assurance in that He hath raised Him from the dead."

### III.

#### FREEDOM OF THEOLOGICAL THOUGHT.

BY REV. WILLIAM RUPP.

WHEN the Reformers of the Sixteenth century successfully resisted the power of the Catholic church, and refused in matters of religion to be governed by anything else than the Word of God, they accomplished a great fact: that fact was the emancipation of the Christian mind from all outward authority in spiritual things.\* The Bible, as the original record of divine revelation, and the permanent embodiment of God's word, was thus made the only source and the supreme rule of Christian faith and knowledge.

In taking this position the same relation was assumed to exist between the Christian mind and the Word of God contained in Scripture, as that which exists between the human mind and the objects of its knowledge universally, namely, a relation of direct contact and immediate communication. In knowing, the mind can permit no foreign authority to come between itself and its object. The certitude which the mind possesses concerning an object of knowledge, cannot be derived from any other source than that object itself. Thus, in the science of Astronomy, for example, the ultimate ground of certainty, the absolute and final authority for the settlement of all questions, does not consist in a long stream of astronomical tradition, nor in the utterances of a great number of illustrious men, but is to be found only in the starry heavens themselves. The astronomer of to-day may have learned many things from his predecessors, and, without availing himself of the benefit of their labor, could not have attained to his

\* M. Guizot considers this to be the one fact of paramount importance accomplished by the Reformation. *History of Civilization*, Lect. xii.

present eminent position; still he will not, for that reason, accept the conclusions of his predecessors as being of binding authority for himself, but, on the contrary, he will ever appeal to the stars themselves as the ultimate ground of certitude in all matters pertaining to his science. In like manner the Reformers appealed to the Bible as the ultimate authority and ground of certitude for the individual Christian thinker. The Christian thinker cannot admit any foreign authority between himself and the Bible, any more than the student of nature can admit a foreign authority between himself and the object of his science.

Such an authority the Roman church, as represented in her hierarchy, had hitherto been generally believed to be. She claimed the exclusive right of interpreting Scripture, in virtue of her assumed *infallibility* and her long stream of sacred *tradition*. The Church is the pillar and ground of the truth. She must, therefore, be infallible. This infallibility attaches particularly to the hierarchy, which has its center and head in the papacy. To the hierarchy, therefore, belongs not merely a propædæutic, but a magisterial function; it is her right, not merely to exercise the office of teacher in the Church, but also to determine by absolute authority the form of doctrines to be taught and believed. The Church, as thus understood, does not simply lead her children to the fountain of Scripture and bid them drink from it; she does not, as any other teacher does, simply help them to unfold their powers of thought by means of the truth which she communicates, and then leave them free to penetrate farther into the truth, or even, by independent thinking, to modify that which they have passively received; but she bids them, on pain of damnation, never to think otherwise than as she has taught them to think, and never to arrive at any other conclusions than those which she has given them. She is infallible, and, therefore, her statements of truth must be absolutely free from error or defect. Besides, she is in possession of *tradition*. Christ, it is maintained, taught His disciples many things, and the Apostles

spake many things by inspiration, that are not recorded in Scripture. This originally unwritten truth was at first handed down from generation to generation by oral tradition, but was at last reduced to writing, and now, together with the received opinions of the fathers, and the established dogmas of the church, forms a body of truth which must be eternally valid, and from which no Christian thinking may ever depart.

This claim on the part of the church, of absolutely dominating over the thinking of Christian men, and authoritatively prescribing its results, the Reformers rejected; not at first, indeed, on theoretical, but on practical grounds, that is, not because they were led to see that the claim is wrong in principle, but because their views of certain doctrines and practical questions were not in harmony with the teaching of the church. They did not at first come to the conclusion that the church's claim of absolute authority over faith and doctrine is wrong, and then infer from this conclusion that it was lawful for them to entertain views contrary to those of the church. But, on the contrary, they first formed views which were at variance with those held by the church, and only when they found themselves to be in actual antagonism with the leaders of the church, were they led to question the legitimacy of the church's claim to authority. It is well known how reluctant and slow Luther was to reach this conclusion. At first, in his controversy with Tetzel and Eck, he appealed to the pope, as an authority which both he and his opponents were willing to accept. But when the voice of the pope was against him, he appealed to a general council; and when, at last, it was shown him that his views had already been condemned by the same council that condemned Huss, then he appealed to the Scriptures as an authority higher than pope or council, and higher even than the consent of all the fathers. He was thus, by the hard logic of events, driven to the position that the sacred Scriptures constitute the supreme authority, the ultimate rule in all matters of Christian faith and practice.\* Zwingli, indeed, had arrived at the same conviction,

\* Cf. Ranke's *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, Vol. 1, p. 285. Also, *Dorner's History of Protestant Theology*, Vol. 1. p. 95.

not only earlier, but also in a more direct way than Luther. With him it was an immediate judgment, a sort of intuition, we might say, born of his constant and careful study of the sacred Scriptures, that these Scriptures contain the highest revelation of the will of God given to men; and that they must, therefore, form the ultimate rule or standard to which the faith and practice of Christians must conform.\* But in his case too, no doubt, the actual divergence from the teaching and practice of the church in regard to particular points, preceded the formal rejection of the church's authority in general.

But in rejecting the pretensions of the Catholic Church to be the mistress of Christian thought, and in appealing to Scripture as the only umpire which they were willing to accept in regard to controverted points of theology, the Reformers asserted a *principle* that was of wider application than they themselves were at first aware, namely, the principle of *private judgment*, or the principle of emancipation of the Christian mind from all foreign authority in religious affairs. This is one of those instances where the movements of history are more comprehensive in their scope, and tend to larger ends than the immediate actors themselves either know or desire, thus clearly manifesting the presence of a superintending providence. The Reformers, in the beginning at least, contended simply for the right of maintaining their private views in regard to matters then in dispute between themselves and the representatives of the church. They did not intend to set aside all outward authority in the spiritual order, but simply to correct what they conceived to be the false application of authority. In doing so, they opposed their private judgment, formed indeed by the most devout study of Scripture, to the judgment of the church, which was at least alleged to be in agreement with Scripture likewise. But if they were free to set aside the judgment of the church, how could they complain if others set aside their judgment? Their judgment, whether they desired it or not, was itself destined presently to be invested with something of the

\* Ibid., p. 287.

character of an authority; but if they had the right to oppose the authority of the church, how could they object if others after awhile opposed their authority? If they claimed the right of free thought, untrammelled by any authority outside of themselves, how could they or their followers deny the same right to others? If Luther was free to differ from the doctors of the church, what right had he to "curse and damn" any one for differing from himself? He might say, of course, "I am in possession of the truth and my opponents are all in error." But on what authority could he make such an assertion? Simply on the authority of his own private judgment, and others on the same authority might make similar assertions in their own behalf. Or he might say "I have the Bible and the Holy Ghost on my side." But that simply came in the end to the same thing, namely, that, according to his own best judgment and honest conviction, his views were in harmony with the teaching of Scripture. Others of equal piety, sincerity, honesty and learning might entertain the same convictions in regard to their views.

For the fact that men differ as to religious sentiments and doctrinal views is no proof that they are not equally good and pious men. Men are differently organized. There is a difference of temperament and disposition. The mental constitution of different individuals is as different as their physical appearance. The same faculties of the soul do not possess the same degree of acuteness and vigor in different persons. In one the sensibility predominates, in another the reason, and in another the will. One person possesses in a higher degree the faculty of intuition, another that of abstract thought or reason; in one there is a preponderance of imagination, in another perhaps of reflection or of memory. In consequence of this difference of mental constitution different persons may apprehend the same truth in different ways and hold it in different forms. And besides this, there is the difference of education and of habit, which greatly modifies not only the intellectual process by which the truth is acquired, but also the standpoint from which

it is apprehended. In consequence of all this, different persons, though equally pious, equally sincere, and equally learned, may yet arrive at different conclusions in regard to details of Christian doctrine. Indeed, such differences must in the nature of the case be inevitable. As long as men know only in part, and prophecy only in part, and behold the truth only as in the dim reflection of a mirror, so long there must necessarily be variations in the manner of its apprehension and statement by different persons. One man's appeal to the Bible, therefore, or even to the testimony of the Holy Spirit in regard to the interpretation of the Bible, does not settle the question, and does not preclude another, differing from him in opinion, from making the same appeal with equal justice. In either case the appeal is only a sincere and solemn expression of private judgment, that can have the force of ultimate authority for none other than for the individual making it.

The principle, then, on which the Reformers acted, whether they were from the first conscious of its full bearing or not, the principle on which the Reformation was carried, is that of private judgment or free thought concerning spiritual things, limited only by the authority of God's word. It is only on this principle that the protest against the authority of the Catholic Church in the sixteenth century can be considered either justifiable or consistent. We are aware, of course, of the attempt made at times to escape the conclusion here stated, by representing the revolt from the ecclesiastical power of the sixteenth century as a rejection only of the usurped authority of the Papacy, and an appeal to the authority of the church of the fourth century. But in what court has the usurpation of the Papacy ever been proved? Surely not in any that was acknowledged by both parties to the controversy. Besides, does not the Papacy claim to be the conservator of Nicene and ante-Nicene orthodoxy? And by what authority has it ever been shown that she is not such? Certainly not by any that she herself has admitted. It follows, then, that the appeal to the authority of the Nicene church is as much an

exercise of private judgment, and a repudiation of external authority, as is the appeal to the Bible itself. We repeat, therefore, that the principle on which the Reformation was accomplished, is the principle of freedom of thought in spiritual things. The individual Christian is bound to subject his thought to no other authority than that of God's word; and he is responsible to none but God for the exercise of his liberty. This last remark is one that deserves to be well considered. Freedom of religious thought is not permission to think arbitrarily, but to think according to the truth of God's word. Religious thinking is a moral exercise; and men are therefore, responsible to God for their thoughts as well as for their acts; and they are responsible to God alone. This we believe to be the principle underlying the Reformation. Is this principle sound? Is it consistent with true religion, with order and harmony in the Church, with the permanence and progress of Christianity? Our judgment of Protestantism must depend upon the answer we give to this question; and the fate of Protestantism itself will depend at last upon the verdict which history shall render in regard to this point.

Now it is plain, of course, that the principle here in question must be inconsistent with the notion of infallibility, whether as claimed formally and openly by the Roman Catholic church, or practically and covertly by some Protestant communities, apparently in willful ignorance of the utter inconsistency of such claim on their part. If the empirical church, existing in time and space, be endowed, in every or any moment of her history, with the attribute of infallibility, so that, whenever she speaks authoritatively, her utterances are free from error, then it must be the duty of every one who desires his own salvation, to renounce his own judgment in favor of that of the Church, whenever there is any difference between the two. If the church cannot err, then it follows, not indeed that Christian men are bound to receive as infallible truth the statements of the Augsburg Confession, or of the Thirty-nine Articles, or of the Westminster Confession, but that the framers of confessions

and articles ought to have obeyed Leo X. and the Council of Trent.

How then shall we meet this claim of infallibility? It would manifestly be illogical to endeavor to refute it by an appeal to the supposed errors which the church has sanctioned. There is, for instance, the doctrine of transubstantiation and of the sacrifice of the mass, the doctrine of penance and of indulgences, the doctrine of the veneration of images, and of the invocation of saints and angels, the doctrine of purgatory, and other doctrines of like character, on which the church has fixed the seal of her infallible authority. To say that these are errors, and that, therefore, the church is fallible, would plainly be a begging of the question. If the church be infallible, then these doctrines are not erroneous, while he who pronounces them to be erroneous has already assumed that the church is capable of erring. There would perhaps be more force of argument in an exhibition of the contradictions into which this same infallible authority has at times fallen. The teaching of the church has not always been consistent. Successive councils and synods have given contradictory judgments concerning the same matter; and successive popes, the very organs of infallibility according to the latest theory, have anathematized each other's heresies. Thus Liberius is said to have been an Arian, Zosimus, a Pelagian, Honorius, a Monothelite; John XXII, held the doctrine that the soul is asleep in its disembodied state, and John XXIII was deposed by the council of Constance for open unbelief and scandalous immorality. But even all this may go for nothing, in the way of argument, to a mind made up on *a priori* grounds to believe in the infallibility of the Papacy or of any other authority of the church; so that in this view there is much truth in Luther's remark: "*Papatus simpliciter est merus enthusiasmus.*"\*

\* Seeing that virtual infallibility has in recent times been claimed also for Lutheranism, or at least practical immunity from error, a sort of fallible infallibility, and seeing how Lutherans at times argue with each other about Luther's opinions, as though, if it were just possible to get at the

The theory of infallibility has its origin in *a priori* processes of reasoning,\* and must be met by a similar mode of argumentation. The reasoning by which it is established is brief and simple, and runs about as follows: An infallible divine revelation presupposes always an infallible interpreter and teacher, in order that it may be rightly apprehended and understood.† Suppose the Bible to be the unerring word of God, and suppose it to contain all truth that is necessary to be known in order to salvation; still, as the Bible does not explain itself and *force* its true meaning upon every individual mind, there is need of an infallible authority, by the intervention of which an infallible understanding of divine truth may be secured. Without such an infallible teacher and guide, the individual might still be in fatal error, notwithstanding the fact that he possesses an infallible revelation of divine truth in the Bible. Therefore the church, whose office it is to lead men to the knowledge of the truth, must be clothed with the attribute of infallibility, and must consequently possess supreme authority over the decision of questions concerning Christian faith and knowledge. Now in answer to this, it may be said that, regarded from the standpoint from which the argument proceeds, it does not go far enough. An infallible Bible,‡ and an infallible teacher in the

true mind of Luther, one would be in possession of infallible truth, one might be led to exclaim too: "*Lutheranismus est merus enthusiasmus.*" If there must be a pope, there is some advantage in having a living one, who is always at hand to enlighten people about his opinions.

\* Sometimes, indeed, Scriptural statements, such as Matt. xvi. 18, and Luke xxii. 32, are referred to in proof of papal infallibility. But this is reasoning in a circle that could hardly ever be meant for earnest argument. First establish the infallibility of the Pope by an interpretation of Scripture, and then claim such infallibility as a necessary condition of the sound interpretation of Scripture!

† Cf. Moehler's *Symbolics*, §§ 38-44.

‡ It may be said that in this way of putting the case suspicion is cast also upon the infallibility of the Bible. Of what use, it may be asked, is an infallible Bible, if the individual reading it may err in regard to its meaning? The subject of the infallibility of the Bible is confessedly beset with great difficulties. These difficulties, however, do not necessarily affect the ques-

church even, are not sufficient to secure an infallible knowledge of the truth on the part of the individual, *so long as the individual is not also infallible himself*. If one may fail to understand the true meaning of God's word, he may also fail to understand the true meaning of man's word, though it be the word of an infallible pope, or bishop, or synod. Thus the supposed infallible authority of the church fails of the very object for which it has been invented. It does not make the existence of error impossible, and secure an infallible understanding of the truth among the great mass of Christian believers. Until all Christian believers have become infallible, there is not much gained by the assumption of an infallible doctrinal authority in the church. Though the shepherd may be infallible, the sheep are still exposed to the danger of error.

Would it, indeed, be a blessing to man, as a rational and moral being, if this danger did not exist, if the truth were so conditioned as to make the failure of a correct apprehension of

tion of its *inspiration*, which is after all the matter of chief interest. It may be admitted that there are defects and errors in the Bible, without in the least reflecting upon the inspiration of it. There are historical, geographical and scientific errors in the dramas of Shakespeare; and yet these dramas are works of true poetic or genial inspiration, and kindle the poetic fire in the mind of a sympathetic reader. So there may be historical, chronological, scientific and other inaccuracies and shortcomings in the Bible, for the Bible does not pretend to furnish infallible information in regard to matters of this kind, and does not in view of such inaccuracies and shortcomings cease to be a work of true divine or religious inspiration, begetting in the mind of a sympathetic (spiritually attuned) reader true (infallible) religious knowledge and sentiment. In the sphere of religious truth and sentiment the Bible is infallible, whatever it may be in other spheres. And this infallible religious truth and sentiment is not delivered in the form of abstract propositions, like those employed by the church to set forth her beliefs, but in the concrete form of fact and life. It will, therefore, be perceived that there is a difference of meaning in the conception of infallibility as applied to the Bible and as applied to the church. To say that a great work of art, like Homer's *Iliad*, for example, conveys infallible æsthetic truth and sentiment, is something different from speaking of a treatise on æsthetics, or on the rules of criticism, as an infallible interpretation of æsthetic science.

it on the part of the human mind an impossibility? Now it would seem that, if the impossibility of error in spiritual things had been at all desirable, the light of divine revelation itself might have been so blazingly bright as to make any misunderstanding of it impossible. But we know that this is not the case. The revelation of God, in whatever form it may exist, is not so overwhelming and compulsory in its effect upon the human mind. There is a natural revelation of God. God has manifested Himself in the works of nature, and is manifesting Himself continually in that sense or feeling of God (the feeling of absolute dependence) which is a universal condition of the human mind. But this natural revelation is not of such a character as to compel men to come to a right knowledge of God. It may lead to deism, to pantheism, or to polytheism, according as it is construed. And no more compulsory power, as regards the right understanding of it, is exerted by God's supernatural revelation. To come at once to the center of that revelation, as it is in Christ, the word incarnate, God manifest in the flesh, we know that men had power even to ignore that altogether. In Him dwelled the fullness of the Godhead bodily, but not in such a way as to compel all men alike to perceive and acknowledge it. His miracles, though they were signs and evidences of His heavenly origin and mission, were not so overwhelming in their effect upon men's minds, that they could not be misinterpreted. In His discourses Jesus sometimes purposely adopted a mode of speaking that was unintelligible to some of His audience. He adapted His words not merely to the intellectual, but also to the moral condition of His hearers; and, therefore, he spake some things in parables, that hearing they might hear and might not understand (Mark iv. 12). The perception of the truth was not to be forced upon them without respect to their moral susceptibility, and therefore to their detriment.

The cognition of divine truth is a moral process, depending upon personal volition, and, therefore, presupposing the possibility of error. Truth in general is conformity of thought and

being.\* When the mind produces in itself the reflection of an external object, it is said to know it; and this knowledge is *true* in proportion as the reflection corresponds to the object. Now this subjective or ideal reflection of the objective or intelligible world is not mechanical, like the formation of an image in a mirror. The mirror, in receiving an image of the sun, or a tree, for instance, is simply passive, and bound to receive the image as it is; but the human mind, in producing within itself a reflection of the intelligible world, is self-active. Its activity is volitional and free; and the accuracy of its ideal images or thoughts depends, therefore, not only upon its own nature and constitution, but also upon its own will. The human mind may at will, or in consequence of certain motives, modify its conception of an object, suppress certain features of it, or give undue prominence to others, and thus hold either partial or total error instead of truth. Thus the acquisition of all knowledge is a moral, not merely a natural process. And, certainly, in acquiring a knowledge of divine truth, the mind must be no less self-active and free, than in acquiring a knowledge of the material world. Nay it is here precisely that the postulate of freedom becomes most imperative, and freedom of mental action attains to its sublimest significance. In acquiring a knowledge of God and of divine things, the human mind may suffer no violence, either from the revelation which is the source of its knowledge, or from any outward authority coming between itself and that revelation with the pretence of explaining it; for that would destroy the moral character of the process, and deprive the truth itself of its high value as a moral interest or good. Human freedom, in order to its own

\*The conception of the New Testament *ἀληθεια* is more specific. It is, especially in the writings of St. John, associated with the conception of *life*, and denotes the eternal, divine reality or substance—the *ὄντως ὄν*—in contrast with the fleeting and transitory phenomena of this world. And as the divine being or substance, “the fullness of the Godhead,” has been embodied and manifested in Christ, He is the *truth* as well as the *life* for men (John xiv. 6).

complete reality, demands the possibility of erring in regard to God's being and will, no less than the possibility of sinning.

If it be said that, as a man is not truly free when he sins, so neither can one be free when he holds error for truth, this is readily admitted. A man is truly free only when he obeys the law, and when he violates the law he loses his freedom; in which latter case the feeling of well-being connected with a sense of liberty and innocence, gives place to a feeling of oppression and pain. But a man is free only when he obeys the law *freely*, from his own choice or conscious determination, not when he does so in consequence of any foreign constraint or compulsion. The planet obeys the laws of motion; but it is not, therefore, free with regard to its movement. The animal obeys the law which governs its existence and nutrition; but it is not free, for it does not act from intelligent design or conscious purpose, and has no power to do otherwise than it does. So now it is admitted, of course, that real intellectual freedom is consistent only with the cognition or knowledge of the truth. In error there is bondage, and in embracing a lie there is death. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." But in order to this, the process by which the truth comes to be known must itself be free, that is, determined by nothing outside of the mind knowing and the object to be known. Thus the very conception of human freedom, and of truth as a moral interest or good, forbids the idea of any external infallible authority demanding blind submission to itself in all matters pertaining to Christian faith and doctrine.

Corresponding to its character as a moral process also is the fact, that the attainment of Christian knowledge is *progressive*. It is so both in the case of the individual Christian thinker, and of the collective mind of the Church as a whole. No individual ever jumps to the full knowledge of the truth at one bound; on the contrary, the attainment of it is reached only through years of earnest thought and study. It does not follow from this, however, that meanwhile one may not be a real Christian, and live in the spiritual element of Christian truth. There is a

difference between faith and knowledge in religion, corresponding to the difference between sense and science in the natural order of the world. One may have sense-perceptions of nature, and use and enjoy the manifold objects which nature produces for our benefit, without having much, or indeed any, scientific knowledge of nature. So one may be joined to Christ by faith, and live in the very atmosphere of the supernatural, spiritual world, without much theological knowledge. That knowledge, however, is destined to come. The direct or spontaneous apprehension of the supernatural is intended to be followed by a reflective or scientific apprehension of it. We believe in order that we may know. But this knowledge comes very gradually, and only in consequence of continuous and conscientious effort. No individual may, therefore, flatter himself at any time that he has mastered the whole world of divine truth, that he has attained to the utmost limits of knowledge, that there remains nothing more for him to learn, and that his present stock of opinions must form the rule and measure of all mental activity on the part of himself and others in the future.

But the individual's progress in the attainment of Christian knowledge is conditioned by the advance which Christian science or theology has made in the general mind of the Church. Theology is a progressive, historical science, advancing towards perfection according to the same law of development that governs all human affairs. The fact that it deals with unchangeable, eternal verities, does not make the science unchangeable. The revelation upon which it is based, is constant and unchanging, but the appropriation of that revelation by the human mind is ever progressive and changing. In this respect theological science is perfectly analogous to natural science. The objects of natural science are constant likewise. The constitution of nature is the same now that it was in the days of Thales, but the science of nature has greatly changed. So the essential facts of divine revelation are the same now that they were in the beginning, but the comprehension and explanation of these facts have advanced far beyond the stage of the early Christian

ages. And the point of perfection has not been reached yet. As a historical science theology can not at any period of time be perfect. Successive generations of students can only bring it nearer to the point of perfection, without, however, reaching that point previous to the day of the consummation of all things. But if this be true, then it follows that the theology of one period of time can not be an ultimate standard for other periods. The confessions and doctrinal statements of the sixteenth century, for instance, possess no more binding authority for the Christian mind of the nineteenth century than do those of the fifth or of the tenth. They are always interesting and instructive, as tide-marks of the best thought of the age in which they originated, and deserve, therefore, to be carefully studied and treated with highest respect; but they are not free from imperfections and errors,\* and have no right to be regarded as being invested with the character of ultimate authority over Christian thought. To maintain the contrary would be to fall back into the Romish theory of a mechanical infallibility belonging to the Church, but arbitrarily to change the location of it. If there must be an outward, infallible authority to which the individual mind is required to bend, then why may it not as well be supposed to exist in the Church of Rome as in the Church of Wittenberg or of Geneva? But if theological science be thus ever unfinished and imperfect, what credit then does it deserve as an exposition of divine truth with a view to practical ends? Is there any practical value in a science of divine things, which not only offers no guaranty of infallible accuracy, but which is even confessedly imperfect? If, for the reasons indicated, we should answer this question in the negative, then we would have to pass the same judgment on all human science, for it is all imperfect and fallible. The science of nature is not perfect, and yet it is producing vast beneficial results. The science of

\* "Has any error ever been proved against the Augsburg Confession?" it has been gravely asked. No, not in any Lutheran court; but in courts that were not Lutheran it has been done many times. And the same thing has happened to other Confessions.

medicine is not yet complete. Future discoveries will no doubt throw much new light upon the nature of diseases and the effect of remedies ; but who would, for that reason, deny the practical value of the medical science of to-day ?

The idea of development is now generally admitted with reference to the history of the Church and of Christian thought. But not unfrequently the conception of physical development is unconsciously substituted for that of historical development, and then there is no room for the idea of freedom in any true sense. Development in this sense consists simply in the evolution of what is involved potentially in a physical germ, by the operation of forces which are immanent in that germ. Historical development, on the other hand, consists in the evolution of a plan by means of a process whose factors are free agents. In physical development the process always goes forward continuously on the same line. Such is the development of a tree, which, starting from the life-germ in the seed, proceeds straight towards its end, without requiring any modification or rectification as it goes on. In a process of historical development there is continuity too, but it is the continuity of a determinative idea or plan, employing as its operating factors free agents, and realizing itself by means of a multitude of separate, frequently antithetic, and at times antagonistic movements. Take the history of philosophy for an illustration. There was unity in the movement of Greek philosophical thought from Thales to Aristotle ; and yet the different systems of Greek philosophy were not derived by logical deduction from the physical principle of Thales, as the branches of a tree are derived from the life-principle of the seed. There is unity of movement also in the modern philosophical thinking of England, and yet no one would claim that the idealism of Berkley or the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton proceeds in a direct line of logical development from the sensational principles of Bacon and Locke. Different systems of thought, starting from different logical principles, and moving in separate lines, tend continually towards a clearer comprehension of the whole world of truth. Now it is only this kind

of continuity that can be claimed for the progress of theological thought. The scholastic theology of the middle ages was not simply a continuation, in a direct line, of the theology of the Patristic period, as the branches of a fully developed tree are a continuation of the same branches of the same tree at an earlier stage of growth; nor was the Theology of the Reformation a continuation in such way of the theology of any previous period.

Some, indeed, would have it that theological development is just of this character: that the movement of thought always goes forward in a straight line, from a principle once fixed, as the branches of a tree always continue to grow in the same direction; and that no change of principle, and no progress in any other direction than that once taken, would be either justifiable or allowable. In this view, the results of past theological thought, the principles once established, and the doctrines once formulated, could never be transcended or left behind; they would possess perpetual validity and force, and would exercise a controlling influence over the thought of all future time; and at last a time would come when all development would cease, just as a tree must once stop growing. Accordingly, it is maintained by some that theological thought may be free in respect of things not yet settled, but not free in respect of things once decided and fixed in creeds, confessions and theological systems. In respect of these, it is the business of the living theologian only to restate them in modern phraseology, to answer new objections to them, and to defend and fortify them by new arguments. This is supposed to be employment enough for a professor of theology. If one be a Calvinist, or belongs to a Calvinistic community, he is free to make use of new arguments and methods of reasoning in defence of the Calvinistic system of doctrine; he is free also to develop the Calvinistic system still farther in its own original directions, that is, to out-do Calvin himself; and finally in regard to things which the system does not cover directly or by implication, he is free to think as he pleases. If one be a Lutheran or a

Wesleyan, he is free to do the same thing for the system of Luther or Wesley; but if he utter any thought that is contrary to the doctrinal system to which he owes allegiance, and which he has "sworn" to defend, then he becomes a theological criminal, and subjects himself to the danger of an inquisition, in spite of the fact that, what is heresy according to the system which judges him guilty, may be sound orthodoxy according to other systems that are quite as respectable. There is no reason why the Roman Catholic Church should not freely accord this degree of liberty to all within her pale. To have the assumptions of the papacy and some of its leading dogmas continually defended and fortified by new methods and arguments, could hardly be regarded by her as an undesirable exercise of ingenuity on the part of her children; nor have we ever heard that she has objected to it. This is also the idea of theological liberty that has long been current in the Greek Church. For more than a thousand years that Church has been chewing the cud of unchanging orthodoxy, with what results is well known.

Indeed, on such conditions, no living thought is possible. To tell a man that he is free to think for himself, but that he must always be careful to reflect the system of doctrine which he has once accepted, or to tell a man that he is free to entertain what views he pleases on matters concerning which the Church has not yet spoken, but that he must not depart in any measure from the established dogmas, is simply to tell him that he may not think at all. True thought, such as shall satisfy an active, logical mind, must ever be a thing that is cast in one mold, an organic whole of conceptions, unfolding itself from a single principle or idea according to the laws of reason.\* No consistent system of thought can be produced by simply joining together conceptions taken from different other systems of thought.

\* It will be observed that what we mean here is personal or individual thought, the thought of an individual mind. The progressive thought of the collective, impersonal mind of ages is not, as we have already seen, thus logical. But the "mind of ages" does not think. The historical progress of thought is the result of the thinking of innumerable individual minds, of whom each one traverses, in a peculiar way, the whole realm of truth.

These systems were produced in different ages, under different conditions of general and philosophical culture, and were developed from different principles. The conceptions of one system could not, therefore, easily be made to fit into the body of another system; nor would they continue to retain their old meanings in such new relations. At one time the ruling principle of theological thought is the idea of justification by faith, at another perhaps it is the idea of divine sovereignty. From such different principles systems of thought are developed, whose conceptions can not be united in another system proceeding from a new principle, without suffering essential modifications of their extent and meaning. It is an absurdity, therefore, to tell a man that he may speculate freely in regard to unsettled theological questions, and even construct his system of thought on a new principle, provided only he will include in his system the established dogmas of some old system in their old historical sense. At present the Christological principle is the favorite one with most living theologians. No respectable theologian would now sneer at the idea of a Christo-centric theology. It has come to be widely felt that, if Christianity be the true and absolute religion for the world, then the Christ-idea must be the center and ruling principle of all religious knowledge. There can be no true knowledge of God and no true knowledge of man that does not involve the Christ-idea as its regulative rational principle. In order to true Christian knowledge it is not enough that one be a Christian in faith and feeling; he must be a Christian also in reason and logic, and the idea of Christ must rule the whole process of his religious thinking. But Christological thinking of this sort will not again lead to the re-establishment of any of the old theological systems, in which the idea of Christ occupied merely a subordinate position, while some other idea, like that of predestination, or of justification stood in the centre. No consistent Christological thought, for instance, could again regard Christ as having been brought into the world merely on account of sin, or on account of some abstract decree of election. Christological

thought, if it is to have any reality, must claim the liberty of arriving at different results, in some respects at least, from those reached by other and different orders of thought in the past; it must claim the liberty of reconstructing old dogmatic systems, and of bringing forth new truths from the mine of God's word, as well as of reproducing old truths in new forms and relations.

Can the Church, consistently with her constitution and welfare, allow such liberty? That is a question now in many minds, and a question too that has received different answers even among Protestants. At present the tendency of thought (however it may be in practice) seems to be strongly towards an affirmative answer. And such an answer certainly is in harmony with the universal conditions of human thought and of intellectual progress. We believe too that it is demanded by the principle of Protestantism and by the very nature of religion itself. Religious thought can no more be required to subject itself to the control of an external authority, than scientific or philosophical thought can be required to subject itself to such control. The sacred traditions of the past, the venerable creeds and confessions of former ages, the lofty authority of the Church can not be allowed to set a limit to the freedom of Christian thought. Creeds and confessions and doctrinal traditions are, of course, not to be despised. They are valuable and necessary as indispensable conditions of further progress of thought beyond themselves. The notion of drawing one's theology fresh from the Bible, without any regard to the result of the study of the Bible in the past, would be like the notion of beginning the study of Botany, for instance, by ignoring the result of all past investigations in this department of science. A student who should propose to go to work in this way, would not be likely to make much progress. And so a student of the Bible, wholly ignorant of the results of Biblical study and of religious reflection in all past ages, would not advance the knowledge of the Bible very much. Such a proceeding would be utterly unhistorical, and contrary to the manner of proceeding in every

other department of intellectual activity. In their intellectual activity different generations of men do not begin where their predecessors began, but where they left off. This is a necessary condition of progress in science; and it is an equally necessary condition of progress in religious thought. The confessions and dogmatic systems enshrining the religious thought of former ages are, therefore, to be carefully studied and treated with the highest respect, at the same time that they are not to be recognised as possessing final authority for the religious thought of the present or future. There is no inconsistency in this. A man may have the highest regard for the religious traditions of the past, without conceding to them a controlling influence over his religious thinking; just as a man may very highly honor his grand-father, without adopting all that grand-father's opinions.

But will not the liberty here claimed for theological thought, lead to theological licentiousness? Will not men, influenced perhaps by the love of novelty, or led by personal ambition, or moved possibly by pure but mistaken motives, if liberty be granted them, at once forsake the beaten track of truth, and run away into error? This, of course, may happen, though it need not happen necessarily. Freedom may be abused, but that is not a necessary consequence of freedom. Man, as he is free, may sin, though freedom is not the cause of sin. If he had not been free, if he had been a mere block or stone, then he could not have sinned. But then he could not have been morally good either. It was better, therefore, that he should be free and sin, than that he should not be free. So it is better that the religious mind should be free to do its own thinking, even at the risk of error, than that it should be enslaved by an outward authority, for in that case even the truth would not be a moral good. It should be borne in mind, however, that the truth is every body's interest, and that, therefore, all may reasonably be supposed to be striving for its possession. It is not likely that any one will rush into error from mere wantonness—simply to spite the guardians of orthodoxy. But even if, in

the exercise of liberty, some, from bad motives, should wilfully embrace error and heresy, this would be no reason to take away the liberty of thought. "To renounce liberty," says Castelar, "because it may lead to excess, would be like renouncing the air because it is the element of storms and hurricanes." The only safeguard which God has seen fit to provide against the abuse of liberty, either of thought or action, is the *feeling of responsibility*. Every one is responsible for his thought as well as for his acts; and if, notwithstanding this sense of responsibility, some will abuse their liberty, there is no remedy for it. The risk of failure is inseparable from the life of a rational and moral being, and can not be provided against by any means whatever.

But if liberty may be abused, may not authority be abused likewise? In answer to this it may be sufficient to refer to the history of the Roman inquisition; to the fate of Huss and of Savonarola and of multitudes of kindred spirits; to the eighteen thousand Protestants of Holland judicially murdered by the duke of Alva, and the one hundred thousand more driven from their homes by him, for which the pope presented him a consecrated hat and sword; to the seventy thousand Huguenots perfidiously slain in France on the night of St. Bartholomew, in honor of which bloody deed the pope, frantic with joy, proclaimed a year of jubilee, and had *Te Deums* chanted in all the churches of Rome. These are some of the "damned spots" on the hands of the papacy, that can never be washed away. And the hands of Protestant authorities, when they were clothed with power, have not always been free from oppression and violence. The worst pages of Church history are those which relate to the exercise of that authority, whether fallible or infallible, which claims to be the guardian of orthodoxy and the supreme judge in questions of Christian faith or doctrine.

But it is claimed that freedom of thought is inconsistent with the unity of the Church. Abolish the power of external authority, and, it is said, the result will be endless heresies and schisms. The Bible alone, it is affirmed, is not sufficient to

unite Christian men in the bonds of a common faith, for the Bible alone simply makes heretics. To this it might perhaps be sufficient to reply, that even the exercise of the most absolute authority has hitherto not succeeded in maintaining the unity of the Church. History has proved that men may divide in regard to the very meaning of the authority which they profess to accept. However the unity of the Church is not conditioned on uniformity of thought. It is not the want of uniformity of thought, but the want of charity, that has divided the Church. Agreement in the details of doctrine, or in the metaphysics of a theological system, is a manifest impossibility as men now are constituted, and can, therefore, not be a necessary requisite in order to the unity of the Church. The one faith of which St. Paul speaks, as corresponding to the one Lord, the one baptism, and the one God and Father of all, is not unity of opinion, or of theological theory, or of doctrinal tendency—not agreement in any series of abstract propositions supposed to express the leading doctrines of a system of divinity—but simply agreement in the reception of Christ as the Son of God; it is unity of faith in the subjective, not in the objective sense. There were different doctrinal tendencies in the apostolic Church. There was a Petrine tendency, a Pauline tendency, a Jacobine tendency, and a Johannine tendency. The different leading Apostles did not develop their theological systems exactly in the same way, nor did they even start with the same fundamental principles. And yet there is no evidence that they were not, on the best of terms with each other. St. Peter and St. Paul once had a sharp encounter, but it related merely to a matter of expediency, and did not afterwards disturb their friendship. St. Peter never undertook to demolish his brother Apostles, for their independence of thought, by the thunder of his anathemas, as his pretended successor at Rome has frequently sought to do. The Apostles were one in faith and spirit, although they differed in the manner in which they construed the facts of the Gospel and developed the substance of their faith. Among their followers, who were less enlightened and charitable

than themselves, there sometimes arose trouble. Thus the intolerance and fanaticism of the partisans of James caused the great Apostle of the Gentiles no little affliction and sorrow, and at times stirred up serious divisions among believers. And thus it has ever been. It is not the difference of theological views, for that is inevitable, but the intolerance of believers that has divided the Church. The Church can never be outwardly one, and thus fulfill the Saviour's prayer, until Christian men have learned to recognize the liberty of their fellow Christians as an inviolable right, and to tolerate others' views as willingly as they ask toleration for their own. As long as there are swarms of authorized or unauthorized inquisitors, bigoted heresy-hunters, self-appointed defenders of the faith, impatient or ambitious advocates of truth, men proud of their own opinions and sure of their own infallibility, whose private views (for no one can have any other than *private* views) are dearer to them than the peace or prosperity of the Church, or the souls of their fellow-men, so long the unity of the Church must ever be imperfect.

It is admitted sometimes that men ought, indeed, to be free to think as they please, and conscientiously and honestly to form their own theological opinions; but it is maintained that, if one should, in any respect, find himself to be in disagreement with the particular ecclesiastical organization with which he is identified, he would be in honor bound to get out of it, and, if he should fail to do so, it would be the right of such organization summarily to eject him. In this connection lofty talk is sometimes indulged in about the sacredness of the confession, the piety of its framers, and the solemnity of "subscription;" and not seldom pious and good men are invited out of a denomination by others who are far less pious and good than themselves. Of course, no one is bound to heed such invitations; nor is it any proof of a dishonest or obtuse conscience to smile at them. This view of the relation of the individual to the confession of a denomination, we hold to be utterly inconsistent with the principle of Protestantism, and with the nature of the Christian Church itself. Sometimes, indeed, the

analogy of other social organizations is referred to in proof of this view. Every society, it is said, has the right of defining the qualifications of its own members; and if a member finds himself at variance with the views of his society he must either get out of it voluntarily, or the society may expel him. We do not think that this conclusion is applicable to the case of the Church in respect of either alternative. In the first place, a member is not always bound to separate himself from a society with whose views he does not, in every particular, agree. One may even feel himself bound to stay in the hope of bringing the society round to better views. Take the case of a man's relation to his country. No man is bound to expatriate himself because he dislikes the laws or the policy of his government. He has the right to stay, and to seek in all proper ways to reform what is objectionable. And so no one is bound to leave a denomination because its views or practices do not wholly please him. One may even stay in the hope of seeing the denomination come up to his position, and of himself contributing to such result. Such hope would be unreasonable or wrong only in case the denomination were infallible and unchangeable, as the Church of Rome claims to be. Nor, in the second place, does it follow that the Church has the right of expelling one for holding theological opinions at variance with its standards, because a society has the right of expelling an obnoxious member; for *the Church is not a society*. The Church is a divine institution or organism, the body of Christ. Christ is her Head, and to Him she must look for the principles and laws which are to govern her actions. The Church, therefore, has no right to adopt any other conditions of membership than those which Christ has ordained. She has no right to exclude any man from her communion, whom Christ would not exclude from His fellowship. But there is no evidence that Christ requires subscription to any particular theological system, or the adoption of any series of dogmas, as a condition of discipleship. He certainly did not do so in the days of His flesh; but, on the contrary, He received all who approached

Him in sincerity, accepted Him as the Messiah, and were willing to take up their cross and follow Him. Where then does the Church, or any denomination of the Church, get the right of making the adoption of any theological theory, or any set of theological opinions, a condition of membership in her communion? \* It is said sometimes that, if a man's views are not wholly in accordance with those of a denomination, he ought to enter another denomination where they would pass current. But suppose there is no such denomination. Must there be a church for every possible shade of theological opinion? That would be to resolve the Holy Catholic Church of Christ forever into an endless number of warring sects or schools. A denomination that cannot endure differences of theological views and tendencies, has written itself down as an ephemeral sect whose grave is already waiting for it. If the Church cannot be one until all men are of one mind, then there will never be unity. But we are not shut up to any such gloomy conclusion. All that is necessary in order to the unity of the Church, is

\* On this point see Stuckenberg's *Christian Sociology*, p. 137 sq.—It is generally acknowledged now that heterodoxy does not affect a man's moral or Christian character. A man may be unsound in doctrine, according to the judgment of some respectable denomination, and yet a good Christian. And, accordingly, heresy trials, never very edifying spectacles, nowadays end, for the most part, in sending the convicted culprit, with testimonials of good Christian character, into some other denomination where he is received with open arms. That is, of course, less impious than painting the condemned heretic over with pictures of devils, and then leading him forth to the flames; but is it quite free from absurdity?—It will be borne in mind that what we are discussing in this paper, is only the relation of Church authority to theological thought. We do not question the Church's right of exercising discipline, which involves, of course, the right of judging concerning questions of morality, whether in practice or in doctrine. There may be immoral doctrines which the Church is bound to condemn, like the doctrines of Balaam and of the Nicolaitans (Rev. ii. 14, 15). It may be said, indeed, that it is difficult to distinguish between immoral doctrines and such departures from orthodoxy as are merely theoretical and harmless. The distinction, however, is practically made every time that a man is condemned for heresy and pronounced a good Christian in the same breath. Sound Christian sense is sufficient to make the distinction.

charity conjoined with agreement in the essential matters of Christian faith, which are comprised in that oldest and most universally accepted creed of Christendom, the *Symbolum Apostolicum*.

But shall not the Church and Christian men be concerned for orthodoxy, or for sound doctrine? Certainly. Orthodoxy is a precious interest that must not be regarded lightly; and truth, which, however, is not always exactly one with orthodoxy, is an interest that must be esteemed and defended as being above all price. St. Jude exhorts the readers of his brief epistle to "contend earnestly for the faith once for all delivered unto the saints;" and St. John even goes so far as to say to the "elect lady," whom he is addressing in his second epistle: "If any one cometh unto you and bringeth not this teaching, receive him not into your house, and give him no greeting." But, in the first place, it must be observed that one would not be justified in understanding by the "faith" of Jude or the "teaching" of John either the tenets of modern Lutheranism, or Calvinism, or Arminianism, and that those who are perhaps most earnestly contending for any of these *isms*, are not exactly contending for the thing that was in the mind of the apostles. This, of course, does not prove that there are not truths in Lutheranism, Calvinism and Arminianism that are worth contending for. But, in the second place, it should be remembered that, even in contending for such truths, men have no right to contend otherwise than in the spirit of Christ and of the Gospel. The only weapons that may be used in this contest are such as are of a moral character. Men are not to be compelled to come to the acknowledgment of the truth, either by the employment of physical force or by the employment of such force as consists in sophistry, misrepresentation, detraction and defamation of character. Men who feel called to contend for the faith (whether it be old faith or new faith, does not matter), should understand that they are not called to contend otherwise than *honestly* and in *love*. The truth needs none but an honest defence. There is no need and no justifi-

cation for the employment of tricks and stratagems in the contest for truth. Lying in defence of the truth is not a very consistent, though it may be a sufficiently frequent measure in theological warfare. And, again, men who feel themselves called to do battle for the truth, should remember that it is not their duty to gain the victory at all hazards. If, even, what they believe to be the truth, and what they fight for as such, should be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, which is frequently not the case, it would still not be their duty to fight as if the victory of the truth depended entirely upon their own success in the combat, and as if the truth were forever undone, if they were themselves defeated. A man has done his duty to the truth when he has borne his testimony fairly, frankly and decidedly. It is every one's duty to bear witness to the truth; but it cannot be held to be any one's duty to force the acceptance of that witness upon others, and to persecute all who resist it. Defenders of the faith should remember that, after having honestly borne their testimony, they are not responsible for any body's faith but their own. If, therefore, their views should not be accepted, they have no need to fret, and grieve, and give themselves over to that *odium theologicum* which is anything but a theological virtue, as if they had sustained some irreparable personal injury, or as if the cause of truth were forever ruined. The truth can safely be left to take care of itself.

"Truth crushed to earth will rise again,  
The eternal years of God are her's."

It involves, therefore, no disloyalty to truth, and no skepticism either, to have a little patience even with what one may regard as error. The man who has confidence in the truth can afford to be calm even in the midst of temporary defeat. While, on the other hand, much trembling, blustering, and expressing extreme anxiety for the cause of truth, is often an evidence of secret distrust. He is not always the firmest believer who makes the noisiest profession. It is not an uncommon phenomenon, as Canon Farrar remarks, that men are led even to persecute others in order to confirm or demonstrate

their own soundness in the faith. Saul of Tarsus probably never had his heart torn with so many doubts about Pharisaism as when, after the martyrdom of Stephen, he was making havoc of the Church.

Is it not likely that the blind attachment to party traditions and shibboleths, and the rigid enforcement of confessional standards, leads to a good deal of this sort of unconscious hypocrisy? In theology all things have most certainly not remained as they were from the beginning. There has been a good deal of quiet departure, if not from old truths, at least from old statements of truth; and yet, such departure being unauthorized, the old forms are still repeated, often with an amount of noise and violence that is in direct proportion to the degree in which they are felt to be unmeaning and empty. There is no doubt that, in some quarters, the power of the pulpit has been much impaired by this rupture between the living thought of the present, and the traditional formulas of the past, which still stand in the Churches as sentinels of orthodoxy. Old formulas and definitions are hurled at congregations, which the preacher no longer understands in their historical sense, and which the congregation perhaps understands in no sense at all. There is an insincerity in such preaching that cannot fail to make it offensive. This is, no doubt, the cause of much of the outcry against doctrinal preaching. People want no dull doctrines, no dry theology in the pulpit. And they are right. *Dull* doctrines and *dry* theology are neither instructive nor edifying. But the way to escape the difficulty here contemplated, is not carefully to avoid all doctrine, and to treat congregations merely to high-sounding rhetoric or ephemeral sentiment, that pleases for a few moments, and is then forgotten. Congregations need doctrine; but it must be living, not dead doctrine. Christian men need truth, living truth clothed in living form. In order to make an impression upon the heart of the hearer, the truth must come fresh and quick from the heart of the preacher.\* And this is possible only when the preacher has made the truth his own possession

\* That is sound advice which Goethe puts into the mouth of Faust, in

by the moral process of free thought, not when he has received it merely on the credit of some foreign authority, and holds it simply as a dead outward tradition. This is, no doubt, one of the main reasons why new sects are at first so successful and rapid in their growth. They are not hampered by any old traditions. They repeat no empty formulas. They are thoroughly in earnest. What they proclaim comes fresh from the heart, and therefore penetrates to the heart. Men want living thought. They must have the old Gospel, of course; but it must be the Gospel as apprehended in a living way and presented in a living form, corresponding to the living thought of the age. Hence living thought, intellectual and theological activity in the Church are not to be deprecated as evil. Theoretical activity is not inconsistent with practical activity, as is sometimes imagined. Even discussion and controversy are better than theological lethargy. The Greek Church is not the more active in outward practical work for having manifested no theological activity during a thousand years. We believe that the history of the Church will bear us out in saying that the periods of most intense theological activity have also been the periods of most intense practical activity. Then let the movement of thought go on. Let there be no effort to repress or check it. It can do the Church no harm, but will do much good, if only the old motto is always remembered: *In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus charitas.*

answer to young Wagner's question as to how the world may be moved by eloquence:

“Wenn ihr's nicht fühlt, ihr werdet's nicht erjagen,  
 Wenn es nicht aus der Seele dringt,  
 Und mit urkräftigem Behagen  
 Die Herzen aller Hörer zwingt.  
 Sitzt ihr nur immer! Leimt zusammen,  
 Braut ein Ragout von anderer Schmaus,  
 Und blas't die kümmerlichen Flammen  
 Aus eurem Aschenhäufchen 'raus,  
 Bewunderung von Kindern und Affen,  
 Wenn euch darnach der Gaumen steht:  
 Doch werdet ihr nie zu Herzen schaffen  
 Wenn es euch nicht von Herzen geht.”

#### IV.

#### MARRIAGE AND ITS ABUSES.

REV. S. N. CALLENDER, D. D.

SOME time since, an article appeared in the *Princeton Review*, from the pen of Rev. Leonard Woolsey Bacon, D. D., under the heading of "*Polygamy in New England.*" The writer was fortunate in the selection of this particular form, for the announcement of his theme. It was at once startling and attractive, and was well calculated to arrest attention and secure a careful perusal of the paper. It had the effect to at once arouse curiosity and prompt the question, What can it mean? Has polygamy in fact gained a foothold in stern puritanical New England? Have the assiduous emissaries of the unclean institution of Utah succeeded at last in stealthily planting it in some retired nook in the land of the Pilgrims? For not for a moment could it be supposed that it had dared the attempt to establish itself openly in the midst of that highly moral, religious and law-abiding people. It required but a moment for these questions to suggest themselves; but no time could be taken for conjecture as to the answer; the perusal of the article was at once entered upon. It required, however, the reading of but a page or two, to make it plain enough that the questions were wide of the mark. No; Mormonism was not about to establish itself in New England, but polygamy without the Mormonism, had already done so. And that, too, not in a clandestine way, but by legislative enactment and popular approval. The writer proceeds to point out the difference between Utah polygamy and New England polygamy. There is a difference. That of Utah is simultaneous, that of New Eng-

land is consecutive. The Latter-day-Saint may have his score of wives all at the same time, while the Puritan must discard his first wife to make room for the second. In either case the essence of the evil is the same and at hand, the difference is only in the form.

This evil exists not alone in the New England States. It is to be alleged against most of our other States, especially the northern, and more especially against those which partake largely of the life and spirit of New England. There are exceptions. Notably, New York. Here the laws exclude polygamy in any form. They grant *absolute divorce*, that is divorce, a *vinculo matrimonii*, only for the one scriptural cause, namely, adultery. The lower form, divorce, or separation a *mensa et toro*, (which is approved by the word of God, 1 Cor. 7: 10-15), her laws grant, but they, as do the Scriptures, exclude the right to marry again so long as the separated spouses both live. The evil in her case, and in the case of other States having similar divorce laws—an evil incident to our form of government—is, that she recognizes as lawful, a marriage contracted in another State, which her laws would adjudge polygamous if contracted within her own jurisdiction. It is notorious that married couples in the State of New York desirous of escaping from the bonds of matrimony, for reasons below the standard of her laws, need but carry their cases across the Hudson River into New Jersey, where an absolute divorce can be secured for reasons other than adultery. A brief residence there, the ministry of her easy law being invoked, the conjugal tie is annulled, when the parties may return to their former home and their divorce be recognized as lawful. But this evil is not peculiar to the State of New York; it holds equally in case of all the States of our American Union, and is a reminder of the fact, coming to be more and more clearly recognized, that despite its many excellencies, our form of government still labors under serious and radical defects.

Extend the consideration of the defect in the laws of many of our States a little further, and it becomes ridiculous. They

all have laws with penal sanctions, prohibiting bigamy and polygamy, and yet, side by side they have another statute which provides for and makes lawful these very crimes. A man may not as a matter of private pleasure put away his wife and marry another woman, under pain of the penitentiary, but if he will employ a third-rate divorce lawyer, and comply with certain legal forms he may do that very thing with impunity. Or if his home State does not provide him with a statute sufficiently accommodating, he can step across the line into another State, procure the license and marry again, and then with his polygamous bride return home an approved, law-abiding citizen. So that the penal laws in this regard need be a terror only to the adventurer or to the ignorant and impecunious wight.

It may be objected that this idea of consecutive polygamy is a mere imagination, and has no existence in actual fact,—that the State has the power to sunder the marriage bond and extinguish the conjugal relation in full. If this objection is valid, then, verily, have we reached the end of controversy. The State then, as is claimed, has the right and authority to constitute the nuptial relation, and it has power to annul it. Certainly then it has the prerogative to modify it and establish its terms and limitations. It might authorize a probationary or tentative marriage, which indeed amounts to about the same thing as granting a divorce on account of incompatibility of disposition or temper. It might direct the Justice of the Peace to marry a couple for six or twelve months, with the option of continuance or separation. We are not considering the question of public expediency or State policy, simply of civil prerogative. But is it true that the State is invested with this right and power? Who gave them to it? To reply that God gave them would be to abandon the claim at once, as not a scintilla of evidence can be adduced to its support. Did the people—did man institute marriage? How came to pass, the conditions of marriage—the difference and complementary relation of the sexes? Did man ordain these, or came they to pass by chance? Did not man, when in the beginning he awoke to full

consciousness, and listened to the first lessons as to the meaning of his existence and his mission in this earthly life, find himself in the bosom of the connubial relation appointed to him by the power which created him? Man had no more voice in the constitution of his marriage relations than he had in the determination of the form of his body, or the offices of its organs. It was involved in the structure of his being, and he had no more right or power to change it or modify it, than he had to fashion anew any other constitutional necessity. No; Man had no power over the ordinance of marriage, as a fact grounded in his nature and appointed to him by his Creator, and consequently even upon the infidel theory that "all power emanates from the people," he could not bestow upon the State a prerogative which he did not himself possess. It is therefore an impertinence—an unwarranted assumption of power for the State to celebrate the marriage service, or to sunder its ties, save only with the exceptions which will presently appear.

Has the State then any office with reference to marriage? Certainly it has. The family which is the primary form of the State, is the immediate outbirth of marriage, and finds in it its fountain and source. They are thus organically related.

To reach a just conception of this relation, a brief consideration of the constitution of the State is necessary. It is a mistake to imagine that the State is the result of a compact entered into by a multitude of individuals, who conceding certain "natural rights" as they are called, for prudential considerations, thereby create a social organization which they denominate a government, and to which they agree to submit for the general well-being. The notion involved in this view is, that anterior to the existence of the State, man was an independent unit, possessed of natural rights and prerogatives, which he might maintain and assert as over against his fellow units or concede them at pleasure. Man does not now, and never did occupy such an attitude of individualistic isolation. He has not now, nor ever had, rights and prerogatives which were not conditioned by those of his fellow-men. There never was a time

after the creation of the first pair, when he was not environed by social relations. He drew his first breath in the midst of them. More than this, they are involved in the necessities of his being, and enter as factors into the structure of his nature. Although highest in the order of created beings, he falls at birth, in point of helplessness and dependence below the beast of the stall, and but for his social surrounding and ministrations the day of his birth would be the date of his death. At the same time all his powers and possibilities, save the play of his vital functions are dormant. These can be evolved and his manhood developed, only as they are drawn out by proper nurture, at first physical, afterwards intellectual and moral. If we imagine him isolated from early infancy, with no other ministry than that demanded by his physical and animal wants, whatever else might be the result, we cannot for a moment suppose that he would grow to manhood, possessed consciously of rights and prerogatives which he might compromise for prudential benefits. And the very fact that man is conscious of any rights as related to his fellow beings, is precisely because of the very governmental order, in the bosom of which from infancy he has lived and moved and had his social being, and in the creation of which order, this theory most grotesquely alleges for him an active, conscious agency. No. The family, as the incipient form of the State, is anterior in the order of both time and sequence to the individual, and instead of his being a contributor to its origination, he is its offspring, born and nourished by its providence.

But it needs not to elaborate an argument to confute this inadequate theory. The unequivocal deliverance of history is final in this regard. Its voice, no less than the postulate of reason clearly indicates that in the earliest development of civil government, it took the form of the patriarchal. The father was the natural head of the family. But as the family grew to maturity, and the children went forth in their turn, to establish new families, the parental jurisdiction of the father extended to and comprehended these, and so on, until as a tribe

his descendants recognized him as their chief or emir. And he was succeeded in a hereditary way by his son. The tribe grew apace and extended its territorial limits, until whether from remoteness of habitation or conflicting interests, new tribes were formed with a similar patriarchal form of government. Thus, as the human family grew, and separate tribal organizations and interests were multiplied, did a spirit of rivalry and strife manifest itself which led to conflict for the mastery. And so it came to pass that whether by conquest or confederation several tribes were brought under a common governmental head, in the form of a kingdom or monarchy. The king, however, was still in theory, which theory remains to the present day, the patriarch or father of his people. In the earlier stages of the national life—in its years of infancy and childhood, the will of the king was the law of the subject, and only as this life grew to manhood in wisdom and competent self-reliance was the arbitrary power of the ruler modified and conditioned by the broader national life.

The fact of government in its idea and essence, has held in unbroken continuity and succession from the first natural family of man to the present hour. It has passed through numerous vicissitudes, from the family to the tribe, from the tribe to the kingdom, from the absolute to the limited and constitutional monarchy, and from this last to the republic. But at no intermediate point was the fact of government originated *de novo*. The growth—the development of humanity reveals itself in the form of civilization, and civilization modifies the *form* of government. But government itself, as a principle innate in man from the beginning, is the power which in its evolution advances to a higher and freer form. It falls within the province of the individual, therefore, to give his voice in the modification and determination of the *form* of the State to which he owes allegiance, but as to the fact itself, in whatever form it may happen to be, he is the subject of it from the beginning.

The truth and correctness of this view we can easily discern even in the midst of the anarchy and civil convulsions of the

middle ages. We are accustomed to speak of the Germanic and Asiatic tribes as "barbarian hordes," but in their devastating incursions into Western Asia and Europe, they invariably came as organized tribes, with their Kings and Emirs and Sultans. It was not an unorganized mob of individuals which invaded Italy and overthrew the old Roman civilization, but it was Alaric as King, at the head of his Visigoths. The Huns had their Attila, the Mongols their Ghengis Khan, and subsequently their Tamerlane. The Saracens had their Sultans and their Caliphs, and the Osmanli Turks their Osman. In the case of our own United States, there was no lapse in the fact of government, merely a change in form, and a transference of allegiance from a hereditary sovereign, to a ruler designated by the choice of the subjects of the State.

If then we bear well in mind the form of the State, which is subject to modification and change by the will of the citizen, and the essence or principle of government to which the individual citizen stands subject by creative ordinance, we will be able to appreciate the organic character of the State as developing out of the family. The family as already remarked is the immediate product of marriage. The State then is organically related to marriage, and finds in it the condition precedent to its existence. In a word, marriage is the womb which gives birth alike to the family and the State, and is their antecedent in the order of existence. It stands related to the principle of generation, creatively comprehended in the constitution of our humanity, as the condition of normal development, and as such is a factor in its organic law. It is simply monstrous then to claim, as is so largely done in the present day, that the State is possessed of legislative power as regards the idea and essential form of marriage. With equal justice might it claim the same prerogative with reference to the sacred requirements of truthfulness, honesty and chastity and moral distinctions in general. These interests belong to an order which transcends and commands human volition, and can never even in the midst of the extremest circumstances be subordinated to expediency

and passion, but at the expense of a violation of the laws of man's ethical and spiritual nature. This is an office which pertains alone to the Author and Creator of our being, and to exercise its sacred functions is to repeat the fatal presumption of our first parents, by which our nature was wrecked in the morning of its existence.

The State then is invested with no legislative power touching the fact, the idea and the essential form and limitations of marriage. It is bound as it would be true to the law of its being, to accept it as an ordinance of divine legislation, for its governance and control, and reverently confine itself to the exercise of the ministry which the same superior power has committed to its hand. This office is purely ministerial and executive. And in the exercise of its prerogatives, it is set for the conservation and defence of this divine institution as the immediate source of its own perpetuation—to preserve it in its integrity and purity, and to constrain thereto by the infliction of the pains and penalties decreed against its violation and abuse.

Marriage is a divine institution, and involves the union of one man and one woman in a relation which transcends in its intimacy all other human ties, even that of parent and child. "And they twain shall be one flesh, so that they are no more twain, but one flesh." (St. Matt. 19: 5-6; St. Mark 10: 8.) This union by force of divine appointment, and in virtue also of the fact that generic man is male and female, is *normally* indissoluble so long as "both shall live." "What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." (St. Matt. 19: 6; St. Mark 10: 9.) The rending of the marriage tie therefore, must always be the result of violence and wrong, and incurs the penal judgment of God. This union is inward, reaching the life of either spouse, and comprehends them in a mysterious unity which finds its exemplar in the union of Christ and His spouse, the Church. All purely human associations are in comparison outward and secular—the result of a voluntary agreement, and may by consent of the contracting parties be annulled. In this latter case even, the State has only a lim-

ited jurisdiction. The approved principles of jurisprudence have wisely adjudged the State incompetent to impair the obligation of contracts, and it may interpose to release one of the contracting parties, only in the event of the violation of its terms by the other party. If then the State is impotent for the impairment of contracts in affairs which legitimately fall within the realm of its jurisdiction, what are we to think of that presumption which arrogates the right to do this very thing in a matter which lies clear above its jurisdiction? If it cannot annul a relation, which has not already been violated by one of the interested parties, in business affairs, how puerile must be the assumption that it can do so in an interest which reaches the life and the blood of the spouses? No more monstrous would be the legislative enactment which would essay to abrogate the relation of brother and sister.

God in the economy of creation, and His moral government in the world, has constituted the State the guardian and custodian of this sacred institution. Its duty is to watch over it, and guard its integrity against the waywardness and passions of men—to insist upon its offices, as well for its own legitimate perpetuity as for the realization of the higher interest of His creative purpose—to decree upon penal sanctions, that parentage be allowed only within the pale of wedlock—and that the marriage service be duly celebrated by those whose office empowers them to minister in spiritual things, to which order matrimony belongs. In addition to this, it belongs to the State to require of spouses fidelity to the estate of wedlock, and faithfulness to their duties as parents. As to the power of granting divorce, the duty of the State is very plain as laid down in Holy Writ, by Him who alone has jurisdiction in the case, and ought to be easily understood. Where a husband or a wife breaks the marriage bond, by the commission of that offence, which alone can break it, namely, adultery, it is the prerogative of the State, as God's minister for the execution of His laws in this regard, to declare the bond as broken, and the innocent party as absolved from its binding force. The decree of the court does not

break the bond, it simply declares it to be already broken by the offending party. This is what is usually denominated absolute divorce, or divorce *a vinculo matrimonii*. This leaves the innocent party at liberty to marry again during the lifetime of the sinning spouse, while the guilty person, by divine enactment is forbidden to remarry. (St. Matt. 19: 9.) It may be here remarked that this latter restriction is but lightly emphasized in Scripture, doubtless from the fact that in the days of our Saviour, adultery was a capital offence, and a conviction of it at once dissolved the marriage tie and set the innocent party free, while it condemned the guilty party to death. How shameful the contrast in our day. A person may be proved guilty of this crime in a divorce suit, and never be arraigned in the criminal court. Is not some officer of the law guilty of the violation of his official oath, who allows a proved criminal to go unquestioned as to his crime? Let those answer who are learned in the law.

One other form of divorce, or in view of the technical signification with which that term has come to be invested, it should rather be called a *separation*, is recognized and approved in the word of God. (1 Cor. 7: 12-15.) Here the principle is involved, that a husband and a wife may be lawfully separated for other causes than adultery. The general idea seems to be that in case of conflict, incompatibility, violence and faithlessness to domestic obligations, so as to preclude that peace to which they are called of God, the parties are at liberty to separate, yet not so as to be at liberty to form new marriage relations. The conjugal tie is not dissolved. They remain husband and wife, but the rights, privileges and obligations of the marriage state are suspended until by mutual consent they be resumed. It belongs unquestionably to the State, set of God for the conservation of this sacred relation to recognize this provision, and by suitable statutes to give it its proper efficiency. In doing so, it is to accept this rule as a general law or principle which is to govern it in its legislation, and control its administration in the midst of the changes and vicissi-

tudes incident to the growth and development of human society. It has no legitimate power to change the terms and conditions of this law, but to maintain its spirit, and as it would be true to its divine charter, to accept it as an organic, a constitutional provision, which can be neglected or transcended only at the cost of its own moral and secular deterioration.

Having thus in a very general way looked into the normal relation in which the State stands to the institution of marriage, and the nature and measure of its prerogatives as the guardian and conservator of its perpetuation and purity in human society, we are prepared to appreciate the enormity of the infidelity and dereliction of duty with which it stands justly chargeable this day, by the moral sense of Christendom. Nor is this arraignment confined to the distinctively religious and Christian portion of the community. So outrageously loose have our divorce laws become, and so scandalous their administration, and as consequences therefrom, so lightly has the nuptial tie come to be esteemed, so dreadfully has the family relation become debauched, and so unclean are public morals becoming in this direction, that not only our Literary Magazines and Reviews, but the secular newspapers, have widely felt constrained to utter their indignant and growing protests.

This may, perhaps, be considered strong, if not unwarranted language, and we may feel loath to assent to the allegation that our moral status is suffering so alarming a deterioration. But statistics are within easy reach, for those who would inform themselves upon the subject, to amply justify even stronger language. The alarm which has been caused by these evils has provoked diligent inquiry, and statistics have been gathered and spread out in print which are painfully humiliating to our civilization. Without pausing here to give them in extended detail, it is sufficient for our present purpose to state that, according to the records of many of our Northern States, and the larger cities within their bounds, the number of divorces to that of marriages ranges from one to five, to one to six. Now, when it is borne in mind that a large percentage of

these divorced people marry again, and that these second and polygamous marriages are counted in the general aggregate, it becomes painfully manifest that the number of marriages which fall under the interdict of God's law, and which according to that law involve the crime of adultery, is to the number of lawful marriages as one to about four or five. It is really startling to think of it, that in some sections of our country about every fourth or fifth couple are living in a state of *legalized adultery*, and that their children, if they have any, are bastards in the sight of God. Matrimony it would seem is fast losing its character as an honorable and holy estate, and with only too many is being used as a cover for passion and lust; to be entered upon from frivolous or improper motives, and to be cast aside at the instigation of caprice or prejudice. No wonder that the moral and religious convictions of the people should feel themselves scandalized by this outrage upon decency, and that the secular print, which is not over diffusive in its advocacy of moral reform movements, should be provoked to a vigorous denunciation.

Happily this tendency to moral derogation is not equally marked throughout our entire country. It manifests itself in larger measure in those sections where the New England spirit predominates. But everywhere the evil is discernible in a greater or less degree. The European States show the same evil drift. But there it moves with a sluggish downward pace, as compared with the greater precipitancy in the United States.

The question as to how this evil is to be arrested, and marriage be reinvested with its exalted attributes of purity and sanctity, has engaged much earnest thought. And the inquiry is still pressed with growing solicitude. The prevailing conviction seems to be that the remedy is to be found in legislation. This would seem to be the readiest, most efficient and natural expedient. For, as has already appeared, the State not only stands organically related to this institution, but is its divinely appointed guardian and defence. But legislation in

the interest of morals and moral reform has not always proved reassuring as to its efficiency. Statute law is largely confined, in its jurisdiction to the outward act, and is competent to take cognizance of the animus and motive only as they are exhibited in the act. As to the matter of moral distinctions in themselves considered, neither the Legislature nor any other human tribunal has jurisdiction. These are determined by a higher legislation, and are set for the government of man in all his relations. The office of the State is to ascertain what these distinctions and requirements are, and by subsidiary enactment to require conformity on the part of the citizen. A law based upon a correct ethical principle, and this principle recognized as true by the community, will be regarded as a just law, and will command a free obedience; but if based upon a false principle, it will meet the protest of the citizen, and its enforcement be regarded as tyrannical. In this country such a law would fail and become a dead letter. An enactment, based upon a valid moral requirement, while it would be a just law, yet if its justice and truth fail to command the assent and understanding of the community, it could not secure the free acquiescence and obedience of the people. The failure to appreciate its righteousness might be the result of moral obtuseness, of false education, or of ignorance, it none the less would hinder obedience, or regard its execution as oppressive. Or, to express the thought in a general proposition, a statute, to command the respect and obedience of the people, must be the utterance of their moral convictions—their sense of right and justice. Until this inward preparation is secured its enactment would be premature, and would fail in the accomplishment of its beneficial purpose. This general proposition is, of course, not so absolute as to be without exception, and an important one will presently command our attention.

Now let us apply this principle to the matter under consideration. In doing so, let it first be inquired, what legislation would be adequate in the premises? This has already secured pretty wide consideration, and variant answers have been given.

But from a moral and religious standpoint, thus much at least would seem to be called for. The State should clearly distinguish between *absolute divorce*, with adultery as its sole justifying ground, and simple *separation*, which may be granted for other and lower reasons; that the right to marry again during the life-time of both parties should be inexorably restricted to the innocent party in the case of absolute divorce, and that the proof which would warrant such a divorce should be held adequate for the conviction of the guilty party in the criminal court and subject him to the penalty; that in case of separation *a mensa et toro*, the parties be considered as man and wife, so long as they both live, and that meanwhile neither party may marry another spouse under penalty of the crime of bigamy, and such second marriage be declared void; and that in the latter case the act of the offending party, on the ground of which the separation is warranted, if it be cognizable by the criminal code, be held subject to the judgment of the proper court, and the penalty visited upon the offender. Other specifications have been made, but these may suffice for the present discussion.

But here, in the more immediate application of the principle just pointed out, arises the grave question, Is the public conscience—is the moral sense of the community at large prepared for such radical legislation? If not, then under our form of government as representative, the enactment of such a law, not in harmony with the convictions of the people, would be an impossibility. For our legislation is in theory, at least, the expression of the popular sense of want and conviction of right. And if, in the absence of this preparation, the statute were nevertheless enacted, it would encounter the disapproval and protest of the public mind, and would be either speedily repealed or fail in efficiency as a dead law. We have abundant illustrations of the folly, if not worse, of allowing legislation to outrun a sustaining public sentiment in the manner in which many laws are easily evaded, and their violation winked at by the community, and by those even on whom devolves the duty of their

execution, the gravity of the oath of office in many instances proving inadequate. It is very seriously to be feared, judging from the adverse sentiments only too frequently expressed by writers on the subject, as also from the multitude who hasten to avail themselves of the easy terms of our divorce laws, that we have not yet reached the high plane of morality necessary to warrant such advanced legislation.

But this is not the only difficulty in the way. Underlying this want of preparation, and measurably its producing cause, is the widely accepted notion, that marriage is a mere civil contract. Our laws unfortunately place it in this category. The State justly appreciates its jurisdiction as the guardian and defender of this vital institution, but unhappily the rationalistic spirit which has come to leaven our jurisprudence, has reduced it to the plane of secular interests. True Judge Story and other jurists apprehend the fact at least in theory, that it is more than a civil contract, but for all this, in the way of practical administration it falls to this low level. This is manifest in the fact that the civil officer is clothed with authority to celebrate the service. According to the doctrine involved in our laws, a marriage celebrated by the Justice of the Peace, realizes the true idea of the institution the same as when celebrated by the minister of religion. This indicates on the part of the State a radical defect in its apprehension of the mystical and purely religious character of the ordinance. From these false premises the restless spouse correctly reasons that there is nothing in the connubial tie which the divorce court cannot annul, and being annulled he can see no reason why he may not innocently contract a new alliance. So long as these views prevail, there is a dull outlook for the bringing about of such legislation as the religious and indissoluble character of the marriage tie (save for the one cause already indicated) demands.

But there is another grave difficulty in the way. A difficulty, which from our present point of view seems to attain to huge, though happily not insurmountable proportions. This holds in the practical difficulty of procuring uniformity of legislation

in the several States. Marriage, according to our jurisprudence, is held to be a domestic institution, and as such is retained for legislative regulation by each State for itself. The result is that different States have different and conflicting divorce laws. Some, as New York for instance, retain the distinction between the degrees of divorce, and prohibit remarriage in the lower degree, while others ignore the distinction and allow remarriage in all cases alike. As a consequence a divorced person desirous of remarriage, but forbidden by the law of his own State, needs but to cross a river or an imaginary line where it is tolerated, and do what he dare not do in his home State. And after his new nuptials have been celebrated he may return home, and be held blameless, because the several States are bound to respect the laws of each other. This is verily a monstrous evil, and goes far towards cutting the sinews of state sovereignty. It betrays an alarming defect in our form of government. What disastrous issues may arise from conflicting or retaliatory legislation on the part of different States, we need but recur for illustration to our history immediately preceding our civil war.

To obviate this difficulty it has been suggested that the General Government should assume the guardianship of this vital interest, and enact marriage and divorce laws for the whole country. This would seem to be the only and sufficient remedy. Indeed if we ever do have uniform laws in this regard, it will of necessity be by congressional enactment. For it would be utopian to expect that our multitudinous States with their diverse interests and views will ever harmonize. But just here we are met by the grave objection, that such legislation is barred by our organic law—the Constitution of the United States. The jurisdiction of the General Government is by the terms of that instrument limited to those offices and powers which are delegated to it by the primary sovereignty of the several States. All others are retained by the States themselves. The guardianship of the institution of marriage is not one of those delegated offices, and consequently legislation on

this subject falls not within the scope of its powers. It is possible of course to amend the Constitution of the United States, so as to grant this power, and to effect this, Justice Noah Davis tells us in a recent number of the *North American Review* in an article on MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, that it is only necessary to add *two words* to that instrument. But this has been objected to on the ground that it would be a dangerous precedent—that any enlargement of the Federal franchises would be but the beginning of a process of centralization, and thus tend to the ultimate overthrow of the very idea of our civil polity. This objection however, we take it, is more specious than real. He would be a fanatic who would claim perfection for our form of government, and consequently incapable of improvement. Its founders were unquestionably wise and astute statesmen, but infallible they were not. They appreciated the necessity of a Federal Government, and they proceeded to designate the powers with which it should be invested. But who will undertake to say that this wisdom served them in discerning all the franchises which a growing history in time to come, would make necessary for the realization of the grand idea before their minds? Experience has already revealed the necessity of giving the terms of the Constitution the most liberal construction in the way of interpretation, and instances are not wanting in which they have been strained to their utmost tension in this regard. As new relations arise, and consequently new obligations unforeseen by our political Fathers, if our organic charter has not elasticity sufficient to adapt itself to these, and its idea excludes the possibility of such modification and extension, as will make it adequate to these new requirements, we are forced to the conclusion that it is incompetent to meet the wants of an adult nationality. No: It is a poor compliment to the vitality and flexibility of our civil polity, to hold it dangerous to remedy its short-comings, and widen its powers of activity to meet enlarged obligations. Here is a supreme interest which has reached an empirical demonstration, that the several States

in their separate capacity, are incompetent to conserve the general moral well being, and to object now to calling in Federal aid by constitutional amendment, because of imaginary dangers, is folly. It would be a rash assertion to make, that no other question, now left to the wisdom of the States, will in the evolutions of history ever call for Federal solution. And if as such issues may arise and multiply, there be not sufficient elasticity and power of adjustment to meet the demand, in our governmental system, it will break.

It would seem that there is no sufficient reason why the necessary congressional legislation might not be secured in this behalf. We say *might not*, for it would require a herculean moral effort to bring it to pass. Were the necessary moral conditions at hand—were the public conscience, and sense of political well being educated up to the issue, Congress could readily be induced to inaugurate the movement for the constitutional amendment, and three-fourths of the States to ratify it, and the necessary laws could then be enacted. But in the absence of this preparation we may well regard it as an impossible task. And here it may be remarked incidentally, that in just this mighty moral force, this popular conviction, lies the defence of the nation against a rash and dangerous centralization of power in the hands of the General Government. Without it the necessary conservative machinery of government can not be made to move. And in its presence, a refusal to move, would turn its conservatism into tyrannical stubbornness, whose tenure of power would be short-lived.

Do these necessary moral conditions exist in the minds and hearts of the people of the United States, in such effective measure, as to demand the vigorous political action indispensable to the legislation contemplated? We feel free in answering this question in the negative. As long as such low views of the divine character of the institution of marriage prevail—as long as rationalistic thinking degrades it to a plane but little if any above a mere civil contract—so long as incompatibility of temper and disposition, maltreatment, neglect, desertion, etc.

are so largely regarded as causes sufficient to warrant the State in dissolving these sacred ties, and ignoring the divine behest "what therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder," there is but little reason to think that our civil authorities could be induced to enter upon such a far-reaching innovation. Are we therefore to regard the case as hopeless, and forego all effort in the premises? Certainly not. Greater conquests than this have been achieved in the past, by appliances still at hand. And it requires only the resolute and untiring use of these world subduing agencies to win the victory. The diffusion of correct moral and religious sentiment, the bold enunciation of the doctrine of marriage as set forth in the word of God, and its tireless proclamation; these are the grand, efficient weapons to be employed. Meanwhile we are not to forego the employment of such aggressive effort, as may serve to mitigate in part at least, the evil, and thus inaugurate a movement in the direction of final success. Moreover to the extent precisely that an awakened public sentiment on this subject is genuine and intelligent will it reveal itself in diligent effort.

Whatever moral deficiencies may exist in the community, there certainly is sufficient conscience to demand a more rigorous and vigilant execution of our present divorce laws, defective as they are, and this especially as to their prohibitory and penal clauses. Let not divorces be granted in the careless slipshod way which disgraces too many of our courts. And when a legal ground has been established, if it develops crime on either side, let the criminal be immediately arraigned and punished. If our laws are not adequate at present for such a procedure, here is a case where immediate legislation should be demanded. As already said, it is an outrage on civilization and good government if nothing more, that a person, man or woman, should be legally proved guilty of adultery, and the Court take no further notice of the fact than relates to the divorce issue in hand, and the lascivious wretch be allowed to go forth unquestioned. Again, in those States where remar-

riage during the life-time of the partner is forbidden, on the ground that the divorce is not absolute, let that prohibition be sternly enforced. And if the parties remarry beyond the limits of the State, and return again, let them be held for the crime of bigamy. Thus would the public conscience be purged of the guilt of conniving at crime, and the community of the presence of unclean malefactors.

But it is not necessary to detail at greater length the particulars, for which a sufficient public sentiment is already at hand to warrant an appeal for legislative interference. A fuller consideration would reveal others. The great need and duty of the hour, is the elucidation and spreading abroad of the true Scriptural idea of marriage, and a sound morality as growing out of it. That there is a growing feeling of favor in this regard is manifest. As has already appeared, nearly all our able Reviews, and other publications are lending their aid, and are discussing the subject with great ability. This is hope-inspiring, and gives assuring promise for the future. But here it is pertinent to ask, What is the attitude, and with what measure of efficiency is the Church sharing in this beneficent labor? It goes for the saying, that it accepts the teaching of the Word of God as the finality, and condemns the divorce iniquity now so prevalent and wide-spread. But is it as emphatic in its teaching, and as rigid in its discipline as the urgency of the case unquestionably calls for? It is sad to be compelled to confess that it is not. This is deeply to be lamented, as it belongs to the Church first of all to proclaim the truth, to inculcate lessons of Christian morality, and to exercise her spiritual offices for the suppression of immorality and vice. Yet in the very teeth of this duty, there are Christian ministers by the dozens and scores who are countenancing this iniquity and lending it their co-operation by prostituting their sacred office in celebrating these adulterous marriages. And their church courts call them to no reckoning. Such a procedure is simply outrageous and well calculated to provoke indignation. Do these ministers for one moment think what they are

doing? Do they recollect that in regarding a divorced person as eligible to remarry (save in the case of the innocent party in a divorce for the cause of adultery), and performing the service, they recognize and approve the putting asunder of those whom God has joined together? Do they recollect that such marriages according to the word of God involve the crime of adultery, and that they use the office of Christ's ministry to authorize this foul sin, and that in the accompanying prayer they ask God to bless this unclean and criminal reunion? The plea sometimes made by such offenders, that if they refuse some other one will marry the couple, is supremely mercenary and contemptible. Judas Iscariot might have plead that had he refused the thirty pieces of silver some other reprobate would have taken it to betray his Lord. May it not be said without incurring the charge of rashness that in this particular the Church connives at vice and crime?

No time should be lost by the Church of Christ in purging itself of this shameful scandal, and in assuming an attitude of bold aggression in favor of the truth. It would contribute more than all other agencies combined, to disseminate abroad correct views; to elevate the moral tone of the community; to hasten preparations for social reform and also a stringent and radical legislation on the divorce question. A wide-spread effort should at once be inaugurated to secure common and uniform action by the several branches of the Church. Let the higher judicatories formulate in clear and emphatic language the teaching of the Bible on the subjects of marriage and divorce. Let each one announce it as its authoritative deliverance and rule of its order and discipline. Let it hold the membership under its control subject to this order by suitable legislation, and exercise an unsparing jealousy towards those who sin against it. Let it lay upon the ministry, with grave sanctions, the mandatory obligation to refuse to perform the office of marriage, in case of any divorced person, with the exception pointed out above. Let the Church take such high grounds, and though the civil magistrate may still be at hand to perform adulterous

marriages, yet will the moral sense of the community be inspired with a growing healthy tone, and such marriages will soon come to be regarded as below the plane of respectability and decency.

Meanwhile the ministry should awake to the fact that they have been culpably yielding to a false sense of delicacy, in refraining to so large an extent, in their public ministrations, from proclaiming the Word of God on this important subject. Christ and His Apostles have spoken, and the preacher may not innocently withhold the inculcation of their lessons. Let the Church arouse to its sacred duty, and teach the State its true and heaven-ordained office as regards marriage; that it is a relation which far transcends any civil contract; that it (the State) is the servant, not the master of this sacred institution; that it has no right to perform the service which constitutes this union, and just as little right to put asunder those whom God has joined together, save only as He has appointed and ordained and clothed it with authority, and that it can transcend its delegated prerogatives in this regard only at the expense of the derangement and ultimate disruption of its own organic constitution.

But the divorce iniquity is not the only abuse which has attained to alarming proportions in this country. Neither does it mark the farthest confines of the degeneration of morals in our midst. There are secret abuses of such a delicate character that modesty and purity of mind almost proscribe them as topics of conversation, except it be to deprecate them and open the way for their abatement. They enter into and debauch the sanctities of our physical nature, and pollute the springs of our social life. Persons, husbands and wives of intelligence and refinement, of otherwise blameless lives, are guilty of crimes, which could they be unearthed from their dark privacy, would expose them to the rigors of the criminal law, and of evasions, which but for the *formal* defence of their connubial relations, would consign them to the sink-hole of prostitution. These relations save the conduct from the legal, technical form

of unchastity, but the essence of the act, the intention, the purely lustful purpose, determine its moral and religious character. The existence of these evils, the prevalence of the procurement of abortion, and the far wider spread prevention of conception, are notorious and humiliating facts. Physicians whose facilities for knowledge on the subject are exceptional, tell us that the alarming extent to which these abuses are practised, is scarcely suspected by the general community. In attestation of this fact we are pointed to the diminishing fecundity of our American people, especially of the higher classes. In some parts of the Northern States, we are told, the average number of children in the native families will not exceed two, while in the same localities foreign-born parents have numerous offspring. Indeed, we need but look about us in almost any community, to note indications which are more than suspicious. How many young and healthy married couples have no children? How many wives after giving birth to one or two children, without any abatement in health or vitality on the part of either spouse cease to bring forth? Others bring forth at long and abnormal intervals. True there are cases where infecundity exists from legitimate causes, but these your physician will tell you are exceptional and of infrequent occurrence. And, unfortunately, these innocent cases, in consequence of the prevalence of the evil, are included in the general suspicion.

Is it possible that these people know what they are doing? Is it possible that they are aware of the nature of the crimes of which they are guilty, if not before men, at any rate before God? Can they be aware of the outrageous wrong they are perpetrating against the social order, and the depth of more than beastly uncleanness into which they have sunken? One can hardly think so, except in case of those who fear not God nor regard man, and have given themselves up to a life of criminal indulgence. One would rather believe that the evil grows out of a want of reflection, out of ignorance as to what is involved in it, and that a proper understanding of the nature, and the enormity of its guilt, would lead to a detestation and prompt

abandonment of the practice. In this direction some have spoken. Articles have been written and pamphlets have been published. Those who would speak upon the subject have felt themselves embarrassed by its unique and extremely delicate character. But it may well be asked whether the time has not come, and whether the evil has not grown to a magnitude which calls for a truce to a squeamish modesty, and a bold enunciation of the teachings of morality and the law of God upon the subject.

It will contribute to a clearer apprehension of the character of the sin, and the magnitude of the evil generally, to spend a few thoughts upon the peculiar position which the institution of marriage holds in the economy of God's works, and its special import and purpose. That it is a divine and not a human ordinance, goes for the saying, and as has already sufficiently appeared. It must be noted, however, that it enters not as a factor specifically into the scheme of redemption. It antedates sin, as the occasion for soteriological grace. It comes to us as a survivor of the wreck of Eden, as a factor in the order of creation. It is coeval with the creation of man, and finds its ground in the constitution of his nature.

As the first in purpose, hence the last in realization, man, embodies the ideal of the work of creation. God, moved by the abounding fullness of His excellent glory and love, determined to call into existence myriads and hosts of finite spirits, into whom as life-forms He might pour His blessedness, and fill them with His beatific glory. He made the world that it might be the sanctuary in which this plan might grow to its completed fullness. Into this garden of delights He placed man, made and fashioned in the Divine image and likeness, but bearing in the constitution of his physical nature a fecundity out of which was to grow a progeny like unto the stars in multitude, and the sands of the sea-shore in number. Not all would He call into being by the immediate process which gave birth to the first man. But from this great progenitor, as from a fruitful germ, He would make to grow, conditioned by the free agency

with which He endowed him, the proposed hosts of rational intelligences. Why God elected not to work by immediate creative energy, it needs not that we here inquire. It is enough for us to know, that so far as the finite mind can know, He accomplishes His wise designs through intermediate agencies, yet so as none the less to exercise His creative power and work His sovereign will. Thus is it, that in the emergence of the multiplying race of man, God ceased not the work of creation when He made Adam out of the dust of the earth, and formed Eve out of the rib from his side, but the same energy works still through the instrumentality of human generation, and will work, to the fulfillment of its ultimate design.

The human body as at present constituted, with gross and perishable flesh and blood, enters not as an element into the divine idea of man. This was given him as a transient expedient to qualify him as an agent in the work of creation. This is the primary and controlling office of our fleshly nature, and when this office is fulfilled, experience teaches us that it wears out, its powers fail and it falls into decay. The same destiny awaits the material and powers of nature, as these stand in organic relation to the human body. God made man male and female for this specific purpose, and when He laid upon them the injunction, "increase and multiply and replenish the earth," He did it, because for this purpose did He constitute them as they were. Only thus could they fulfill their mission—only thus could their nature realize its beneficent design, and its appetencies and affinities be appeased in connubial happiness and domestic peace. Marriage then, with its privileges, its duties and its limitations, is the ordinance of God for the realization of His creative purpose, and the final bringing to pass what was purposed in the counsels of eternity in the determination to make man.

Thus considered it is not hard to appreciate the sacred character of the conjugal relation, and to see the enormity of the abuses under review. The sin involved in them is of the nature of the sin of our first parents in the garden. It is an open revolt against the whole order of creation;—is to strike God in

the face, and set His will at defiance. It is to mock at His purposes, and throw contempt upon His gracious designs. It is to insult His most high Majesty, and to extinguish His excellent glory in the sink of human lust and pollution. Besides all this, it is to outrage the physical nature of man in its most delicate rights and privileges, to pervert the normal activity of its noblest powers, and to precipitate it into premature decay and death. These abuses involve the desperation of wild rebellion against the moral government of God, and suicide to those who practice them.

There is another aspect which these abuses present which may not be passed over, even at the expense of some boldness of speech. Is the mother who procures, or consents to the production of abortion, aware of the fact that she is guilty of premeditated murder? It is a mistake to suppose that the unborn child, whether in its embryonic or foetal state is not a living human being. In conception the ovum of the female is vitalized by its organic union with the seed of the male, which results in a living germ. This germ is the living child in embryo. In it are latent the life and all the powers and qualities of the man. It requires now only the conditions of growth and development. These are furnished by the mother's body. These conditions furnish no new elements to the essence of the life of the embryo child. They furnish the nourishment, heat, etc. necessary to the vital principle already at hand. Just as the conditions of vegetable growth add nothing to the vital principle of the germ in the seed. Whatever modifications may result from the action of the conditions, are attributable not to vitalization but to nourishment and consequent growth. The embryo is the child in an undeveloped germ, and to destroy the embryo, is to destroy the child. No sophistical questions as to the point of time when the embryo becomes a human being, when the moral and intellectual nature emerges, can avail against this truth. As well might it be asked, at what stage in the development of the acorn, do the qualities arise which determine the tree as a living white, red or chestnut oak. There

is no such emergence at all. All the potentialities of the life are at hand in the beginning in the acorn. There is no evading the terrible truth; those who procure abortions, are murderers at the bar of God, and at the court of conscience. The civil law, while it falls short in its estimate of the grade, nevertheless holds it a crime and a felony, and visits it with sore punishment. If we may rely upon the representations which physicians and others make as to the prevalence of this heathenish crime, we may conjecture how many females there are, moving in many instances in the better walks of life, enjoying a good reputation for morality and honesty, some, sad to say professed followers of the pure and holy Jesus, who, were the even measure of the criminal laws of the land meted out to them, would be this day behind the bars of the penitentiary, while in the eyes of God, their hands are stained with the blood of their own children.

Let it not be imagined that the prevention of conception, is any less grave offense in the sight of God, and at the bar of pure morals, than the one just considered. At first thought it might be supposed, that this act at any rate does not involve the destruction of life. A little inquiry into the process of generation, will show this to be a mistake. The vital—the dynamic principle is in the seed of the male, and the ovum of the female is the living bosom for its germination and development. The latter stands related to it somewhat as the body does to the life. To prevent the vital union of these two factors, which it is the office of marriage specifically to provide for, is to destroy both while in a state of violent separation. It is an act of destruction by culpable prevention. But to what extent does this destruction reach? Does it reach human life? As just pointed out, the vital principle is in the seed of the male. Herein abides a latent human being, ready to move forward in the way of development, under the conditions provided in the conjugal act. To interpose in any manner and prevent the normal issue of the act, is to consign the vital factors involved to destruction. It is to destroy a human life yet in its incipient state,—it is in so far, to commit murder. Lest this should be esteemed

a far fetched conclusion, we need but turn to Gen. 38 : 9—10, to learn that for an act of prevention of conception, the Lord slew Onan. He spilled his seed upon the ground—he voluntarily destroyed the vital principle contained in it, for which act of murder the Lord arose in His wrath and slew him. But did not the crime mount up to such heinous proportions, it nevertheless remains, that it is a criminal defeat of the order of creative Providence, thus incurring the wrath of God ; a lascivious perversion of the powers of nature, and a prostitution of its office, which must inevitably recoil upon the head of the offender.

The pleas urged in justification or palliation of these evils, however plausible they may seem, will upon examination be found to be destitute of validity. Exceptional cases may arise, where from malformation of the body of the mother, or other abnormalities, the physician may lawfully resort to violent measures, involving the destruction of the foetus, just as in other cases the amputation of a limb or other dangerous surgical operations may become necessary. Cases of this kind are not here called in question. It is only those where parents, without medical counsel, through fear of possible danger, and for lighter causes, thus violate the sacred rights of nature. Child-bearing is unquestionably attended with danger, but the percentage of disastrous experiences is exceedingly small, while abortion, subjecting the system to an unnatural ordeal is attended with a vastly greater proportion of evil results. The plea of feebleness of constitution and impaired health is largely made in justification of prevention of conception, just as though experience did not demonstrate, the percentage of unfortunate issues to be quite as large in the case of healthy and robust mothers as in the case of the frail and weakly. So that this plea is as good in one case as in the other. And since in all cases of maternity there is more or less danger, it would be universally valid if valid in these. An argument which proves too much, proves nothing at all. Many resort to this expedient to escape the pains of maternity. These pains are the fruit of sin, brought upon our common mother and all her daughters by

transgression. But may we seek to escape the consequences of one crime by committing another? If I lie to escape the penalty of theft, am I justified? When two wrongs can be made to equal the right, then may this be taken to be a valid plea. But some one will urge that a numerous progeny entails a frail constitution and delicate health. This is an allegation which facts do not substantiate. First-born children are not always the healthiest and longest lived, neither do they manifest the greatest moral and intellectual vigor. But even were it true, that would not justify the violation of God's ordinance. It is well known that one-half of the human family die in infancy and childhood, is that to be held as proof that too many children are born into the world? May we seek to rectify the order of creative providence, by violating the Divine command, "increase and multiply and replenish the earth?" Do those who die in infancy and childhood fail to realize God's purpose in creating souls? Are they all failures, and is their existence blotted out? Is it true of them that they had better never have been born? No, verily. The primary interest to be subserved in the creation of the human soul, is not its bodily, not its earthly estate and well being. This belongs to the eternal state beyond this life, and for a parent to prevent an eternity of blessedness and of the glorification of God, on the part of a possible soul, for fear its sojourn in this world might be brief and full of trouble, and that too by a violation of a "thus saith the Lord," is to manifest an ignorance and depravity, at once profound and desperate. Queen Anne of England who was the mother of seventeen children, all of whom died in infancy except one who lived to childhood, did not reason thus, nor did she esteem it a shame, as do so many now-a-days, to have a large family, and although at her death she left no child to succeed her upon the throne, she had the unspeakable joy to know that she was God's instrument in bringing into existence seventeen immortal souls, for His glory, and their everlasting happiness.

The same train of reasoning will apply to those, who would justify their infidelity by the persuasion that one or two chil-

dren are as many as their resources will warrant, that they may be suitably reared and educated. Poor, flimsy excuse. Whose hand is it that supplies their wants? Who feeds the fowls of the air, and clothes the lilies of the field? Who teaches them to walk by faith and not by sight? On the other hand, who teaches them to disobey God, for fear He will not verify His promise, that "all these things shall be added" to those who seek first the kingdom of heaven? Have they not rather in their little pride erected a pitiful standard of worldly comfort and respectability, and now allow themselves to abuse the privileges of their conjugal state in seeking to attain it? As for those wives who, as votaries of fashion and pleasure, prefer idleness and dissipation to the trials of maternity, and the homely yet sacred duties of the nursery—whose desolate homes hear not the cooings of infancy or the prattle of childhood—or if *by accident*, a child is born to one of them, gives it over to be neglected and warped by a heartless hireling; of them we scarcely know what to say. They are treasuring up for themselves an age of satiety and desolation, of unsympathizing and mercenary surroundings, of cold neglect and remorse in this world, while in the world to come there awaits them a fearful reckoning for neglected privileges and duties, the waste of talents and of time, and the prostitution of powers to base and unclean ends. Moreover, if they flatter themselves that they can arouse the generative potencies by indulging in the initial excitement, and then balk them by illegitimate interference, without a recoil in the form of broken health and physical suffering, they little understand the extreme delicacy and sensitiveness of the vital functions of the human body. Physicians alone are cognizant of the widespread misery, the premature decay and death which are brought to pass, by this inexorable protest of a violated nature.

Besides all this, it is verily amazing, that those who commit these crimes, should fail, seemingly, to discern their grossly immoral and licentious character. In deliberately defeating the primary design of marriage, and using its privileges for the

mere gratification of sensual passion, they rob the conjugal intercourse of its purity and chastity, and turn it into a legal whoredom. It involves just this, that the wife is degraded to the status of a *mistress*, she plays the role of a legal prostitute to her husband, while he, consenting to this beastly outrage, is making a harlot of his wife. It passes comprehension that such things should exist in a community, and on the part of persons making pretensions to morality and Christianity, or even common decency. And the wonder is that a righteous God does not visit such bestiality with immediate and condign punishment.

In the face of the known fact of the existence of these evils, and that, too, in the higher walks of life, and on the part of only too many who make high claims to morality, and who dare, as professing Christians, to approach the holy sacrament of the altar, what is the ministry of Christ to do? This is a subject so delicate, of such surpassing difficulty to treat, that its presentation from the pulpit is a matter of questionable expediency. Its presentation in private conversation, to those who are guilty, as they would almost surely resent the imputation, would be attended with almost forbidding embarrassment. What can be done? Were the Publication Boards of the several Churches to publish inexpensive tracts, setting forth with incisive brevity the shocking immorality and appalling sinfulness of these practices, might they not be placed in the pews, to be taken for perusal by the members and frequenters of the churches? Certainly, some who have fallen into the evil, are ignorant of its terribly sinful character, and need only to be instructed that they may flee from it, while many others may be saved from it in time to come.

## V.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURES.—By Henry M. Harman, D. D. Fourth Edition. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1884.

We called the attention of the readers of the Review to this work when it was first published six years ago. It is unnecessary, therefore, at this late day, to say anything more of its general character and merits. The book has been received by the theological public with much favor. It has already reached a fourth edition, and of the earlier edition about four thousand copies have been sold. The present edition is much enlarged and improved, especially the part relating to the Pentateuch, where the author now discusses the later criticism as represented by Prof. Kayser, Wellhausen, Kuenen and W. Robertson Smith, and endeavors to shew the falsity of their theory, that the priestly laws of the middle books of the Pentateuch were not recorded until the period of the Babylonian captivity and were completed about the time of Ezra. In this revised and enlarged form, the book deserves and will doubtless achieve still greater success, as showing what strict conservatism on Biblical questions has to say on its own behalf in opposition to the oftentimes wild hypotheses of modern critics.

THEOLOGICAL ENCYCLOPÆDIA AND METHODOLOGY. On the Basis of Hagenbach. By George R. Crooks, D. D., and John F. Hurst, D. D. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1884.

This Encyclopædia and Methodology is the third volume of the "Library of Biblical and Theological Literature," edited by Revs. Drs. George R. Crooks and John F. Hurst, and, as well as the preceding volumes of the same library, is a valuable contribution to American and English Theology. It is based, as stated in the title page, on the volume on the same subject by Rev. Dr. Karl Hagenbach, for many years the eminent Professor of Theology in the University of Basel. The bibliography of the original work has, however, been greatly enlarged by adding the titles of English and American books in each department and thus the usefulness of the book has been greatly increased.

In the Introduction to the work we are informed that Theological Encyclopedia "is a survey of all departments of theology, with a statement of what has been accomplished in each", and that Methodology "is applied encyclopædia", and contains "the regulative conclusions from the principles and historical character of a science, which are requisite for the process of appropriation." We are also informed that "the relation of Theological Encyclopædia to the body of theological science is twofold; it stands at the threshold of the course as an introductory science, and serves a complementary purpose for him, who has arrived at its end, by collecting together the results obtained." This treatise,

accordingly, will be found useful not only to theological students, but also to ministers generally.

The work consists besides the Introduction, of two principal parts, and an Appendix. The Introduction treats of the idea and scope of Encyclopædia and Methodology and of their importance. Part first deals with General Encyclopædia. In it Theology is considered as a positive science, and the relation to it of Philology, Mathematical and Natural Science, the Arts and General Culture, and Philosophy are exhibited and discussed. The relations of Ethics, Psychology, and Logic to Theology are likewise considered in this part of the work, and attention directed to the leading tendencies of theological thought from the beginning of the Christian Church down to the present time. Part second consists of Special Theological Encyclopædia. It is divided into four chapters treating respectively of Exegetical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical Theology. The Appendix contains *first* a large number of titles, chiefly of English and American works upon the relations of Religion and Science, and *secondly*, of a list of Histories of the Christian Churches in the United States. The subjects considered are all treated with great ability and the work in every respect is a most excellent one.

A HIGHER CATECHISM OF THEOLOGY. By William Bart Pope, D. D., Theological Tutor, Didsbury College, Manchester. New York: Phillips & Hunt. Cincinnati: Walden & Stowe. 1884.

This volume is a treatise on Systematic Theology in the form of Question and Answer. The theology presented is that generally accepted by the Methodist Episcopal Church. The method pursued is that mostly followed in treatises on Dogmatic Theology. After a brief introduction, the Christian Revelation and the Rule of Faith are considered, and then in regular order, God, God and the Creature, Sin, the Mediatorial Work of the Redeemer, the Application of Redemption, and the Last Things are treated of. The questions throughout the work are put with much skill, and the answers are clear and generally very satisfactory. Of its kind the work is a truly admirable one, and we would commend it to all who would acquaint themselves with the views entertained by the Church, in whose interest it has been prepared and published. All the various denominations of Christians, we think, would find it advantageous to have their theology presented in the same form if it were done with equal ability. The careful study of such a work by the members of the Church generally, we feel assured, would result in much good. It would tend to protect them against falling into serious errors and to make their Christian life more firm and complete.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL HAND-BOOK OF THE GOSPEL OF JOHN. By Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, Th. D., Ober-Consistorialrath, Hanover. Translated from the Fifth Edition of the German by Rev. William Urwick, M. A. The translation revised and edited by Frederick Crombie, D. D., Prof. of Biblical Criticism, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. With a preface and supplementary Notes to the American Edition by A. C. Kendrick, D. D., Greek Professor in the University of Rochester. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1884.

The same excellencies that characterize the preceding volumes of Messrs. Funk & Wagnalls' Edition of Meyer's Commentary on the New Testament, characterize the present volume. The additions of the

American Editor are especially valuable and add considerably to the usefulness of the work. In the preface to this Commentary on John, Dr. Kendrick, after referring in a general way to the great merits of Meyer as a Biblical Expositor, says, "For the work of expounding this Gospel he (Meyer) has some very special qualifications. To his wide learning, his philological exactness, his exegetical tact and acuteness, his independence and candor, he adds a hearty and loving sympathy with his author that is among the surest aids to a right understanding of him." This volume, it is scarcely necessary to say, should find a place in every minister's library. No better help for the thorough study of this profoundest of the Gospels can be found anywhere.

OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY, with Special Reference to the Theory of Education. A Text-book for Colleges. By James Sully, M. A., Examiner for the Moral Science Tripos in the University of Cambridge. Examiner in Philosophy in the Victoria University; late Examiner in Mental and Moral Science in the University of London; Author of "Sensation and Intuition," etc. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1, 3, and 5 Bond Street. 1884.

The object of this volume is to present the leading facts and truths of Mental Science. The author holds that Psychology, while a science of *Mind* is a *Science* of mind. By this he means "first of all, that it deals with events or processes which agree with the phenomena of the external world, in exhibiting orderliness or uniformity of succession, and so are susceptible of being brought under definite laws; and, secondly, that it has in its own instruments and methods of research when properly understood, an adequate means of ascertaining these laws." He claims for Psychology "a place apart from the physical sciences, as the fundamental moral science," but at the same time follows "the modern tendency to supplement the properly psychological study of mind by the physiological study of its nervous conditions and concomitants." With Lewes, he holds that "since in psychology we are specially concerned with that type of mental development, which presents itself in members of civilized communities, we must give prominence to the educative influence of that elaborate social system, involving the structure of language, traditional forms of thought, &c., with which each individual comes from the first into intimate contact." Moreover, he informs us that he has sought "to give a practical turn to the exposition by bringing out the bearing of the subject on the conduct and cultivation of mind," and has added "special sections in a separate type dealing with the bearing of the science on Education."

The work throughout is written in a clear and attractive style and contains a large amount of useful information relating to the subject of which it treats. Though we do not agree with the author on some important points, we can, nevertheless, recommend the work as a valuable contribution to psychological science. Those especially who would acquaint themselves with the more recent views advanced regarding man's intellectual powers, should procure this treatise and carefully study its contents. Much can be learned from it even by those who cannot accept all its teachings. The book we would yet state is beautifully printed in large, clear type, and contains over seven hundred pages. D. Appleton & Co. deserve the thanks of students generally for publishing the work in such fine style.

**THE GOSPEL AND ITS WITNESSES.** Some of the Chief Facts in the Life of Our Lord and the Authority of the Evangelical Narratives considered in Lectures chiefly preached at St. James, Westminster. By Henry Wace, B. D., D. D., Prebendary of St. Paul's, Preacher of Lincoln's Inn, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in King's College, London, Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1883.

This volume is made up of nine lectures which treat respectively of the Christian Creed and its Evidence, the Results of Modern Criticism, the Birth of our Lord, the Name of Jesus, the Miracles of our Lord, the Passion and Death of our Lord, the Witness to our Lord's Resurrection, our Lord's Return to Judgment, and the Gift of the Spirit. The design of the author in preparing these lectures and giving them to the public, "was," as he informs us in his preface, "to exhibit the real character and results of modern criticism in respect to the authenticity of the Gospels and at the same time to illustrate the credibility and spiritual significance of the main facts in the Evangelical Narratives." What he designed to do he has successfully accomplished. In the first two Lectures he very clearly shows that the critical inquiries of the last fifty years have signally failed to establish any objections against the traditional authorship of the four Gospels. In the remaining Lectures he just as clearly demonstrates the credibility of the Gospels as to the main facts of our Lord's life to which they bear witness. These Lectures throughout, indeed, are written in such a way as to carry conviction as to the correctness of the position taken in them. Their style is unusually clear and forcible, and on every page almost they give evidence of superior scholarship. They deserve to be widely circulated and carefully read. Within a brief compass they present just such information as should be generally possessed, and as is especially suited to the wants of those whose historical faith in the Gospels has been shaken.

**SOURCES OF HISTORY IN THE PENTATEUCH.** Six Lectures delivered in Princeton Theological Seminary on the Stone foundation, March 1882. By Samuel C. Bartlett, D. D., LL. D., President of Dartmouth College. New York: Anson D. Randolph & Company, 900 Broadway, Cor. 20th St.

The subjects discussed in this volume are the Earliest Cosmogony, Early Man, the Early Arts, the Earliest Consanguinities, the Early Movements of the Nations, and the Early Documents. There is also an Appendix giving an Extract from Stack's Article on the Pentateuch in the last Edition of Herzog's Real-Encyclopädie, Leipzig, 1882. The object of the author in discussing these subjects is to "set forth in the direct and affirmative aspect the claims of the Pentateuch as a book of origins, containing the sources of all our earliest consecutive knowledge, and alone solving those great questions concerning the human race which must be asked and which lie otherwise unanswered." Accordingly the views presented and defended in these Lectures are those most generally held by conservative theologians. President Bartlett thinks that "the attempts to invalidate the traditional view in regard to the authorship of the Pentateuch may all be characterized as efforts to set aside the usual laws of evidence by evasions and side-issues,—chiefly unwarranted inferences or unfounded assertions," and he holds as regards the latest form of objections as presented by Kuenen and Wellhausen and in part interpreted by Prof. W. Robertson Smith, that "it is only a question of a little time for rallying to the defence, and we shall see this airy

fabric like its predecessors vanish into thin air." The Lectures throughout give evidence that the author is thoroughly acquainted with the departments of knowledge to which his subjects belong and that he knows how to present his topics and points in the best possible manner. The volume containing them, though only a 16mo. of 247 pages, is nevertheless a valuable contribution to theology and will be sure to be read with interest and profit.

**SHORT HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS** from Abraham and Paul to Carey, Livingstone and Duff. By George Smith, LL. D., F. R. G. S., Companion of the order of the Indian Empire, Author of the 'Life of Dr. Wilson,' 'Dr. Duff,' etc. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1884.

This is one of the series of Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students, edited by Rev. Marcus Dods, D. D., and Rev. Alexander Whyte, D. D., and published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburg. As stated in the title page it gives a short history of Missions from Abraham down to the present day. It is divided into three parts. Part I treats of the Judaic Preparation, B. C. 2000 to A. D. 70; Part II, of the Latin Preparation, A. D. 70 to 1784; Part III, of the English Speaking Universal Evangelization, 1784 to 1884. In these various parts of the book a great deal of useful information respecting the work of missions is given. Owing to the great importance of this form of Christian work, it would be well if not merely the members of Bible Classes but Christians generally would thoroughly acquaint themselves with the contents of this volume. Ministers especially will find it very advantageous to have this volume within easy reach when called upon to prepare Missionary Addresses, as it furnishes a large number of valuable facts and statistics in a very convenient form. The closing chapter of the book, we would yet add, gives a short but serviceable Bibliography of Missions.

**IS GOD KNOWABLE?** By the Rev. J. Iverach, M. A., Author of "The Life of Moses." London: Hodder & Stoughton, 27 Paternoster Row. 1884.

This work forms one of the volumes of "The Theological Library" now being published by Hodder & Stoughton, London. The object of this Library is to furnish a series of small books on the doctrines which recent debate has brought prominently before the public mind. All the volumes are to be prepared by competent writers and are to be condensed in expression, biblical in doctrine, and catholic in spirit.

The question discussed in the present volume the author not unaptly styles the question of the hour. Its importance is unquestionable. Modern unbelief seems especially inclined to be agnostic. But practically agnosticism amounts to the same thing as atheism. For a God that is wholly unknowable is to all intents, so far as man's conscious life is concerned, no God at all.

The thesis which the author of the book before us seeks to maintain is, that God "is spirit; personal, self-conscious, and capable of entering into personal relations with finite spirits and that He may be known in a very true and real sense of the word knowledge." In maintaining this thesis, we think, he has proved himself eminently successful.

The work itself is divided into ten chapters. In the first we have a statement of the question, and in the nine following chapters the following subjects are discussed in the order here given: Personality and the

Manifestation of it in history, Anthropomorphism, Dean Mansel and Mr. Herbert Spencer, the Agnosticism of Science, the Search after God, the Hebrew Solution, the Greek Solution, the Christian Solution, and the Conception of God. The chapter on Personality and its manifestation in history is especially fine and, in the highest degree, convincing. No part of the work, however, is dull, and no one who begins to read it will be likely to lay it down before he has finished it. We commend it to all our readers. It is a masterly defence of an important truth.

**LIFE: IS IT WORTH LIVING?** By the Rev. John Marshall Lang, D. D., Minister of the Barony Parish, Glasgow. Author of "Heaven and Home," "The Last Supper of the Lord," etc. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 27 Paternoster Row. 1884.

This volume like the preceding one belongs to the "Theological Library," published by Hodder and Stoughton, London. It deals with an old question, but with one, nevertheless, which will be likely to engage the earnest thought of man until the end of time. The contrast between the expectations of life and what is realized in our earthly existence will continually cause it to arise in the minds of men. In the present volume the question is considered from a Christian standpoint.

Though Dr. Lang is not as brilliant in the treatment of the subject under consideration as is Mr. Mallock, yet the views which he presents are much sounder. His work is both critical and expository. He reviews critically the various theories of the worth of life which are opposed to, or fall short of, the truth of the Christian revelation, and holds himself justified by the examination of antitheistic theories in maintaining that "every conception of life is unworkable which denies or ignores a super-natural reference," and that "the chief interest of life is directly or indirectly a religious interest." He then brings forward and expounds the distinctive truths of our catholic Christian faith "as witnessing to the essential worth of life and as revealing the way in which this worth may be realized in different circumstances and conditions." The work, as may be inferred from what has been stated, abounds in instructive criticism and in forcible expositions of important truths, and as a whole presents a strong argument in favor of Christianity.

**A STUDY OF ORIGINS; or, the Problems of Knowledge, of Being, and of Duty.** By E. De Pressensé, D. D., Author of "Jesus Christ: His Times, Life and Work," "The Early Years of Christianity," etc. New York: James Pott & Co., 12 Astor Place. 1884.

The distinguished author of "Jesus Christ: His Times, Life and Work," and of "The Early Years of Christianity," in this volume, enters on the discussion of the philosophical and scientific questions of the day. His aim in this discussion is to bring before his readers the conflict which is going on between the thinkers of our age, and in which the highest interests of humanity are involved, and to do something to dispel the fatal misconception that science and conscience, liberty and religion are incompatible. Throughout the treatise, he appeals only to the authentic exponents of science for evidence in the solution of the problems under consideration. He admits the complete independence of science and would fully vindicate its claims in this respect. He maintains that "it can not recognise any authority whatever which would fetter it in its course of free inquiry. Neither the Bible nor the councils"

he holds, "have any prescriptive right to control science; but on the other hand it is equally bound not to receive the arbitrary commands of any of the exponents of vaunted free thought. To think freely is to lay aside all prejudice and to accept simply the results of experience." He, moreover, declares that he "is increasingly convinced that experimental science is in no way hostile to the principles of theism," and that "it is not the province of science to demonstrate those principles," but that "all that can be fairly asked of it is to recognize their possibility." This being granted he believes that "other processes of experiment, adapted to the nature of the subject, supply its demonstration."

The work is divided into four books. The *first* book treats of the problem of knowledge, the *second* and *third*, of the problem of being, and the *fourth*, of the problem of duty. All these problems are discussed in a most masterly manner. The various theories relating to them, and which are now especially claiming attention, are carefully reviewed, and analyzed and criticised with great precision and perspicuity. In this volume, indeed, de Pressensé shows himself to be no less gifted as a philosopher than in former volumes he proved himself gifted as a historian. As a critical exposition of the contending philosophies of the day, written from a Christian standpoint, we know of no treatise that excels it.

The work has been well translated into English by Annie Harwood, who also translated some of the other works of the same author. It is published by Messrs. Pott & Co in a cheap yet excellent form.

**SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.** By Henry B. Smith, D. D., LL. D. Edited by William S. Karr, D. D., Professor of Theology in Hartford Theological Seminary, New York.: A. C. Armstrong and Son, 714 Broadway. 1884.

Those who are interested in Dogmatic Theology will find this a valuable and interesting volume. Among American theologians there have been few more profound and acute thinkers than the late Professor Smith, whose system of theology is given to the public in its pages.

The work, as indicated in the title page, was not prepared for publication by Prof. Smith himself, but has been formed from complete sets of notes of his lectures on theology taken by his students in different years, and from sketches and outlines of his lectures as left by him in manuscript, and from selections from a number of his unpublished sermons. Though consequently not as complete in every respect as it would undoubtedly have been if the author himself had given it its final form, it is nevertheless an important contribution to theological science, and in some respects all the more valuable, because it allows us occasionally to see the process by which the theologian reached his conclusions.

Theology, as presented in this volume, is Calvinistic, but at the same time also Christological. Prof. Smith maintains the views generally accepted by Calvinists, but presents them from a Christo-centric standpoint. The centre of his system is redemption, and the centre of redemption is Christ Himself. The treatise before us, accordingly, falls into three principal divisions. The first division treats of the Antecedents of Redemption, the second of Redemption itself, and the third of the Kingdom of Redemption. Under the first division the author discusses the Christian doctrine respecting God, Christian Cosmology, Christian Anthropology and Christian Hæmatology. In the second division he treats of the Incarnation in its general nature and objects, and of the person and work of the Mediator. The third division presents his views on the

union between Christ and the individual believer as effected by the Holy Spirit, on justification, on the union between Christ and His Church, and on the consummation of redemption in time and eternity.

The work is truly deserving a place in the library of every minister and student of theology. Its careful study will tend to invigorate the intellect and to quicken the spiritual life.

**THE LORD'S SUPPER** Historically Considered. By the Rev. G. A. Jacob, D. D., formerly Head Master of Christ's Hospital, author of "The Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament," etc., London: Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press, Warehouse, Amen Corner, Seeley, Jackson, and Halliday, Fleet Street.

The professed purpose of this little volume is to present "a short but comprehensive view of the history of the Lord's Supper from the commencement of the Christian Church to the present time." This history is substantially derived from the exhaustive work of Rev. Charles Hebert, D. D., published some four years ago, and entitled: *The Lord's Supper, History of Uninspired Teaching*, and which consists of extracts from the principal ecclesiastical authors who have expressed themselves on this subject from A. D. 75 to 1875. The conclusion at which Dr. Jacob arrives in this historical review, is that the Lord's Supper is merely a memorial of the one, all-sufficient sacrifice offered once for all by our Lord Jesus Christ on the cross. He claims that no consecration of the bread and wine has any scriptural authority. As to the real presence of Christ in the Sacrament he says: "There is no presence of Christ's real body and blood in, or with, or under the form of, the bread and wine. There is no real presence, but a *real absence*, of Christ as the Son of God made man; for it is only during His absence that this Sacrament is to be used—'Ye do show the Lord's death till He come.' The Lord Jesus, in His divine nature, is present in the heart of the faithful communicant, as He dwells in our hearts by faith in other devotions also. But the body and blood of Christ here represented are His body which died, and His blood which was shed upon the cross, and they *are now nowhere*; for the glorified body of Christ, like that which His people will one day have, is no longer 'the body of his humiliation,' consisting of flesh and blood, but a spiritual body, 'the body of His glory.'" From this statement our readers will be able to understand the drift of this historical review. The work we would yet add is a truly able and interesting one, and will repay study on the part of those even who cannot accept the conclusions at which the author arrives.

**THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF COMMON SCHOOL EDUCATION.** By James Currie, A. M., Principal of the Church of Scotland Training College, Edinburgh. Author of "The Principles and Practice of Early and Infant-School Education," "Elements of Musical Analysis," "First Musical Grammar," etc. Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1884.

This is a most admirable work. On the subject of which it treats, we know of no other equal to it. On every page it gives evidence that its author is a man of true culture as well as a thoroughly trained, experienced and judicious teacher. The views which he advances we consider unusually sound and practical.

The work, which is a closely yet very legibly printed 12mo., of 424 pages, consists of three parts. Part I treats of the Principles of Education. In it are discussed in a very masterly and interesting manner the

function of the school, the conditions and objects of moral and religious education, the different subjects of intellectual instruction, and the cultivation of the senses, the imagination and memory, the judgment, the power of connected thinking, and the taste and physical education. Part II is devoted to the consideration of the important subject of school management, and presents very valuable suggestions with reference to organization, discipline, and the art of teaching. In Part III, method is considered, and very full and clear instruction given as to the course that should be pursued in teaching the various branches of a Common School Education.

We would especially commend this volume to all who have to do with the instruction of youth. A careful study of its contents on the part of teachers and parents generally, could scarcely fail to be productive of much good.



Vo

C

31  
Vol. VI.

No. J. Miller  
NEW SERIES

No. 1.

THE  
REFORMED  
Quarterly Review.

EDITORS:

THOMAS G. APPLE, D. D.,  
*Professor in the Theological Seminary, Lancaster, Pa.*

JOHN M. TITZEL, D. D.,  
*Altoona, Pa.*

THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.

VOLUME XXXI.

JANUARY, 1884.

PHILADELPHIA:  
REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,  
907 ARCH STREET.

THREE DOLLARS A YEAR TO BE PAID IN ADVANCE

CONTENTS OF JANUARY NUMBER, 1884.

ARTICLE I.—The Salvation of Infants. . . . .	5
By <b>PROF. E. V. GERHART, D. D.</b>	
“ II.—The Meaning of the Cross. . . . .	46
By <b>Rev. Wm. RUPP.</b>	
“ III.—The Prison-Work of Hugo Grotius, . . . .	85
By <b>Rev. M. G. HANSEN, A. M.</b>	
“ IV.—Otterbein and the Reformed Church, . . . .	110
By <b>Rev. J. H. DUBBS, D. D.</b>	
“ V.—The Pulpit; its Province and its Power. . . .	134
By <b>Rev. JOHN M. TITZEL, D. D.</b>	
“ VI.—Notices of New Books. . . . .	146

## "THE BEST THOUGHTS OF THE BEST THINKERS OF THE AGE."



THE MOST EMINENT LIVING AUTHORS, such as

Prof. MAX MÜLLER,	THE DUKE OF AROYLL,	MATTHEW ARNOLD,
JAMES ANTHONY FROUDE,	WILLIAM BLACK,	J. NORMAN LOCKYER,
Prof. HUXLEY,	MISS THACKERAY,	FRANCIS W. NEWMAN,
RICHARD A. PROCTOR,	Mrs. MULOCK-CHAIK,	ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE,
Prof. GOLDWIN SMITH,	GEORGE MACDONALD,	FRANCIS GALTON,
Rev. HOB. W. E. GLADSTONE,	Mrs. OLIPHANT,	P. G. HAMERTON,
EDWARD A. FREEMAN,	Mrs. ALEXANDER,	W. W. STORY,
Prof. TYNDALL,	JEAN INGELW,	RUSKIN,
Dr. W. B. CARPENTER,	THOMAS HARDY,	TENNENSON,
FRANCES POWER COBBE,	W. H. MALLOCK,	BROWNING,

and many others, are represented in the pages of

## LITTELL'S LIVING AGE.

In 1884 THE LIVING AGE enters upon the forty-first year of its publication. It has constantly received the warm commendation and support of the best men and journals of the country, and has met with uninterrupted success. A WEEKLY MAGAZINE of sixty-four pages, it gives more than

### Three and a Quarter Thousand

double-column octavo pages of reading-matter yearly, forming four large volumes. It presents in an inexpensive form, considering its great amount of matter, with freshness, owing to its weekly issue, and with a satisfactory completeness attempted by no other publication, the best Essays, Reviews, Criticisms, Tales, Sketches of Travel and Discovery, Poetry, Scientific, Biographical, Historical, and Political Information, from the entire body of Foreign Periodical Literature.

During the coming year Serial and Short Stories by the Leading Foreign Authors will be given, together with an amount

### Unapproached by any other Periodical

in the world, of the most valuable Literary and Scientific matter of the day, from the pens of the foremost Essayists, Scientists, Critics, Discoverers, and Editors, above named and many others, representing every department of Knowledge and Progress.

The importance of THE LIVING AGE to every American reader, as the only satisfactorily fresh and complete compilation of a generally inaccessible but indispensable current literature — *indispensable* because it embraces the productions of

### THE ABLEST LIVING WRITERS

in all branches of Literature, Science, Art and Politics — is sufficiently indicated by the following recent

### Opinions.

"THE LIVING AGE flourishes in even more than youthful vigor. It is the most valuable treasury of foreign periodical literature existing. It has become indispensable." — *New York Observer*.

"From the first it has sustained the highest character. Its readers are supplied with the best literature of the day. . . There is nothing noteworthy in science, art, literature, biography, philosophy, or religion, that cannot be found in it. . . It gives in accessible form the best thought of the age." — *The Churchman, New York*.

"It becomes more and more necessary, as well as valuable, as the field of periodical literature broadens. . . It has no peer." — *Zion's Herald, Boston*.

"It stands centrally at the head of its class, and deserves its prosperity." — *The Congregationalist, Boston*.

"Among all miscellaneous literature we know of no equal to THE LIVING AGE for variety of information, depth of interest, and purity of tone. Its pages are sufficient to keep any reader abreast with the best printed thoughts of the best of our contemporary writers. . . It is the great eclectic of the world." — *Episcopal Register, Philadelphia*.

"It stands quite at the head of its class of magazines. . . The ablest essays and reviews of the day are to be found here." — *The Presbyterian, Philadelphia*.

"It is one of the best investments of the age. . . It enables its readers to keep fully abreast of the best thought and literature of civilization." — *Christian Advocate, Pittsburgh*.

"No other periodical gives so diversified a view of current literature, not by abridgments, but by publishing entire the best essays, criticisms, discussions, short stories, and serial romances of the day. . . It is for readers of limited leisure or pursue the most convenient and available means of possessing themselves of the very best results of current criticism, philosophy, science, and literature." — *Presbyterian Banner, Pittsburgh*.

"It is simply invaluable, bringing to us as it does, week by week, the very cream of all the current literature of the day." — *The Living Church, Chicago*.

"Words commendatory of THE LIVING AGE are like adjectives applied to fine gold." — *Christian Leader, Boston*.

"It is a visitor that is always the more welcome the longer it comes." — *Christian at Work, New York*.

"The best and freshest thoughts of the day are sure of a place in its pages, and whatever there is of interest in the literary and scientific world is spread before its readers." — *Boston Journal*.

"No other periodical can compare with it in interest and value." — *Boston Traveller*.

"Every year strengthens its hold upon popular favor. Every one of its fifty-two numbers brings something which one must read to know what is being thought of and talked of. . . It is indispensable in every household where any attempt is made to keep up with the current thought of the day." — *Hartford Courant*.

"Foremost of the eclectic periodicals." — *A. J. World*.

"No reader who makes himself familiar with its contents can lack the means of a sound literary culture." — *New York Tribune*.

"It is edited with great skill and care, and its weekly appearance gives it certain advantages over its monthly rivals." — *Albany Argus*.

"It more than holds its own in the face of all rivals, and that solely on account of its intrinsic merits." — *Philadelphia Times*.

"Through its pages alone, it is possible to be as well informed in current literature as by the perusal of a long list of monthlies." — *Philadelphia Inquirer*.

"A repository of choice reading-matter presented in a form and at a cost which combine to make it one of the most popular of American publications. . . The range is a wide one, embracing history, science, fiction, travel, and every department of literature." — *Troy Times*.

"It furnishes a complete compilation of an indispensable literature." — *Chicago Evening Journal*.

"As much in the forefront of eclectic publications as at its start forty years ago." — *Cincinnati Gazette*.

"Remarkably cheap for the quality and amount of reading furnished." — *Montreal Gazette*.

"It affords the best, the cheapest, and most convenient means of keeping abreast with the progress of thought in all its phases." — *North American, Philadelphia*.

"It seems to increase in excellence as it grows older." — *Milwaukee Republican-Sentinel*.

"It is by odds the best periodical in the world. . . It has no rival; it stands alone in its excellence." — *Morning Star Wilmington, N. C.*

Published Weekly, at \$5.00 a year, free of postage.

### CLUB PRICES FOR THE BEST HOME AND FOREIGN LITERATURE.

"Possessed of 'LITTELL'S LIVING AGE,' and of one or other of our vivacious American monthlies, a subscriber will find himself in command of the whole situation." — *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*.

For \$10.50, THE LIVING AGE and any one of the four-dollar monthly magazines (or *Harper's Weekly* or *Basar*) will be sent for a year, with postage prepaid on both; or, for \$9.50, THE LIVING AGE and the *St. Nicholas* or *Lippincott's Monthly*, postpaid.

ADDRESS

LITTELL & CO., 31 Bedford St., Boston.

# PROSPECTUS

OF THE

## REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW

The MERCERSBURG REVIEW was commenced in January, 1849, and it has been published regularly ever since, except during the years 1861-1867, when its publication was suspended chiefly on account of the civil war then existing in the country. During the past thirty years it has supported the system of philosophy and theology taught in the institutions of the Reformed Church, located for a time at Mercersburg, and afterwards at Lancaster, Pa., while it has labored also in the general interest of science and literature, in common with the theological quarterlies of this and other countries. It became thus more or less identified with a school of philosophy and theology in the Reformed Church, known as the Mercersburg school. During this period of over a quarter of a century, the Reformed Church has grown into larger proportion and established other literary and theological institutions, while great progress has been made also in the theological life of Christianity and the Church throughout the world.

In dropping its old name and adopting a new one, it aims to advance with this progress and widen its sphere of usefulness. As the only theological Quarterly published in the Reformed Church in this country, it will seek to be an organ for the whole Church. So far as it is a denominational organ, therefore, it will stand on the doctrinal basis of the Heidelberg Catechism, the most irenic confession of the Reformed Churches of the Reformation, and the only confession of the Reformed Church in the United States; and it invites to its pages articles of approved literary ability from all in that Church who hold to that confession, whatever may be their minor differences in theological views.

But while it holds this denominational relationship and character, it will continue to labor in a broad catholic spirit for the interests of scientific and theological learning as these are related to the progress of Christianity in general. Taking for its motto the words of our Lord, "The truth shall make you free," it will be in sympathy with freedom of inquiry and the spirit of Divine charity, as necessary conditions for harmonizing all antagonisms. It is believed that while denominational boundaries may still be necessary in the Church, yet in the higher departments of theological inquiry, these lines of separation should be least visible. The QUARTERLY REVIEW will, therefore, be in harmony with the spirit of union which is asserting itself with growing power in the Christian Church throughout the world. While it continues to be a theological Review, it will welcome articles also of a general scientific and literary character, believing that science and religion when true to themselves, must tend freely towards harmonious agreement and union.

The REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW is edited by Thos. G. Apple, D.D. and J. M. Titzel, D.D. assisted by eminent writers in the Reformed and other Churches. It is published quarterly, in the months of January, April, July and October of each year. Each number will contain an average of 136 pages.

 The Editors do not hold themselves responsible for the views of individual writers.

### TERMS:

**THREE DOLLARS** per year; to be paid in advance.

*A free copy will be sent to any one who sends us the names of six new subscribers, accompanied with \$15.*

*Orders, with remittances per check or money order, are to be sent direct to the publishers,*

**REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,**  
907 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

**NOTICE.**—The Exchanges of the REVIEW, books for notice, and all letters relating to the Editorial Department, must be directed to Thos. G. Apple, D.D. at Lancaster, Pa. Manuscripts intended for the REVIEW, may be sent to either of the Editors.

VOL. VI.

NEW SERIES.

No. 2.

THE  
REFORMED  
Quarterly Review.

EDITORS:

THOMAS G. APPLE, D. D.,  
*Professor in the Theological Seminary, Lancaster, Pa.*

JOHN M. TITZEL, D. D.,  
*Altoona, Pa.*

THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.

VOLUME XXXI.

APRIL, 1884.

PHILADELPHIA:  
REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,  
907 ARCH STREET.

---

THREE DOLLARS A YEAR TO BE PAID IN ADVANCE.

CONTENTS OF APRIL NUMBER, 1884.

---

ARTICLE	I.—The Protestant Reformation. . . . .	157
	By <b>THOS. G. APPLE, D. D.</b>	
"	II.—Assyrian Research and the Old Testament. . . . .	178
	By <b>PROF. F. A. GAST, D. D.</b>	
"	III.—Foreordination and Fatalism. . . . .	200
	By <b>TALBOT W. CHAMBERS, D. D.</b>	
"	IV.—The Demosthenic Oath. . . . .	209
	By <b>REV. J. SPANGLER KIEFFER.</b>	
"	V.—The Perils of the Republic. . . . .	238
	By <b>REV. C. Z. WEISER, D. D.</b>	
"	VI.—Life and Immortality. . . . .	258
	By <b>A. A. PFANSTIEHL.</b>	
"	VII.—Notices of New Books. . . . .	270

Rev. CHAS. G. FISHER,  
*Superintendent and Treasurer.*

LOUIS BOETTGER,  
*Business Agent.*

---

## REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,

### Booksellers and Stationers,

907 ARCH STREET, - - - PHILADELPHIA.

Publishers of the

Books and Periodicals

of the REFORMED CHURCH in the United States.

## RELIGIOUS & THEOLOGICAL WORKS

constantly on hand or procured to order.

MUSIC BOOKS, REWARD CARDS AND SUNDAY SCHOOL  
SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS.

---

### — *SUNDAY SCHOOL PERIODICALS:* —

SUNDAY-SCHOOL TREASURY." "LESSON PAPERS"—Advanced.

"SUNSHINE." "LESSON PAPERS"—Primary. "GUARDIAN."

SCHOLAR'S QUARTERLY. SUNDAY-SCHOOL MISSIONARY.

SEND FOR SPECIMEN COPIES!


# PROSPECTUS OF THE REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW

The MERCERSBURG REVIEW was commenced in January, 1849, and it has been published regularly ever since, except during the years 1861-1867, when its publication was suspended chiefly on account of the civil war then existing in the country. During the past thirty years it has supported the system of philosophy and theology taught in the institutions of the Reformed Church, located for a time at Mercersburg, and afterwards at Lancaster, Pa., while it has labored also in the general interest of science and literature, in common with the theological quarterlies of this and other countries. It became thus more or less identified with a school of philosophy and theology in the Reformed Church, known as the Mercersburg school. During this period of over a quarter of a century, the Reformed Church has grown into larger proportion and established other literary and theological institutions, while great progress has been made also in the theological life of Christianity and the Church throughout the world.

In dropping its old name and adopting a new one, it aims to advance with this progress and widen its sphere of usefulness. As the only theological Quarterly published in the Reformed Church in this country, it will seek to be an organ for the whole Church. So far as it is a denominational organ, therefore, it will stand on the doctrinal basis of the Heidelberg Catechism, the most irenic confession of the Reformed Churches of the Reformation, and the only confession of the Reformed Church in the United States; and it invites to its pages articles of approved literary ability from all in that Church who hold to that confession, whatever may be their minor differences in theological views.

But while it holds this denominational relationship and character, it will continue to labor in a broad catholic spirit for the interests of scientific and theological learning as these are related to the progress of Christianity in general. Taking for its motto the words of our Lord, "The truth shall make you free," it will be in sympathy with freedom of inquiry and the spirit of Divine charity, as necessary conditions for harmonizing all antagonisms. It is believed that while denominational boundaries may still be necessary in the Church, yet in the higher departments of theological inquiry, these lines of separation should be least visible. The QUARTERLY REVIEW will, therefore, be in harmony with the spirit of union which is asserting itself with growing power in the Christian Church throughout the world. While it continues to be a theological Review, it will welcome articles also of a general scientific and literary character, believing that science and religion when true to themselves, must tend freely towards harmonious agreement and union.

The REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW is edited by Thos. G. Apple, D.D. and J. M. Titzel, D.D. assisted by eminent writers in the Reformed and other Churches. It is published quarterly, in the months of January, April, July and October of each year. Each number will contain an average of 136 pages.

 The Editors do not hold themselves responsible for the views of individual writers.

## TERMS:

**THREE DOLLARS per year; to be paid in advance.**

*A free copy will be sent to any one who sends us the names of six new subscribers, accompanied with \$18.*

*Orders, with remittances per check or money order, are to be sent direct to the publishers,*

**REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,**  
907 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

**NOTICE.**—The Exchanges of the REVIEW, books for notice, and all letters relating to the Editorial Department, must be directed to Thos. G. Apple, D.D. at Lancaster, Pa. Manuscripts intended for the REVIEW, may be sent to either of the Editors.

VOL. VI.

NEW SERIES.

No. 3.

THE  
REFORMED  
Quarterly Review.

EDITORS:

THOMAS G. APPLE, D. D.,  
*Professor in the Theological Seminary, Lancaster, Pa.*

JOHN M. TITZEL, D. D.,  
*Altoona, Pa.*

THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.

VOLUME XXXI.

JULY, 1884.

PHILADELPHIA:  
REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,  
907 ARCH STREET.

---

THREE DOLLARS A YEAR TO BE PAID IN ADVANCE.

CONTENTS OF JULY NUMBER, 1884.

---

ARTICLE I.—Moral Culture in the Public Schools. . . .	277
By <b>REV. THOS. G. APPLE, D. D.</b>	
“ II.—Revelation and Science. . . . .	297
By <b>REV. M. KIEFFER, D. D.</b>	
“ III.—Zwingli and the Reformation. . . . .	319
By <b>REV. JOSEPH H. APPLE, D. D.</b>	
“ IV.—Disappearing Religions. . . . .	332
By <b>PROF. CHAS. RUDY, Ph. D.</b>	
“ V.—French Republicanism the Legacy of the Huguenots. . . . .	349
By <b>REV. J. O. JOHNSON,</b>	
“ VI.—The Spirit of the Day. . . . .	372
By <b>REV. J. E. GRAFF.</b>	
“ VII.—The Ethical Character of Longfellow's Poetry. . . .	392
By <b>REV. J. MAX HARK.</b>	
“ VIII.—Notices of New Books. . . . .	404

Rev. CHAS. G. FISHER,  
*Superintendent and Treasurer.*

LOUIS BOETTGER,  
*Business Agent.*

---

## REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,

### Booksellers and Stationers,

907 ARCH STREET, - - - PHILADELPHIA.

Publishers of the

### Books and Periodicals

of the REFORMED CHURCH in the United States.

### RELIGIOUS & THEOLOGICAL WORKS

constantly on hand or procured to order.

MUSIC BOOKS, REWARD CARDS AND SUNDAY SCHOOL  
SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS.

---

#### — *SUNDAY SCHOOL PERIODICALS:* —

SUNDAY-SCHOOL TREASURY." "LESSON PAPERS"—Advanced.

"SUNSHINE." "LESSON PAPERS"—Primary. "GUARDIAN."

SCHOLAR'S QUARTERLY. SUNDAY-SCHOOL MIS SIONARY.

SEND FOR SPECIMEN COPIES!


# PROSPECTUS OF THE REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW

The MERCERSBURG REVIEW was commenced in January, 1849, and it has been published regularly ever since, except during the years 1861-1867, when its publication was suspended chiefly on account of the civil war then existing in the country. During the past thirty years it has supported the system of philosophy and theology taught in the institutions of the Reformed Church, located for a time at Mercersburg, and afterwards at Lancaster, Pa., while it has labored also in the general interest of science and literature, in common with the theological quarterlies of this and other countries. It became thus more or less identified with a school of philosophy and theology in the Reformed Church, known as the Mercersburg school. During this period of over a quarter of a century, the Reformed Church has grown into larger proportion and established other literary and theological institutions, while great progress has been made also in the theological life of Christianity and the Church throughout the world.

In dropping its old name and adopting a new one, it aims to advance with this progress and widen its sphere of usefulness. As the only theological Quarterly published in the Reformed Church in this country, it will seek to be an organ for the whole Church. So far as it is a denominational organ, therefore, it will stand on the doctrinal basis of the Heidelberg Catechism, the most irenic confession of the Reformed Churches of the Reformation, and the only confession of the Reformed Church in the United States; and it invites to its pages articles of approved literary ability from all in that Church who hold to that confession, whatever may be their minor differences in theological views.

But while it holds this denominational relationship and character, it will continue to labor in a broad catholic spirit for the interests of scientific and theological learning as these are related to the progress of Christianity in general. Taking for its motto the words of our Lord, "The truth shall make you free," it will be in sympathy with freedom of inquiry and the spirit of Divine charity, as necessary conditions for harmonizing all antagonisms. It is believed that while denominational boundaries may still be necessary in the Church, yet in the higher departments of theological inquiry, these lines of separation should be least visible. The QUARTERLY REVIEW will, therefore, be in harmony with the spirit of union which is asserting itself with growing power in the Christian Church throughout the world. While it continues to be a theological Review, it will welcome articles also of a general scientific and literary character, believing that science and religion when true to themselves, must tend freely towards harmonious agreement and union.

The REFORMED QUARTERLY REVIEW is edited by Thos. G. Apple, D.D. and J. M. Titzel, D.D. assisted by eminent writers in the Reformed and other Churches. It is published quarterly, in the months of January, April, July and October of each year. Each number will contain an average of 136 pages.

 The Editors do not hold themselves responsible for the views of individual writers.

## TERMS:

**THREE DOLLARS per year; to be paid in advance.**

*A free copy will be sent to any one who sends us the names of six new subscribers, accompanied with \$18.*

*Orders, with remittances per check or money order, are to be sent direct to the publishers,*

**REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,**  
907 Arch Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

**NOTICE.**—The Exchanges of the REVIEW, books for notice, and all letters relating to the Editorial Department, must be directed to Thos. G. Apple, D.D. at Lancaster, Pa. Manuscripts intended for the REVIEW, may be sent to either of the Editors.

VOL. VI.

NEW SERIES.

No. 4.

THE  
REFORMED  
Quarterly Review.

EDITORS:

THOMAS G. APPLE, D. D.,  
*Professor in the Theological Seminary, Lancaster, Pa.*

JOHN M. TITZEL, D. D.,  
*Altoona, Pa.*

THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE.

VOLUME XXXI.

OCTOBER, 1884.

PHILADELPHIA:  
REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,  
907 ARCH STREET.

---

THREE DOLLARS A YEAR TO BE PAID IN ADVANCE.

CONTENTS OF OCTOBER NUMBER, 1884.

---

ARTICLE I.—First Principles; or, the Philosophy of Things.	413
By REV. THEODORE APPEL, D. D.	
“ II.—On the Testimony of Language to the Unity of the Human Race.	460
By PROF. JOHN B. KIEFFER, Ph. D.	
“ III.—Freedom of Theological Thought.	487
By REV. WILLIAM RUPP.	
“ IV.—Marriage and its Abuses.	517
By REV. S. N. CALLENDER, D. D.	
“ V.—Notices of New Books.	548

Rev. CHAS. G. FISHER,  
*Superintendent and Treasurer.*

LOUIS BOETTGER,  
*Business Agent.*

---

REFORMED CHURCH PUBLICATION BOARD,  
**Booksellers and Stationers,**

907 ARCH STREET, - - - PHILADELPHIA.

Publishers of the

Books and Periodicals

of the REFORMED CHURCH in the United States.

RELIGIOUS & THEOLOGICAL WORKS

constantly on hand or procured to order.

MUSIC BOOKS, REWARD CARDS AND SUNDAY SCHOOL  
SUPPLIES OF ALL KINDS.

---

— **SUNDAY SCHOOL PERIODICALS:** —

SUNDAY-SCHOOL TREASURY." "LESSON PAPERS"—Advanced.

"SUNSHINE." "LESSON PAPERS"—Primary. "GUARDIAN."

SCHOLAR'S QUARTERLY. SUNDAY-SCHOOL MISSIONARY.

SEND FOR SPECIMEN COPIES!

The Property of  
Rev. N. J. Miller.

Loaned to  
The Philomathian Club.

Time of Keeping, 4 days.

No	Members	When rec'd	When forwarded.
7	W. J. Carlin	Oct. 15, 1884	Oct. 21 '84
1	C. L. Gramley	Oct. 21, 1884	25
2	Henry Meyer	" 6	Oct. 29 '84
3	J. W. Bright	Oct. 29	Nov. 1st 1884
4	C. C. Ziegler	Nov. 1, 1884	Nov. 3, 1884
5	G. S. Frank	Nov. 3, 1884	Nov. 7, 1884
6	Noah Corns	Nov. 7, 1884	Nov. 11, 1884
8	N. J. Miller	Nov. 11, 1884	

Bucks

8.

4

44

1

1

4